People v. G.C. (In re G.C.)

• Decision Date: 20 February 2020
• Docket Number: S252057
• Citation: 258 Cal.Rptr.3d 595,8 Cal.5th 1119,458 P.3d 70
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: IN RE G.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. G.C., Defendant and Appellant.

8 Cal.5th 1119

458 P.3d 70

258 Cal.Rptr.3d 595

IN RE G.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

The People, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.G.C., Defendant and Appellant.

S252057

Supreme Court of California.

February 20, 2020

Sidney Sue Hollar, San Francisco, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa A. Meth, Donna M. Provenzano and Victoria Ratnikova, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.

When a minor is found to have committed a so-called "wobbler" offense,¹ the juvenile court "shall declare the offense to be a misdemeanor or felony." ( Welf. & Inst. Code, § 702.)² The question here is whether G.C. may challenge the court’s neglect of this mandatory duty in an appeal from a later dispositional order after the time to appeal the original disposition expired. Under the current procedural posture, she may not. The court’s omission was part of the original dispositional order which became final and binding once that order was not appealed. G.C.’s failure to timely appeal deprived the appellate court of jurisdiction. There was no ongoing duty to correct the error in a later proceeding to modify placement under section 777, so as to create a cognizable error in that subsequent disposition. Although section 702 is mandatory, noncompliance did not make the original dispositional order an unauthorized sentence that could be corrected at any time.³ The appellate court correctly dismissed the appeal.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2014, two separate wardship petitions⁴ were filed against G.C. in Santa Clara County (Santa Clara; petitions A and B). They alleged three violations of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), for unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (auto theft). These offenses are wobblers. (Ibid .) G.C. admitted all three allegations, which the court found true. G.C. told a probation officer that she belonged to Kollmar Vagos Trece, a Sureño gang, and stole the vehicles to sell their parts to buy drugs.

The minute order described the offenses as felonies, as they had been charged. However, the court did not declare on the record whether they were felonies or misdemeanors, as section 702 requires. A separate box on the minute order, noting that the court had considered the question, was left unchecked.⁵ After the jurisdictional hearing, G.C. and her mother moved to Hayward. The two petitions, along with two others later admitted,⁶ were transferred to Alameda County (Alameda) for disposition.

The Alameda court accepted the transfer and held a dispositional hearing on March 13, 2015. There was some confusion whether the case was before the court for disposition on all petitions or just the most recent one. The resulting order was also less than precise as to which petitions it encompassed. The court adjudged G.C. a ward, placed her on probation, removed her from her mother’s custody, and set the maximum term of confinement at four years six months. The court did not declare whether the offenses in petitions A and B were misdemeanors or felonies, but the maximum term of confinement reflected a felony treatment. G.C. did not appeal the disposition, and eventually returned to her mother’s custody.

In October 2015 a section 777 notice to modify disposition was filed in Alameda alleging that G.C. ran away from home, violating the terms of her probation. G.C. admitted the allegation, and the matter was transferred to Santa Clara where she and her mother had relocated. The transfer was accepted. At a hearing on November 19, 2015, there was some confusion about whether G.C. had been declared a ward on petitions A and B. The court initially stated that it would "continue" G.C. as a ward in those matters, but in an abundance of caution, declared her to be so, and incorporated all probation orders from Alameda as orders of its own. Again, the court did not state on the record whether the offenses in petitions A and B were misdemeanors or felonies.

A section 777 dispositional hearing was held on December 30, 2015, and January 26, 2016. The court maintained G.C. in her mother’s custody under the supervision of the probation department, with various terms and conditions. On February 1, 2016, G.C. filed a notice of appeal from the Santa Clara dispositional order challenging "Gang Probation Conditions and Electronic Search Conditions (of minor’s cellphone, computer, and social media sites)."

On appeal, G.C. argued that the Alameda court failed to expressly declare whether the offenses in petitions A and B were misdemeanors or felonies. A majority of the court concluded that the issue was not timely raised because G.C. failed to appeal from the dispositional order on these offenses. ( In re G.C. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 110, 114, 237 Cal.Rptr.3d 783.) The majority rejected G.C.’s argument that the court’s error was " ‘ "tantamount to an unauthorized sentence" ’ " ( id . at p. 115, 237 Cal.Rptr.3d 783 ) that could be raised at any time ( id . at p. 116, 237 Cal.Rptr.3d 783 ). It expressly disagreed with the contrary decision in In re Ramon M. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 665, 101 Cal.Rptr.3d 158 ( Ramon M . ). ( In re G.C ., at pp. 112, 115–116, 237 Cal.Rptr.3d 783.) Having no cognizable issues before it, the court dismissed G.C.’s appeal. ( Id . at p. 117, 237 Cal.Rptr.3d 783.) The dissenting justice would have held that G.C. was properly before the court on a timely appeal from the section 777 dispositional order. ( In re G.C ., at p. 117, 237 Cal.Rptr.3d 783 (dis. opn. of Greenwood, P. J.).) The dissent reasoned that "the juvenile court’s ongoing failure to adhere to Section 702 constituted an abuse of discretion and resulted in unauthorized orders with respect to the subsequent disposition of G.C.’s case." ( Id . at p. 118, 237 Cal.Rptr.3d 783.)

We granted review to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

The Welfare and Institutions Code incorporates the Penal Code’s determinate sentencing scheme to set a minor’s maximum term of confinement. (See § 726, subd. (d)(1)–(4); In re Jovan B ., supra , 6 Cal.4th at pp. 816–819, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 863 P.2d 673 ; In re E.G. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 871, 881, 211 Cal.Rptr.3d 580.) In the context of wobblers, section 702 provides: "If the minor is found to have committed an offense which would in the case of an adult be punishable alternatively as a felony or a misdemeanor, the court shall declare the offense to be a misdemeanor or felony." This declaration must be made at or before disposition. ( In re E.G. , at p. 881, fn. 9, 211 Cal.Rptr.3d 580 ; Cal. Rules of Court, rules 5.790(a)(1), 5.795(a) ; see In re Manzy W. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1199, 1206–1207, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 889, 930 P.2d 1255 ( Manzy W . ).) Section 702 ’s purpose is twofold. First, it helps determine the length of any present or future confinement for a wobbler offense. ( Manzy W ., at p. 1206, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 889, 930 P.2d 1255.) Second, it "ensur[es] that the juvenile court is aware of, and actually exercises, its discretion under ... section 702."

( Id . at p. 1207, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 889, 930 P.2d 1255.)

The parties agree that neither court made the section 702 declaration. It is well established that section 702 ’s requirement is "obligatory" rather than "merely ‘directory’ " ( Manzy W. , supra , 14 Cal.4th at pp. 1204, 1207, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 889, 930 P.2d 1255 ) and requires an explicit declaration ( id . at p. 1204, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 889, 930 P.2d 1255 ). It is not sufficient that the offenses were identified as felonies in the wardship petitions and in the minute order of the jurisdictional hearing, or that they were treated as felonies for purposes of calculating the maximum term of confinement. ( Manzy W ., at pp. 1207–1208, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 889, 930 P.2d 1255 ; In re Ricky H . (1981) 30 Cal.3d 176, 191, 178 Cal.Rptr. 324, 636 P.2d 13 ( Ricky H . ).)

In Manzy W. we remanded the matter to the juvenile court to make the required discretionary finding. ( Manzy W ., supra , 14 Cal.4th at p. 1211, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 889, 930 P.2d 1255.) But in that case a timely notice of appeal had been filed. ( Id . at pp. 1202–1203, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 889, 930 P.2d 1255.) Here, G.C. did not timely appeal the dispositional order entered in Alameda for petitions A and B.⁷ Her claim of error is not cognizable in a later appeal from the January 26, 2016 dispositional order from Santa Clara in the section 777 proceeding.

A. Timeliness of Appeal

The Court of Appeal majority dismissed the appeal because G.C.’s sole challenge related to the dispositional order on petitions A and B, which was not timely appealed. G.C. counters that the appeal was timely because all petitions in a juvenile proceeding are considered one case, and a timely appeal of one petition confers jurisdiction over all petitions. She also urges that the Santa Clara court had an ongoing duty to make the section 702 declaration as part of the current disposition on appeal. The arguments fail.

A minor may appeal a judgment in a section 602 proceeding "in the same manner as any final judgment." (§ 800, subd. (a).) A dispositional order is appealable, and review on appeal encompasses the court’s jurisdictional findings. ( In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1138, 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 84 ; In re James J. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1339, 1342–1343, 232 Cal.Rptr. 456 ; cf. In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 532, 94 Cal.Rptr.3d 24, 207 P.3d 525 [discussing similar provisions of § 395, subd. (a)(1) ].) We independently review the Court of Appeal’s dismissal order. ( People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1099–1100, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 969 P.2d 146.)

Section 702 addresses the court’s obligations as to the findings and disposition on the petition. The court must: (1) hear evidence and make a finding whether or not the minor is a person described by section 300, 601, or 602; (2)...