Manti v. New York City Transit Authority, 1

• Citation: 165 A.D.2d 373,568 N.Y.S.2d 16
• Decision Date: 19 March 1991
• Docket Number: No. 1,No. 2,1,2
• Parties: Alfred J. MANTI, Andrew Manti and Manti's Transportation, Inc., Plaintiffs-Respondents-Appellants, v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants-Appellants-Respondents. ActionNEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Plaintiff-Appellant-Respondent, v. Alfred J. MANTI, et al., Defendants-Respondents-Appellants. ActionAlfred J. MANTI, Andrew Manti and Manti's Transportation, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants-Respondents. ActionNEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Plaintiff, v. Alfred J. MANTI, et al., Defendants. Action
• Court: New York Supreme Court Appellate Division

Page 16

568 N.Y.S.2d 16

165 A.D.2d 373

Alfred J. MANTI, Andrew Manti and Manti's Transportation, Inc., Plaintiffs-Respondents-Appellants, v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants-Respondents. Action No. 1.

NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Plaintiff-Appellant-Respondent, v. Alfred J. MANTI, et al., Defendants-Respondents-Appellants.

Action No. 2.

Alfred J. MANTI, Andrew Manti and Manti's Transportation, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, et al.,

Defendants-Respondents. Action No. 1.

NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Plaintiff, v. Alfred J. MANTI, et al., Defendants. Action No. 2.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

First Department.

March 19, 1991.

Evan H. Krinick, of counsel (Rivkin, Radler, Bayh, Hart & Kremer, attorneys, Uniondale), for New York City Transit Authority and its employees.

Milton S. Gould, of counsel (Jeffrey D. Buss with him on the brief; Curt Rogg-Meltzer and Shea & Gould, attorneys, New York City), for Mantis in Action Nos. 1 and 2.

Before SULLIVAN, J.P., and ROSS, ROSENBERGER and KASSAL, JJ.

ROSENBERGER, Justice.

Plaintiffs Alfred J. Manti et al. were issued a permit by the New York State Department of Transportation on December 8, 1981, authorizing them to transport individuals in vehicles capable of carrying up to fifteen passengers between the counties of Kings and New York. Plaintiffs were not permitted to solicit, pick up or discharge passengers at stops or on routes of existing bus lines or subways. Defendant New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) objected to the issuance of the permit to plaintiffs and filed a petition for reconsideration. However, on November 5, 1982, the New York State Department of Transportation adhered to its decision granting plaintiffs a permit to operate a transportation service. No further appeal was taken by the NYCTA.

Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking an injunction and damages against the NYCTA and some of its employees (Action No. 1 herein) on November 11, 1982 alleging harassment, abuse of process, malicious prosecution and deprivation of civil rights based on the NYCTA's purported actions in attempting to interfere with and prevent the operation of plaintiffs' competing transportation service. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the NYCTA police officers harassed plaintiffs by unlawfully ticketing their vehicles and delaying their passengers. The NYCTA had increased its enforcement activity against surface transportation carriers by forming a "Bus Squad" within its Police Department Task Force Unit in August of 1982, which concerned itself with "gypsy" cabs and commuter vans which "poached" passengers by soliciting them at bus stops and accepting hails. Within a six month period, plaintiffs were issued 82 summonses of which approximately fifteen resulted in a disposition of guilt. Almost half were dismissed.

The Supreme Court (Greenfield, J.) granted plaintiffs' application for a preliminary injunction on February 10, 1983, prohibiting the NYCTA from unlawfully issuing tickets and detaining plaintiffs' vans. The NYCTA thereafter instituted a lawsuit against plaintiffs in Kings County (Action No. 2), seeking a preliminary injunction precluding plaintiffs from operating their vans, on the ground that plaintiffs were operating an illegal transportation service. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was granted by order entered June 7, 1984 (Jordan, J.). The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed and the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal.

Plaintiffs seek damages based on the NYCTA's purported malicious prosecution of that action, which the Supreme Court termed frivolous and without any basis in law or fact. Plaintiffs' counterclaims were severed from the Kings County action and were joined with the New York County lawsuit. After the NYCTA launched another ticketing campaign against plaintiffs' vans in August of 1983, plaintiffs moved for an order adjudging the NYCTA in contempt for violating the temporary restraining order issued by Judge Greenfield. After a referee concluded that the NYCTA was in civil contempt for twice violating the preliminary injunction, by improperly issuing one ticket and by unduly delaying an employee of plaintiffs, the Supreme Court (Smith, J.) confirmed the referee's report and fined the NYCTA $250.

The NYCTA thereafter moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in Action No. 1 and the counterclaims in Action No. 2. By order entered January 21, 1990, the Supreme Court (Schackman, J.) denied the NYCTA's motion for summary judgment "except to eliminate certain duplication and to limit some of the issues." While concluding that plaintiffs' civil rights causes of action were viable, and that disputed facts existed warranting the denial of summary judgment, the court nonetheless denied summary judgment "except to the extent this decision limits the issues in favor of the Manti plaintiffs by making a partial and limited finding of liability in connection with disobedience of the TRO" previously issued by Judge Greenfield. The court further denied the NYCTA's motion to dismiss the amended and supplemental counterclaims asserted by the Manti plaintiffs, except that summary judgment was granted with respect to the third and fourth counterclaims since they duplicated the sixth and seventh causes of action. In a previous order entered November 15, 1989, the Supreme Court denied plaintiffs' motion for an award of interim attorneys' fees and disbursements.

On appeal, the NYCTA contends that the Supreme Court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment since the complaint failed to state a cause of action. Moreover, it maintains that the court's sua sponte grant of summary judgment to plaintiffs, finding the NYCTA liable in connection with its disobedience of the temporary restraining order (TRO), was improper since the violations of the preliminary injunction did not establish automatic liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition to its appeal challenging the denial of its motion for attorneys' fees, plaintiffs' cross appeal of the January 21, 1990 order seeks further specification as to the Supreme Court's limited finding of liability. They seek an order transforming the Supreme Court's decision into a formal grant of partial summary judgment on their sixth cause of action.

Contrary to the NYCTA's contentions, the factual allegations contained in plaintiffs' complaint were sufficient to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, we agree with defendants that by making a partial and limited finding that the NYCTA was liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on its violations of the temporary restraining order (TRO), the Supreme Court erred in sua sponte awarding partial summary judgment to plaintiffs. A full trial is necessary to determine whether defendant engaged in a persistent pattern of misconduct aimed at deterring competing transportation services.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 enables an aggrieved individual to seek a civil remedy against "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution...." Governmental units such as the NYCTA are among those "persons" whose conduct is proscribed by statute. (Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611; Simpson v. New York City Transit Auth., 112 A.D.2d 89, 491 N.Y.S.2d 645, aff'd, 66 N.Y.2d 1010, 499 N.Y.S.2d 396, 489 N.E.2d 1298). Liability is predicated upon deprivations derived from a policy or custom of the municipality (Id.). A true pattern of harassment by government officials may make out a § 1983 claim for violation of due process of law, where the municipal defendant's actions are illegal, or place a discriminatory burden on a constitutionally protected activity (Chalfy v. Turoff, 2nd Cir., 804 F.2d 20; Batista v. Rodriguez, 2nd Cir., 702 F.2d 393; Espanola Way Corp. v. Meyerson, 11th Cir., 690 F.2d 827, cert. denied 460 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 1431, 75 L.Ed.2d 791; and see, Black Jack Distributors, Inc. v. Beame, D.C.N.Y., 433 F.Supp. 1297). A complaint will survive dismissal "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his ( § 1983) claim which would entitle him to relief" (Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80, cited in Batista v. Rodriguez, supra at 397).

A protected constitutional interest exists where the state recognizes the right to operate a vehicle by issuing an operator's license (Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405; Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miller, D.C.Pa., 477 F.Supp. 299). By alleging that the NYCTA and its employees engaged in a repeated pattern of harassment in an effort to drive them out of business, a business licensed by the New York State Department of Transportation, plaintiff...