Maranian v. Worker's Comp. Appeals Bd.
| Decision Date | 26 June 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. F033647.,F033647. |
| Citation | 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 418,81 Cal.App.4th 1068 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Ray MARANIAN, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD and Industrial Indemnity Company, Respondents. |
Thomas J. Tusan, for Petitioner.
Justice, Brass & Zuckerman and Gail S. Taylor and Yohman, Parker, Kern & Nard and Janet M. Maus, Fresno, for Respondents.
In the published portion of this opinion we consider whether an order by the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB or Board) on reconsideration under Labor Code section 5900 is final for purposes of appellate review under Labor Code section 5950. At trial, the Workers' Compensation Judge applied the presumption of liability in Labor Code section 5402 and awarded benefits; the Board reversed and remanded for a new trial on all issues, including liability. Relying upon Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 528, 163 Cal. Rptr. 750 (Safeway), we will hold that a writ of review from the Board's order on reconsideration lies under section 5950 because the order resolved, for purposes of the compensation proceedings, a substantial issue fundamental to the employee's entitlement to benefits. For the reasons stated in the unpublished portion of the opinion, we will affirm the decision of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board.
Petitioner Ray Maranian was hired in 1983 as a field pest control advisor by J.R. Simplot, Inc. He worked from the Reedley office until 1993. In the performance of his job, Maranian was consistently exposed to agricultural chemicals, both in the warehouse and in the fields. In January 1990, he began to experience medical problems and in February was diagnosed with chronic lymphocytic leukemia. A Qualified Medical Examiner concluded the disease was work related.
On September 2, 1994, Maranian sent Simplot, via certified mail, an "Employee's Claim for Workers' Compensation Benefits." Maranian sought out-of-pocket expenses incurred in his medical care and treatment and reserved the right to collect the costs of the future medical expenses likely to be incurred as his disease progressed. The claim was addressed to Simplot's Lathrop office and was picked up at the Lathrop post office by Simplot receptionist Bonnie Moran. The return receipt bears Moran's signature, but the date of delivery is not inserted. Moran had no recollection of receiving Maranian's claim for benefits. She testified her job duties included the daily collection of the Lathrop office's mail and its subsequent sorting and distribution. Mail intended for other offices, such as the Reedley office, would be forwarded by bulk mail. Mail for Reedley was delivered by the U.S. Postal Service to the mailbox on site.
Upon receipt of Maranian's claim at the Reedley office, Susan Lynch, also employed by Simplot, prepared the employer's portion of the claim and had Mary Lou Mattison, another Simplot employee then visiting the Reedley office, sign the claim on behalf of the employer. The claim was next forwarded to the insurer, respondent Industrial Indemnity Company (Industrial Indemnity).
Mattison testified she worked at another office and normally would not have received workers' compensation claims from the southern part of the state, but she did remember, when she was in Reedley, being given Maranian's claim to sign by Susan Lynch. Mattison also testified she did not know how Maranian's claim got to Reedley from Lathrop.
No evidence established the date on which Mattison signed the claim for Simplot. September 15, 1994, is inserted on the form as the date the claim was received by the employer, the date the employer first knew of the injury, and the date the form was provided to the employee. Mattison was given this date by Lynch, but did not know whether the date referred to the receipt of the claim at Reedley or at Lathrop.
Susan Lynch testified mail was sent to Reedley from the Lathrop office, and the transit time between the offices was not extraordinarily long. She did not recall Maranian's claim or Mattison's handling of the claim in Reedley, but it was company policy that Mattison deal with all workers' compensation claims. She normally received claims via the mail. No evidence established how or when the claim was transferred from Moran to Lynch.
On September 21, 1994, Industrial Indemnity notified Maranian by letter that the company had the claim and would make a determination of compensability by December 13, 1994. On December 8, 1994, Industrial Indemnity denied the claim.
At trial, Maranian claimed Simplot's denial was untimely and invoked the presumption of Labor Code1 section 5402. Section 5402 provides as follows:
The matter was heard and submitted to the presiding Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ) on April 2, 1997. On May 20, 1997, the WCJ issued an award, finding that Simplot had not denied the claim within the 90 days specified in section 5402. The WCJ therefore applied the statutory presumption, concluded Maranian had sustained a work-related injury, and awarded benefits. Had he been allowed to testify at trial, Simplot's medical expert would have taken the position there was no reasonable medical probability of a relationship between Maranian's occupational exposure to agricultural chemicals and his leukemia.
On June 6, 1997, Simplot filed a petition with respondent WCAB seeking reconsideration of the WCJ's award in favor of Maranian. On July 11, 1997, the WCJ filed an amended award correcting an omission in the initial award. Simplot filed a new petition for reconsideration with the WCAB on July 24, 1997.
On September 22, 1997, the WCAB issued an order granting Simplot's petition for reconsideration, on the ground the record did not support the WCJ's factual finding with respect to the date Simplot received Maranian's claim, and ordered that the record be more fully developed on this issue.
Depositions of various employees at Simplot were taken and the parties returned to trial. On March 16, 1999, the WCJ issued a new award, again finding in favor of Maranian. The WCJ determined that the company's denial was untimely under section 5402 because the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence was that the claim had been received by Simplot before September 15, 1994. As a result, the WCJ again applied the statutory presumption and awarded Maranian benefits.
Simplot filed a third petition for reconsideration with WCAB, challenging the WCJ's March 16 order. On June 4, 1999, the WCAB granted the petition, vacated the order, and remanded the matter for a trial on the merits of Maranian's claim, both as to liability and benefits. The WCAB made the following specific findings:
Maranian filed his Petition for Writ of Review with this court on July 19, 1999. We issued the writ on November 10, 1999.
The WCAB decision challenged by Maranian did not decide the merits of Maranian's claim for compensation, and it is possible Maranian may succeed, at the ordered plenary trial, in proving liability and a right to the benefits he wants. Were the usual rules of civil appellate practice to apply, the WCAB's order would not be a "final," and therefore not an appealable, order. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1; Rao v. Campo (1991) 233 Cal. App.3d 1557, 1565, 285 Cal.Rptr. 691; Kinoshita v. Horio (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 959, 963, 231 Cal.Rptr. 241; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 104 Cal.App.3d at pp. 539-540, 163 Cal.Rptr. 750, dis. opn. of Elkington, A.P.J.) The well-known final judgment rule that governs general civil appeals was designed to prevent costly piecemeal dispositions and multiple reviews which burden the courts and impede the judicial process. (Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 741, fn. 9, 29 Cal. Rptr.2d 804, 872 P.2d 143.) This final judgment rule, however, has not held sway with respect to many decisions of the WCAB, and section 5950, which authorizes a disaffected party in a compensation proceeding to petition for a writ of review from WCAB "order[s], decision[s] or award[s]," has not been found by the few pertinent cases to preclude review of selected interlocutory decisions of the Board. (See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 104 Cal.App.3d at p. 531, 163 Cal.Rptr. 750; Graham v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 499, 503, 258 Cal.Rptr. 376; Kosowski v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 632, 636, 216 Cal. Rptr. 280.)
Given the interim nature of the order in issue here and what we perceive to be a paucity of relevant case law, we directed the parties to file supplemental briefing on the question whether the WCAB's June 4, 1999 order was one to which section 5950 applied. We will hold that it is.
Section 5950 provides:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial