March v. Bricklayers' & Plasterers' Union No. 1

• Decision Date: 17 April 1906
• Citation: 63 A. 291,79 Conn. 7
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: MARCH v. BRICKLAYERS' & PLASTERERS' UNION NO. 1 et al.

63 A. 291

79 Conn. 7

MARCH

v. BRICKLAYERS' & PLASTERERS' UNION NO. 1 et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 17, 1906.

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Hartford County; John Coats, Judge.

Action by George L. March against the Bricklayers' and Plasterers' Union No. 1 of Connecticut and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

The plaintiff conducted a brickyard and manufactured and sold brick. The defendant union was a voluntary association composed of journeymen, bricklayers, and plasterers. The defendant Butler was a member of the union and its financial secretary and business agent. As business agent it was made his duty, among other things, to see that members of the union did no work in violation of its requirements, and to ascertain and report to the union all brick manufacturers who furnished brick to any "boss mason" who was proscribed by the union as "unfair" as being the employer of other than union bricklayers and plasterers, and generally to act as the agent of the union in securing obedience to its orders and compliance with its demands. The plaintiff was not a member of the union, nor an employer of members of it, neither was he under any contractual or other obligation to it save such obligation as one owes to other members of society. The defendant union had voted that its members would refuse to handle brick from any brickmaker who should furnish brick to "unfair" bosses. By authority of the union, notice of this action had been mailed to the plaintiff and to substantially all other brickmakers in the vicinity of Hartford. It had also been voted that the two secretaries prepare and cause to be printed cards having thereon the names of those "boss masons" who were by the union classed as "fair" and those classed as "unfair." These had been so prepared, accepted by the union, and distributed. The plaintiff received said notice and one of said cards was delivered to him by Butler. A few months subsequently the plaintiff sold and delivered brick to a "boss mason" who was classed as "unfair." Thereupon the union voted "to place damages of $100 against said March for violating agreement with Bricklayers' Union." There was no such agreement. Shortly afterward the plaintiff sold and began to deliver to one Flynn, a "fair" boss mason, brick for the construction of a building upon which the latter was doing the brickwork. After a few loads had been so delivered the defendant Butler, acting for the union in his said capacity as business agent, visited this building and had a talk with the plaintiff and Flynn. The penalty imposed upon the plaintiff was then discussed, and Butler then either expressly said to the plaintiff and Flynn or intended from what he did say that they should understand and they did understand that he, "Butler, acting for the union and the union acting through him, could and would through their control over Flynn's workmen, then had and to be exercised by Butler, prevent Flynn from using brick bought by him from March, by immediately stopping Flynn's workmen laying the brick, unless Flynn would agree to become surety for the payment by March to the union of the $100 demanded by it from him, as aforesaid," unless the union should at its next meeting afford the plaintiff some relief. To tills Flynn agreed and the plaintiff continued to make deliveries. The plaintiff appeared at this meeting and was accorded a hearing. A motion "to reduce the fine" to $50 was lost and Butler was instructed to collect it. The following day Butler met the plaintiff and Flynn, told them that the union held out for the $100, and added that they were going to have it. From what he said then "he intended that March and Flynn should understand and believe, and they did understand and believe, that Butler had instructions from the defendant union to stop the bricklayers who were working for Flynn from work for him upon said building, and to cause them to strike, unless March or Flynn at once paid the hundred dollars demanded by the defendant union, and that he (Butler) could and would do as he represented that we was instructed to do." Flynn and March both protested against the payment, but, influenced by the aforesaid representations of Butler, Flynn, who was indebted to March for brick, paid Butler the $100 with the assent of March and charged the same to March on his account, and said money was paid, as aforesaid, to save greater loss threatened, as aforesaid, to the business of March and Flynn, and for that reason only. Butler paid over the money to the defendant union at its next meeting. Demands for the return of the money were made on the defendants and refused. The complaint seeks the recovery of the money so paid.

Joseph P. Tuttle, for appellants. Walter S. Schutz and Stanley W. Edwards, for appellee.

PRENTICE, J. (after stating the facts). The complaint alleges that the defendants conspired, combined, and confederated with each other and other persons to extort, demand, and obtain from the plaintiff the sum of $100; that in pursuance of that conspiracy and combination they threatened to injure the plaintiff in his property and business, unless said sum was paid; and that by reason of said conspiracy and combination, and by reasons of said threats, intimidation, and coercion, and by such means alone said sum was paid by the plaintiff to the defendants. It is found that the payment was made, that the combination between the members of the defendant union to secure that payment and Butler's agency for it existed, and that...