Manuel v. State

• Decision Date: 14 November 1997
• Docket Number: CR-96-0616
• Citation: 711 So.2d 507
• Parties: Ercell MANUEL, Jr. v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 507

711 So.2d 507

Ercell MANUEL, Jr. v. STATE.

CR-96-0616.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Nov. 14, 1997.

Paul D. Brown, Mobile, for appellant.

Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and Rosa H. Davis, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

COBB, Judge.

On November 21, 1996, Ercell Manuel, Jr., was convicted of murder, a violation of § 13A-6-2, Ala.Code 1975, in connection with the fatal shooting of Danny Lamar Strickland. He was sentenced to life imprisonment.

The evidence presented at trial tended to show that Manuel fatally shot Strickland during an argument that occurred in the house of a mutual friend, Kim Hill. Manuel, Hill, and two other persons were at Hill's residence when Strickland entered. Hill testified that she was involved in a sexual relationship with Manuel at the time of the shooting and that she had had a relationship with Strickland in the past. The fact that Manuel shot Strickland was undisputed. It is also undisputed that Strickland was unarmed.

Manuel's trial strategy rested on self-defense. Manuel testified that Strickland abruptly entered Hill's residence without knocking, that Strickland was hostile toward him, and that Strickland appeared to be reaching into his pants for a weapon just before he fired his gun.

Although Manuel raised three issues in his brief to this Court, our disposition of the case requires that we address only one of these issues.

Manuel contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it charged the jury as follows:

"Ladies and gentlemen, in a trial of a person for committing or attempting to commit a crime of violence, the fact that he was armed with a pistol and had no license to carry the same shall be prima facie evidence of his intention to commit said crime of violence unless the evidence which proves the killing rebuts that presumption."

(R. 332) (emphasis added). Manuel argues that this jury instruction created a mandatory rebuttable presumption that, he says, impermissibly relieved the State of its burden of proving every element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree.

The State has not cited, and we cannot find, a case involving a similar charge.

The record reflects that, during a pre-charge conference, the trial court stated its intent to give the disputed charge. The following exchange took place:

"MR. DAVIS [prosecuting attorney]: You mentioned--and I think it is a statutory provision on the business with the pistol if you don't have a permit. I think that's in the Code of Alabama, if I'm not mistaken. I'm pretty sure I've seen that before.

"But I guess it bothers me to some extent because of the way the Code puts it in terms of you may presume such and such in a criminal case when, of course, the presumptions are always the other way in a criminal case. And it bothers me that we create a [rebuttable] presumption when we talked about [rebuttable] presumption because as you recall for a long time the Court of Criminal Appeals couldn't decide exactly with the implied consent statute what the [rebuttable] presumption meant.

"And I'm just a little bit concerned with the wording of your charge when it comes to a pistol without a permit creating a presumption if the person intended to engage or commit the violent crime, but that presumption is rebuttable or whatever--

"THE COURT: That's exactly what Williams [v. State, 34 Ala.App. 410, 42 So.2d 594 (1949) ] says or Wright v. State [, 252 Ala. 46, 39 So.2d 395 (1949) ].

"MR. DAVIS: But I just wanted to bring that to the court's attention.

"THE COURT: Oh, I understand. I was not going to give it until I read the Wright case.

"MR. DAVIS: If you should decide not to give it, I'm not going to jump up--

"THE COURT: I'm going to give it. That's my decision to give it.

"MR. DAVIS: That's your decision.

"MR. JORDAN [defense counsel] I'm going to object to it.

"THE COURT: No kidding. That is what it says. They did not give the--unless evidence proves the killing rebuts a presumption in this case, and they said that's error to give that unless you give the proviso unless the evidence proves it rebuts the presumption. And this Alabama Supreme Court case has not been overturned. Let them have a chance to, okay?"

(R. 321-323.) After the jury was instructed and before it retired for deliberations, Manuel objected to the charge on the ground that it violated his right to due process.

The trial court based its charge on § 13A-11-71, Ala.Code 1975, and also on Wright v. State, 252 Ala. 46, 39 So.2d 395 (1949). Section 13A-11-71, Ala.Code 1975, which was originally enacted in 1936 (See Ala. Acts 1936, Ex.Sess., Act No. 82, p. 51) provides in part:

"In the trial of a person for committing or attempting to commit a crime of violence, the fact that he was armed with a pistol and had no license to carry the same shall be prima facie evidence of his intention to commit said crime of violence."

In Wright, the Alabama Supreme Court cited Hornsby v. State, 94 Ala. 55, 66, 10 So. 522, 526 (1892) (quoting Mitchell v. State, 60 Ala. 26, 28 (1877)), in support of its holding that it was " 'error to charge the jury as to the presumptions arising from the use of a deadly weapon, without accompanying such charge with the further statement, "unless the evidence which proves the killing rebuts the presumption." ' " Wright, 252 Ala. at 48, 39 So.2d at 396. However, the whole line of caselaw that Wright was based upon was, in turn, founded upon the premise, set out in Hadley v. State, 55 Ala. 31 (1876), that a homicide defendant bore the onus of proving that a killing was committed in self-defense.

"In Foster's Crown Law, it is said, 'In every charge of murder, the fact of killing being first proved, all the circumstances of accident, necessity, or infirmity, are to be satisfactorily proved by the prisoner, unless they arise out of the evidence produced against him; for the law presumeth the fact to have been founded in malice, until the contrary appeareth; and very right it is that the law should so presume.' The same doctrine is affirmed in all the older writers and adjudications on criminal law.

"Sir Wm. Blackstone (4 Com. 201) says: 'we may take it for a general rule, that all homicide is malicious, and, of course, amounts to murder, unless when justified, excused, or alleviated into manslaughter; and all the circumstances of justification, excuse, or alleviation, it is incumbent on the prisoner to make out to the satisfaction of the court and jury.' "

55 Ala. at 37-38.

Today, it is clear that a defendant bears no burden of proving self-defense. Vaughn v. State, 293 Ala. 365, 367-68, 304 So.2d 6, 8 (1974). "Once the issue of self-defense is raised, the State 'must prove that the accused did not act in self-defense in the sense that the State must prove a prima facie case of unjustified homicide.' " Ex parte Johnson, 433 So.2d 479, 481 (Ala.1983). Additionally, as discussed below, recent opinions, both in federal courts and the courts of this state, have addressed with disapproval jury charges that create mandatory presumptions in favor of the prosecution regarding the existence of certain elements of the offense charged.

This Court, in Beard v. State, 612 So.2d 1335 (Ala.Cr.App.1992), addressed the concerns raised by jury charges that create mandatory presumptions in favor of the State. In Beard, the appellant was accused of capital murder and had been found to be in possession of property belonging to the murder victim. Judge Patterson, writing for this Court, applied the following analysis in holding that it was reversible error to instruct the jury that the possession of property stolen during the course of a crime created a rebuttable presumption that the possessor participated in the crime.

" 'Inferences and presumptions are a staple of our adversary system of factfinding. It is often necessary for the trier of fact to determine the existence of an element of the crime--that is, an "ultimate" or "elemental" fact--from the existence of one or more "evidentiary" or "basic" facts. E.g., Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843-44 [93 S.Ct. 2357, 2361-62, 37 L.Ed.2d 380] [ (1973) ]; Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 [63 S.Ct. 1241, 1244, 87 L.Ed. 1519] [ (1968) ]; Mobile J. & K.C.R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 42 [31 S.Ct. 136, 137, 55 L.Ed. 78] [ (1910) ]. The value of these evidentiary devices, and their validity under the Due Process Clause, vary from case to case, however, depending on the strength of the connection between the particular basic and elemental facts involved and on the degree to which the device curtails the factfinder's freedom to assess the evidence independently. Nonetheless, in criminal cases, the ultimate test of any device's constitutional validity in a given case remains constant: the device must not undermine the factfinder's responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 [90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368] [ (1970) ]; Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. [684,] at 702-703, n. 31 [95 S.Ct. 1881, 1891-92, n. 31, 44 L.Ed.2d 508] [ (1975) ].

" 'The most common evidentiary device is the entirely permissive inference or presumption, which allows--but does not require--the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from the proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and which places no burden of any kind upon the defendant. See, e.g., Barnes v. United States, supra, [412 U.S.], at 840 n. 3 . ... Because this permissive presumption leaves the trier of fact free to credit or reject the inference and does not shift the burden of proof, it affects the application of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard only if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier could make the connection permitted by the inference. For only in that situation is there any risk that an explanation of the permissible inference to a jury, or its use by a jury, has caused...