Mansouri v. Colvin

• Decision Date: 31 July 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 8:14-cv-02251-JMC-JDA
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Werner Mansouri, Plaintiff, v. Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

Werner Mansouri, Plaintiff, v. Carolyn W. Colvin,Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 8:14-cv-02251-JMC-JDA

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA ANDERSON/GREENWOOD DIVISION

July 31, 2015

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the Court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a), D.S.C.¹ Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner"), denying Plaintiff's claim for supplemental security income ("SSI").² For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the decision of the Commissioner be reversed and remanded for administrative action consistent with this recommendation, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 7, 2013, Plaintiff protectively filed an application SSI alleging an onset of disability date of March 1, 2001. [R. 127-33.] The claim for SSI benefits was deniedinitially and upon reconsideration by the Social Security Administration ("the Administration"). [R. 81-89.] Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ, and on February 6, 2014, ALJ Edward T. Morriss conducted a de novo hearing on Plaintiff's claims. [R.33-56.] Plaintiff declined representation a this hearing and proceeded pro se. [R. 36.]

The ALJ issued a decision on March 19, 2014, finding Plaintiff not disabled under § 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act ("the Act"). [R. 20-28.] At Step 1,³ the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 7, 2013, the application date. [R. 22, Finding 1.] At Step 2, the ALJ found Plaintiff had a severe impairment of degenerative disc disease. [R. 22, Finding 2.] The ALJ also noted Plaintiff suffered from depression but that it no more than minimally affected his ability to work and resulted in no limitations in his activities of daily living; no limitations in his social functioning; mild limitations in his concentration, persistence, and pace; and no episodes of decompensation. [R. 22-23.] At Step 3, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the criteria of one of the impairments listed at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. [R. 24, Finding 3.] The ALJ specifically considered Listing 1.04, Disorders of the Spine. [R. 24.] Before addressing Step 4, Plaintiff's ability to perform his past relevant work, the ALJ found Plaintiff retained the following residual functional capacity ("RFC"):

After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to performmedium work⁴ as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c) and is limited to occasional climbing of ladders, ropes and scaffolds with frequent but no continuous climbing of ramps and stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling.

[R. 24-25, Finding 4 (footnote in original).] Based on his RFC, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was capable of performing his past relevant work as a sales person. [R. 28, Finding 5.] Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not been under a disability as defined by the Act since February 7, 2013, the date the application was flied. [R. 28, Finding 6.]

Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review of the ALJ's decision, and the Council declined review. [R. 1-5.] Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action for judicial review on June 10, 2014. [Doc. 1.]

THE PARTIES' POSITIONS

Plaintiff contends the final administrative determination of the Commissioner should be reversed and Plaintiff should be awarded SSI because the ALJ failed to consider the MRI and photos of his back performed by Dr. Dilip Malhotra at the International Hospital of Bahrain. [Doc. 24.] Plaintiff alleges that those hired by SSI are fully biased in favor of SSI and are downplaying the true severity of his back pain. [Id.]

The Commissioner contends the final decision is supported by substantial evidence and argues that, while the ALJ did not specifically mention the MRI, this is not a compelling argument for remand because MRIs provide no insight into a plaintiff's functional limitations and the MRI report categorized Plaintiff's condition as "mild" and did not show anything requiring surgery at the time. [Doc. 25 at 10.] Further, the Appeals Council considered theMRI and concluded it did not provide a basis for changing the ALJ's decision. [Id. at 10-11.]

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint

Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Even under this less stringent standard, however, a pro se complaint is still subject to summary dismissal. Id. at 520-21. The mandated liberal construction means only that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court "conjure up questions never squarely presented." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

Court's Scope of Review in Social Security Actions

The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla—i.e., the evidence must do more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quotingConsolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966) (citing Woolridge v. Celebrezze, 214 F. Supp. 686, 687 (S.D.W. Va. 1963)) ("Substantial evidence, it has been held, is evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion. It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance. If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is 'substantial evidence.'").

Where conflicting evidence "allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [Commissioner] (or the [Commissioner's] designate, the ALJ)," not on the reviewing court. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision). Thus, it is not within the province of a reviewing court to determine the weight of the evidence, nor is it the court's function to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner so long as the decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Bird v. Comm'r, 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012); Laws, 368 F.2d at 642; Snyder v. Ribicoff, 307 F.2d 518, 520 (4th Cir. 1962).

The reviewing court will reverse the Commissioner's decision on plenary review, however, if the decision applies incorrect law or fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning to determine that the Commissioner properly applied the law. Myers v. Califano, 611 F.2d 980, 982 (4th Cir. 1980); see also Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994). Where the Commissioner's decision "is in clear disregard of the overwhelming weight of the evidence, Congress has empowered the courts to modify or reverse the [Commissioner's] decision 'with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.'" Vitek v. Finch, 438 F.2d 1157, 1158 (4th Cir. 1971) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Remand is unnecessary where "the record does not contain substantial evidence to support a decision denying coverage under the correct legal standard and when reopening the record for more evidence would serve no purpose." Breeden v. Weinberger, 493 F.2d 1002, 1012 (4th Cir. 1974).

The court may remand a case to the Commissioner for a rehearing under sentence four or sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Sargent v. Sullivan, 941 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision). To remand under sentence four, the reviewing court must find either that the Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantial evidence or that the Commissioner incorrectly applied the law relevant to the disability claim. See, e.g., Jackson v. Chater, 99 F.3d 1086, 1090-91 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding remand was appropriate where the ALJ failed to develop a full and fair record of the claimant's residual functional capacity); Brehem v. Harris, 621 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding remand was appropriate where record was insufficient to affirm but was also insufficient for court to find the claimant disabled). Where the court cannot discern the basis for the Commissioner's decision, a remand under sentence four is usually the proper course to allow the Commissioner to explain the basis for the decision or for additional investigation. See Radford v. Comm'r, 734 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985);see also Smith v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1176, 1181-82 (4th Cir. 1986) (remanding case where...