Manzy W., In re

• Decision Date: 20 February 1997
• Docket Number: No. S051463,S051463
• Citation: 930 P.2d 1255,60 Cal.Rptr.2d 889,14 Cal.4th 1199
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 930 P.2d 1255, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1193, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 1815 In re MANZY W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MANZY W., Defendant and Appellant.

Page 889

60 Cal.Rptr.2d 889

14 Cal.4th 1199, 930 P.2d 1255, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1193,

97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 1815

In re MANZY W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MANZY W., Defendant and Appellant.

No. S051463.

Supreme Court of California.

Feb. 20, 1997.

William I. Parks, Nevada City, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Roger E. Venturi, Shirley A. Nelson and Ward A. Campbell, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

MOSK, Justice.

Welfare and Institutions Code section 702 provides that, in a juvenile proceeding, "[i]f the minor is found to have committed an offense which would in the case of an adult be punishable alternatively as a felony or a misdemeanor, the court shall declare the offense to be a misdemeanor or felony." In this juvenile adjudication, the superior court imposed a felony-level term of physical confinement in the Youth Authority for an offense that would, in the case of an adult, be punishable either as a misdemeanor or as a felony--a so-called "wobbler"--but did not expressly declare that it was a felony.

We granted review to determine whether the juvenile court's error requires remand for a declaration that the offense was a felony or misdemeanor and possible recalculation of the term of commitment. We conclude that it does. Under the circumstances here presented, "[w]e are compelled by the statute and decisional authority to return this case to juvenile court with directions to determine the character of the offense as required by [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 702." (In re Kenneth H. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 616, 620, 189 Cal.Rptr. 867, 659 P.2d 1156; see also In re Ricky H. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 176, 191, 178 Cal.Rptr. 324, 636 P.2d 13.) Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

I.

On August 27, 1994, Manzy W. was placed under citizen's arrest by his mother for "joyriding" in Redding after he took her car without permission. (Pen.Code, § 499b [taking a vehicle for temporary use].) He told the investigating officer that he had taken the car because he was "just trying to get her attention." He was released into her custody. At the time, he was on juvenile probation based on sustained juvenile wardship petitions alleging the offenses of receiving stolen property, in violation of Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a), and misdemeanor battery, in violation of Penal Code section 242.

On February 6, 1995, Manzy was a passenger in a car that was stopped by an officer of the Redding Police Department. When asked if he had any identification, he stated that he did not and identified himself as "John Jacob James." The driver consented to a search of the car; the officer found 2 marijuana smoking pipes, 3.3 grams of rock cocaine, 5.9 grams of methamphetamine, and $25 under the rear seat where Manzy had been sitting.

On February 8, 1995, a juvenile wardship petition was filed in the Shasta County Superior Court sitting as the juvenile court, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging possession of a controlled substance, to wit, methamphetamine, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a); sale or transportation of a controlled substance, to wit, methamphetamine, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11379, subdivision (a); false identification to a police officer, in violation of Penal Code section 148.9, subdivision (a); and use of a motor vehicle without permission, "joyriding," in violation of Penal Code section 499b. The petition referred to each of the controlled substance offenses as "a Felony." A supplemental petition, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 777, subdivision (a), alleged that he had previously been declared a ward of the court and was ordered not to use any restricted drugs, to submit to warrantless search for drugs, and to obey all laws.

On February 27, 1995, Manzy admitted the allegations concerning possession of a controlled substance and joyriding. The juvenile court found those allegations true and dismissed the remaining allegations against him.

The dispositional report prepared by the probation department stated that the maximum term of physical confinement for possession of a controlled substance as a felony was three years, while the maximum term for joyriding was one month. ¹ It recommended, inter alia, that "he be committed to Shasta County Juvenile Hall [for] 75 days with discretion given to the probation officer to release [him] in 60 days should [his] behavior so warrant with discretion to furlough the minor to Phoenix [a drug rehabilitation program] if appropriate." Although the recommendation was not for a felony-length term of confinement, the dispositional report did not indicate that the possession offense was a so-called "wobbler" or that the juvenile court could or should declare the offense to be a misdemeanor.

The juvenile court conducted a dispositional hearing on March 13, 1995. After both the prosecutor and Manzy's counsel agreed with the recommendation of the probation department, Manzy's mother interrupted the proceedings to express her disagreement with the recommendation and to request that Manzy "be ordered to participate in drug and mental health counseling." "I think there needs to be some real cause-and-effect going on. And I'm especially concerned because we're discussing him coming back to my home and, although [a] former substance abuser myself, I have almost five years and I live in a clean and sober environment and I'm really not prepared to allow--I mean, if I had a neighbor that was abusing drugs, I'd try to get them out of my neighborhood, let alone having a person in my home." The juvenile court observed that "Manzy may be a really good candidate" for LEADS, a "highly structured, intensive substance abuse program" within the confines of the Youth Authority. It found that "the mental and physical condition and qualifications of Manzy are such as to render it probable that he will benefit by the reformatory educational discipline or other treatment provided by the Youth Authority." Stating "for the record" that it had "considered, carefully, lesser alternative placements in alliance with or in consideration of In re Ricky H. 30 Cal.3d 176 [178 Cal.Rptr. 324, 636 P.2d 13]," it committed him to the Youth Authority for a maximum period of physical confinement of three years for the possession offense, and an additional one month for "joyriding." The minute order includes a finding that "the minor shall make a good candidate for the LEADS Program."

Manzy appealed. He contended that the juvenile court had erred by failing to expressly declare whether the possession offense was a felony or a misdemeanor and by committing him to the Youth Authority. The Court of Appeal found no error in commitment, but did find error in failure to declare expressly that the offense was a felony or misdemeanor and remanded for compliance with Welfare and Institutions Code section 702 and possible recalculation of the maximum period of physical confinement. The People sought review. We granted review.

II.

Welfare and Institutions Code section 702, in relevant part, provides: "If the minor is found to have committed an offense which would in the case of an adult be punishable alternatively as a felony or a misdemeanor, the court shall declare the offense to be a misdemeanor or felony."

What is not at issue is what the juvenile court must do. The language of the provision is unambiguous. It requires an explicit declaration by the juvenile court whether an offense would be a felony or misdemeanor in the case of an adult. (Webster's New Internat. Dict. (3d ed.1961) at p. 586 [defining "declare" as "to make known publicly, formally, or explicitly" "to state emphatically"]; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1494(a) ["Unless determined previously, the court shall find, and note in the minutes, the degree of the offense committed by the child, and whether it would be a felony or a misdemeanor had it been committed by an adult."]; id., rule 1488(e) ["[T]he court shall make findings on each of the following, noting in the order ... [p] ... [p] (5) In a [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 602 matter, the degree of the offense and whether it would be a misdemeanor or a felony had the offense been committed by an adult...."].)

The requirement is obligatory: "[Welfare and Institutions Code] section 702 means what it says and mandates the juvenile court to declare the offense a felony or misdemeanor." (In re Kenneth H., supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 619, 189 Cal.Rptr. 867, 659 P.2d 1156; In re Ricky H., supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 191, 178 Cal.Rptr. 324, 636 P.2d 13; Welf. & Inst.Code, § 15 [" 'Shall' is mandatory and 'may' is permissive."]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1401(b)(1) [" 'Shall' is mandatory and 'may' is permissive."].)

What is at issue is what happens if the juvenile court does not do what it must. That is, we must determine whether failure to make the mandatory express declaration requires remand of this matter for strict compliance with Welfare and Institutions Code section 702. Under our precedents, we conclude that it does. (In re Kenneth H., supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 620, 189 Cal.Rptr. 867, 659 P.2d 1156; In re Ricky H., supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 191, 178 Cal.Rptr. 324, 636 P.2d 13.)

The People argue that Welfare and Institutions Code section 702 serves a merely "administrative" purpose unrelated to any benefit of the minor and is, for that reason, "directory" rather than "mandatory." (In re Richard S. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 857, 865-866, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 819 P.2d 843.) ² We disagree.

It is true that Welfare and Institutions Code section 702 serves the collateral administrative purpose of providing a record from which the...