Maple Hts. v. Ephraim
| Citation | 2008 Ohio 4576,178 Ohio App.3d 439,898 N.E.2d 974 |
| Decision Date | 11 September 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 90237.,90237. |
| Parties | CITY OF MAPLE HEIGHTS, Appellant, v. EPHRAIM, Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Melling, Harding & Montello and John J. Montello, for appellant.
Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Jeffrey B. Lazarus and John T. Martin, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellee.
{¶ 1} In this case of first impression, we are asked to rule on the legality of a municipal ordinance that holds the parent or legal guardian of a child under the age of 18 criminally liable, in the absence of intent or action, if that child commits a delinquent act that would be considered a felony or misdemeanor if committed by an adult. Appellant city of Maple Heights charged defendant-appellee Thelma Ephraim with a violation of its "parental responsibility" ordinance after her 17-year-old son had been arrested and charged with offenses that would be felonies if committed by an adult. The municipal court declared the ordinance unconstitutional because it was vague and overbroad and conflicted with state law. The city appeals.
{¶ 2} The facts are undisputed for purposes of appeal. A police report showed that officers were dispatched to investigate a report of "a group of people fighting." When they arrived on the scene, they saw a car driven by Ephraim's son in the intersection of the street, with all four of its doors open. The occupants of the car shut their doors and drove away when they saw the police car. When the son failed to signal a lane change, the police activated their overhead lights in order to make a traffic stop. The son rapidly accelerated in an attempt to flee from the police. He drove through three stop signs before losing control of the car and sideswiping a tree. The officers stopped their car and tried to apprehend the occupants. The son fled on foot despite an officer's orders for him to stop. The officers apprehended him and took him face-down to the ground. The son resisted their attempts to handcuff him by moving his hands beneath and towards the waistband of his pants. After handcuffing him, the officers searched him and found a loaded .25 caliber semi-automatic handgun in a front pocket of his pants.
{¶ 3} The city charged Ephraim under Maple Heights Ordinance 648.20, titled "Parental Responsibility to Supervise a Minor," which states:
{¶ 4} "(a) A person commits the offense of failing to supervise a minor if: the person is the parent, legal guardian, or person with legal responsibility for the safety and welfare of a child under 18 years of age, and the child has committed a status offense,1 unruly act or a delinquent act that would be a misdemeanor or felony of any degree if committed by an adult.
{¶ 5} "(b) It shall be a defense to the offense of failure to supervise a minor if the person took reasonable steps to control the conduct of the child at the time the person is alleged to have failed to supervise.
{¶ 6} "(c) In addition to any fine or penalty imposed pursuant to this section, the court may order the person to pay restitution to a victim of the minor's conduct. The amount of restitution ordered pursuant to this section shall not exceed three thousand dollars ($3,000).
{¶ 7} "(d) Whoever violates division (a) of this section is guilty of failing to supervise a minor, a minor misdemeanor for a first offense. For a second offense, such person is guilty of a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. For a third and subsequent offense, such person is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree. The penalty shall be as provided in Section 698.02.
{¶ 8} "(e) The first time a person is convicted of an offense described in division (a), the person shall not be required to pay a fine (other than court costs) if the person successfully participates and completes a parent effectiveness program to the satisfaction of the court."
{¶ 9} Ephraim filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on grounds that the city's parental responsibility ordinance violated her right to due process and was vague and overbroad. The court heard arguments on the motion and then issued a written opinion in which it found the ordinance unconstitutional because it conflicted with state law, specifically, R.C. 2901.21(A). That section states:
{¶ 10} "(A) Except as provided in division (B) of this section, a person is not guilty of an offense unless both of the following apply:
{¶ 11} "(1) The person's liability is based on conduct that includes either a voluntary act, or an omission to perform an act or duty that the person is capable of performing;
{¶ 12} "(2) The person has the requisite degree of culpability for each element as to which a culpable mental state is specified by the section defining the offense." The court held that the ordinance allowed a person to be convicted without either a voluntary act or an omission to perform an act or duty that the person is capable of performing. The court also found that the ordinance was vague because it granted the city's prosecuting attorney too much latitude in deciding when to charge a person with violating the ordinance. Finally, the court held that the ordinance overbroadly included all parents, regardless of whether a particular parent had actual oversight of the child at the time the child committed the delinquent act.
{¶ 13} Because it is a basic principle of appellate review that we should avoid deciding questions of constitutional law if a case can be decided on nonconstitutional grounds, see Kinsey v. Police & Firemen's Disability & Pension Fund Bd. of Trustees (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 224, 225, 551 N.E.2d 989, we begin with the city's argument that the court erred by finding the ordinance to be preempted by Ohio law. The court held that the ordinance permitted the imposition of strict liability, even though it failed to specify any voluntary act or omission to act on the part of the accused.
{¶ 14} Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution (the "Home Rule Amendment") states that municipalities are authorized "to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws."
{¶ 15} An ordinance is in "conflict" with general laws when it allows that which the statute does not, and vice versa. Struthers v. Sokol (1923), 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519, paragraph two of the syllabus. See also State v. Burnett (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 419, 431, 755 N.E.2d 857. Conflicts between state and local laws are not lightly found—"in order for such a conflict to arise, the state statute must positively permit what the ordinance prohibits, or vice versa, regardless of the extent of state regulation concerning the same object." Cincinnati v. Hoffman (1972), 31 Ohio St.2d 163, 169, 60 O.O.2d 117, 285 N.E.2d 714.
{¶ 16} In Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255, ¶ 17, the Supreme Court stated:
{¶ 17}
{¶ 18} When considering whether the ordinance is an exercise of the police power, rather than of local government, we acknowledge that "[i]f an allegedly conflicting city ordinance relates solely to self-government, the analysis stops, because the Constitution authorizes a municipality to exercise all powers of local self-government within its jurisdiction." Am. Fin. Servs. Assn. v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 170, 2006-Ohio-6043, 858 N.E.2d 776, ¶ 23. In Marich v. Bob Bennett Constr. Co., 116 Ohio St.3d 553, 2008-Ohio-92, 880 N.E.2d 906, ¶ 11, the Supreme Court stated:
{¶ 19}
{¶ 20} There is nothing in the Maple Heights ordinance that suggests it is related "solely" to the city's government and internal affairs. We therefore consider whether it is validly enacted under the city's police power.
{¶ 21} The police power has been said to have originated "in the inherent need of government to impose certain restraints on the private actions of citizens for the benefit of all." (Footnote omitted.) Hodge, The Role of New Federalism and Public Health Law (1997), 12 J.L. & Health 309, 320. The rationale for the police powers is:
{¶ 22} ...
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