Mapes v. Dir. of Revenue
| Decision Date | 08 November 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. WD 73303.,WD 73303. |
| Citation | 361 S.W.3d 29 |
| Parties | Daniel R. MAPES, Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Supreme Court Denied Jan. 31, 2012.
Application for Transfer Denied
April 3, 2012.
Chris Koster, Attorney General, Jonathan H. Hale and Samuel E. Buffaloe, Special Assistant Attorneys General, Jefferson City, MO, for Appellant.
Matthew D. Lowe, Jeffrey Dull, and Jason Heany, Clinton, MO, for Respondent.
Before Division II: MARK D. PFEIFFER, Presiding Judge, and VICTOR C. HOWARD and JAMES EDWARD WELSH, Judges.
The Director of Revenue of the State of Missouri (“Director”) appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Henry County (“trial court”), ordering the Director to remove the administrative revocation from Daniel R. Mapes's (“Mapes”) driving record and to reinstate Mapes's driver's license. We affirm.
Following the Director's administrative revocation of Mapes's driving privilege for his refusal to submit to a chemical test, Mapes petitioned the trial court, pursuant to section 577.041.4,1 for review of whether the arresting officer had probable cause to believe Mapes was driving a motor vehicle in an intoxicated condition. The case was submitted on a certified copy of the records of the Department of Revenue, which included Mapes's Missouri Driver Record, the Director's notice of revocation and temporary driving permit, the Alcohol Influence Report, the arresting officer's Alcohol Influence Report Narrative, and a copy of the Missouri State Highway Patrol uniform citation issued to Mapes for driving while intoxicated (“DWI”).
Though the parties disagreed about the quality of the evidence as it related to the issue of probable cause, the facts set forth in the certified documents produced by the Director are not disputed. They are as follows:
At approximately 1:00 a.m. on July 4, 2010, Sergeant W.P. Bremer (“the Officer”) met a vehicle exceeding the posted speed limit (70 miles per hour in a 60 miles-per-hour zone). The Officer turned around, overtook the vehicle, and activated his emergency lights. After about ten seconds, the driver pulled the vehicle to the shoulder. As the Officer approached the driver's door, he noticed that the driver's eyes were bloodshot. When requested by the Officer, the driver produced his driver's license and proof of insurance. The driver was identified as Mapes. The Officer asked Mapes to exit the vehicle and sit in the patrol car. The Officer observed that as Mapes walked to the patrol car, his torso was rigid and stiff. While seated in the patrol car, the Officer detected a “moderate to strong odor of intoxicants on or about” Mapes. When the Officer asked Mapes how much alcohol he had consumed during the day, Mapes replied, “Not much at all.” When the Officer asked Mapes to clarify what he meant, Mapes responded that he had consumed one beer early in the afternoon of July 3, 2010. The Officer asked why Mapes's eyes were bloodshot, and Mapes responded that he was having family issues and had been crying.
The Officer then had Mapes perform several field sobriety tests. Mapes successfully completed the One–Leg–Stand Test and the Alphabet Test. He did not touch heel to toe on steps 3 and 5 down and step 3 on the return during the Walk–and–Turn Test. During the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (“HGN”) Test, Mapes had no smooth pursuit in either eye, had distinct nystagmus at maximum deviation in both eyes, and had an onset of nystagmus before forty-five degrees in the right eye only. The Preliminary Breath Test was positive for alcohol: .08%, low breath sample.2 At 1:20 a.m., the Officer arrested Mapes for DWI and transported Mapes to the Henry County jail, where the Implied Consent Law 3 was explained to him. Mapes refused to submit to a chemical test of his breath to determine the alcohol content of his blood. He was advised of his Miranda4 rights. The Officer issued Mapes citations for speeding and DWI. Thereafter, the Director revoked Mapes's driving privileges pursuant to section 577.041, and Mapes petitioned for a trial de novo.
In its judgment, the trial court found that the Director failed to establish that the Officer had probable cause to believe that Mapes was driving while intoxicated at the time of the arrest. The trial court noted that Mapes did not have any problems with his balance, walking, or speech at any point prior to the arrest; that Mapes was able to successfully complete the One–Leg–Stand Test; and that Mapes was able to recite the alphabet when requested to do so. Although the record indicated that Mapes failed to touch heel to toe on the Walk–and–Turn Test, the trial court declined to give weight to that evidence because the record did not indicate what the Officer instructed Mapes to do during the test and whether Mapes completed the test in accordance with the instructions. Likewise, the trial court acknowledged the results of the HGN Test but gave no weight to them because the record failed to establish the procedures that were used during the administration and scoring of the test or to suggest how the trial court should interpret the results.
In its judgment, the trial court ordered the Director to remove the administrative suspension (revocation) from Mapes's driving record and to reinstate Mapes's driver's license.
The Director timely appeals.
Judicial review of an administrative revocation of a person's driver's license pursuant to section 302.505 is governed by section 302.535. At the trial de novo in the trial court, the State (represented by the Director) has the burden of proof to adduce evidence. § 302.535.1. “The [D]irector's burden of proof has two components—the burden of production and the burden of persuasion.” White v. Dir. of Revenue, 321 S.W.3d 298, 304 (Mo. banc 2010) (footnote omitted). To satisfy the burden of production, the Director must introduce enough evidence on an issue to have the issue decided by the trial court, rather than decided against the Director in peremptory ruling. Id. at 304–05. To satisfy the burden of persuasion, the Director must convince the trial court to view the facts in a way that favors the Director. Id. at 305. “When the burden of proof is placed on a party for a claim that is denied, the trier of fact has the right to believe or disbelieve that party's uncontradicted or uncontroverted 5 evidence.” Id. “If the trier of fact does not believe the evidence of the party bearing the burden, it properly can find for the other party.” Id. “[T]he party not having the burden of proof on an issue need not offer any evidence concerning it.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
The standard of review to be applied to an appeal from a trial court's judgment in a driver's license suspension and revocation case under section 302.535 is that of Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976). White, 321 S.W.3d at 307–08. We will affirm the trial court's judgment unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, it erroneously declares the law, or it erroneously applies the law. Id. (citing Murphy, 536 S.W.2d at 32). Engelage v. Dir. of Revenue, 197 S.W.3d 197, 198 (Mo.App. W.D.2006) (internal quotation omitted).
At a trial de novo following administrative revocation of a driver's license pursuant to the Implied Consent Law, the trial court is to determine only:
(1) Whether or not the person was arrested or stopped;
(2) Whether or not the officer had [r]easonable grounds 6 to believe that the person was driving a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated or drugged condition; [and]
....
(3) Whether or not the person refused to submit to the test.7
§ 577.041.4. “The Director has the burden of proving all three elements by a preponderance of the evidence.” Bruce v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 323 S.W.3d 116, 119 (Mo.App. W.D.2010). “If the court determines any issue not to be in the affirmative, the court shall order the director to reinstate the license or permit to drive.” § 577.041.5.
The Director's sole point on appeal challenges the trial court's reinstatement of Mapes's driving privileges on the grounds: (i) that there was no basis in the evidence for the trial court to disregard the HGN results, and (ii) that the evidence established that the Officer had probable cause to arrest Mapes for DWI.
The trial court concluded that the Director failed to establish that the Officer had probable cause to believe that Mapes was driving while intoxicated at the time of the arrest. “The probable cause required for the suspension or revocation of a driver's license is the level of probable cause necessary to arrest a driver for an alcohol-related violation,” and exists when an arresting officer: (i) “observes unusual or illegal operation of a motor vehicle”; and (ii) “observes indicia of intoxication on coming into contact with the motorist.” White, 321 S.W.3d at 309 (internal quotations omitted). “The level of proof necessary to show probable cause under section 302.505 is substantially less than that required to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). “Probable cause, for purposes of section 302.505, will exist when the surrounding facts and circumstances demonstrate to the senses of a reasonably prudent person that a particular offense has been or is being committed.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). “The trial court must assess the facts by viewing the situation as it would have appeared to a prudent, cautious, and trained police officer.” Id. (...
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