Mansfield v. Neff

• Citation: 43 Utah 258,134 P. 1160
• Decision Date: 26 July 1913
• Docket Number: 2491
• Court: Supreme Court of Utah
• Parties: MANSFIELD v. NEFF, et al

134 P. 1160

43 Utah 258

MANSFIELD v. NEFF, et al

No. 2491

Supreme Court of Utah

July 26, 1913

APPEAL from District Court, Third District; Hon. M. L. Ritchie Judge.

Action by Matthew W. Mansfield, as administrator of the estate of John Haslam, deceased, against Ann Eliza B. Neff, and others and proceedings by Ann Eliza B. Neff, and others for the distribution of the real estate of said decedent, which actions were consolidated and tried together.

Judgment for the said Ann Eliza B. Neff, and others. Matthew W Mansfield appeals.

AFFIRMED.

A. Duncan and Stanley Hanks for appellant.

APPELLANT'S POINTS.

The fact that the life tenant permits the taxes to become delinquent and the land to be sold and buys the title later does not give her a title any better than she had before, and that for her life only. (Watkins v. Green, 101 Mich. 439.) A life tenant who allows the property to be sold for taxes cannot acquire a title adverse to the remainderman or reversioner by purchase at the sale or by receiving a release of the title acquired by another. (16 Cyc. 617; Pruit v. Holly, 75 Ala. 369; Ollman v. Kellgore, 52 Iowa 36; Monger v. Caruthers, 57 Kan. 525; Stewart v. Mathney, 66 Miss. 21; Cook v. Presser, 14 Ohio Circuit Court, 137; Archer v. Brecksmidt, 5 Ohio, S. & R. E. Pl. Dec. 348, 5 Ohio N. P. 549; Lyman v. Hollister, 12 Vt. 407; Chaplain v. U.S. 29 Ct. C. I. 231; Patrick v. Sherwood, 18 Fed. Cases. No. 10804; Note 31: Varney v. Stevens, 22 Me. 331.)

The relation of a life tenant to the remainderman or reversioner is usually termed that of a trustee, or as explained by some of the decisions, a quasi trustee. He is a trustee in the sense that he can not injure or dispose of the property to the injury of the rights of the remainderman, or acquire an outstanding title for his own exclusive benefit; but he differs from a trustee of a pure trust in that he may use the property for his exclusive benefit and take all of the income and profits. In general a life tenant can do nothing during the continuance of the life estate to impair the estate in remainder, and on the other hand the remainderman cannot do any act which will affect the life estate. (16 Cyc. 617, and cases cited.) The reason for the rule is based upon the fact that the remainderman or reversioner can not, during the life of the person holding the life estate, bring an action against the person in possession to recover the possession of the premises. (1 Cyc. 1057; Wallace v. Jones, 93 Ga. 419; Rhon v. Harris, 130 Ill. 525; Barrett v. Strad. 73 Wis. 385; Mettler v. Miller, 129 Ill. 630.) The possession of the life tenant, or his vendee, during the continuance of the life tenancy, is in contemplation of law, the possession of the remainderman or reversioner. (Mettler v. Miller, 129 Ill. 630; Clark v. Parsons, 69 N.H. 147.) Thus a tenant for life cannot debar the rights of the remainderman by a surrender or a release, or by any other voluntary acts for merging the lesser estate in the greater. (Moore v. Luce, 29 Pa. 260.)

Stokes & Bagley, John M. Cannon and J. H. Hurd for respondents.

RESPONDENTS' POINTS.

It is elementary that the probate of a will is not impeachable collaterally. (1 Woerner, Adm., 498.) As to omitted children under a statute like our own it is held that the will is void and it follows, therefore, that a probate of the same must be contested in the manner provided by the statute by any such person who claims any opposition to the will. (1 Und. Wills, 329; In re Doles Estate (Cal.), 81 P. 533; Estate of Maxfield, 74 Cal. 384-5.) In the case of the Estate of Maxfield, supra, the court expressly holds that any party interested in the estate who was under no disability at the time of the admission of the will to probate cannot contest its validity or the validity of any of its terms in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate, after the expiration of one year from time the will was probated. (State ex rel. Reuf v. District Court (Mont.), 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 617, (85 P. 866); Estate of Davis, 136 Cal. 590, 59 P. 412; Tracy v. Muir, 151 Cal. 318, 86 P. 183.) The effect of the probate of the will is to vest title under it in the devisees. After probate the will may be offered as evidence of title and is admissible in ejectment. (Long v. Patten, 154 U.S. 573; Tiedeman Real Prop, 5892; State ex rel. Ruef, v. Dist. Court, supra; Adamson Eject., 71; 15 Cyc. 38; Dunn v. Peterson. 4 Wash. 170.)

Where a widow remained in occupation of her deceased husband's residence for many years, claiming ownership, it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States that her possession was adverse to the heirs. (Hogan v. Kurtz, 94 U.S. 773; Woodstock Iron Co. v. Fullenwider, 87 Ala. 584; Lowery v. Davis, (Ala.) 8 So. 79.)

An unincorporated charitable society may take and hold real estate by gift, devise, deed, adverse possession or in any other manner by which the title or possession of real property may be taken or held by any other person. (25 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 1132-3; Phipps v. Jones, 20 Pa. 260; 5 id 918; 59 Am. Dec. 708; Beach on Private Corporations, vol. 1, p. 618; Byam v. Bickford, 140 Mass. 31; Burr v. Smith, 7 Vt. 241; 29 Am. Dec. 154; Dye v. Beaver Creek Church, 48 So. Carolina 444; Burbanks v. Whitney, 24 Pick 146; 35 Am. Dec. 312; Beatty and Ritchie v. Kurtz et al, 2 Pet. (U.S.) 566; Beurhaus v. City of Watertown, 94 Wis. 617; White v. Rice, 112 Mich. 403; American Bible Society v. American Tract Society, 62 N. J. Eq. 219.) Not only may charitable societies take and hold property, but the courts will, where a bequest or conveyance is made for charitable purposes, carry out the terms thereof even though no trustee is named, and will if necessary appoint a trustee to do so, or devote the property or fund to analogous purposes. (U. S. v. Late Corp. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 136 U.S. 1; 3 Pom. Eq. Sections 1025-26; 1 Underhill on Wills, Section 71.)

FRICK, J. McCARTY, C. J., and STRAUP, J., concur.

OPINION

FRICK, J.

The plaintiff, as administrator, with the will annexed, of the estate of John Haslam, deceased, brought this action in the district court of Salt Lake County to quiet the title to certain real estate in the alleged heirs of said deceased, of whom the plaintiff claimed to be one. At the same time, in the same court, another proceeding was pending, in which a distribution of said real estate was asked by the assignee of the devisee named in the last will of decedent. The two actions were tried together, and are so presented here.

The pleadings and evidence are fairly reflected in the findings of fact made by the district court, which, in substance, are as follows:

The decedent, John Haslam, on the 25th day of December, 1882, was seised of the real estate involved in this action, which is fully described in the complaint and in the findings of fact; that said Haslam, on the day last aforesaid, died in Salt Lake County, leaving a last will and testament, and also leaving surviving him his wife, Ann Arnold Haslam, and also leaving surviving him his plural wife, Sarah Ann Haslam, the latter of whom, it is found, he married "according to the usages of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints," commonly called the Mormon church; that in said will he devised all of his real estate, about thirty acres, more or less, to said wives "for their joint use and benefit and to the survivor of them for life" and the remainder in fee to the church aforesaid. The testator also bequeathed all of his personal property (not of great value) to said wives, share and share alike.

The court further found "that the said last will and testament was, by order of the probate court of Salt Lake County, State (territory) of Utah, duly and regularly admitted to probate on the 4th day of May, 1893," and letters of administration, with the will annexed, were duly issued to the plaintiff, who qualified as such administrator "and has ever since continued to act as such;" that said Ann Arnold Haslam died at Salt Lake County in April, 1884, and said Sarah Ann Haslam died there in April, 1900; that taxes were duly levied and assessed against a portion of said real estate for the year 1892, and, the same not having been paid, said land was sold for taxes to said Sarah Ann Haslam, and thereafter, no redemption having been made for said sale, a tax deed was issued to her, whereby said land was conveyed to her; that for a number of years prior to her death said Sarah Ann Haslam, being old (nearly ninety years), infirm, and in poor health, without means of support, requiring constant attention and financial assistance, "during all of said time (the last few years of her life) the relief society mentioned in the title of this case and its members, the defendants herein, other than the defendant James M. Fisher, Jr., took care of, nursed, attended, and supported the said Sarah Ann Haslam, in consideration of which said care, attention, and support she agreed to give all of said property mentioned and described in the first finding of fact to the defendant society and its said members, and that on or about the 1st day of April, 1895, she did deliver and surrender the possession thereof to the said Ann Eliza B. Neff, Amelia Fisher, and Lydia King (defendants herein), as members and in trust for the said defendant relief society, and that ever since said date and for more than seven years next preceding the commencement of this action the said relief society and its said members have continued, without disturbance or interruption, in the exclusive possession and occupation of said premises, and have during all of said time and ever since said date, farmed, cultivated, used, and occupied, and improved said premises to the exclusion of said plaint...