Marchant v. City of Little Rock, Ark.

• Decision Date: 22 February 1983
• Docket Number: No. LR-C-80-156.,LR-C-80-156.
• Citation: 557 F. Supp. 475
• Parties: Winnie MARCHANT, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS; Walter E. Simpson, Chief of Police; and Albert Renefield, Chief Jail Administrator, All In Their Official and Individual Capacities, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas

557 F. Supp. 475

Winnie MARCHANT, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS; Walter E. Simpson, Chief of Police; and Albert Renefield, Chief Jail Administrator, All In Their Official and Individual Capacities, Defendants.

No. LR-C-80-156.

United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, W.D.

February 22, 1983.

Richard Quiggle, Little Rock, Ark., for plaintiff.

Hugh Brown, Asst. City Atty., Little Rock, Ark., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WOODS, District Judge.

The Pleadings

The complaint based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleges that plaintiff was an inmate of the Little Rock City Jail from September 5-27, 1979. She sued the City of Little Rock, the Mayor, City Manager, Chief of Police, and jail administrator. She claimed the City had a history of indifference to and neglect of jail prisoners and that the other defendants had neglected to properly supervise jail personnel so that medical attention to prisoners was inadequate. The gravamen of plaintiff's individual complaint was that she had not been given her prescribed medication on a regular basis, that some medicine was not given at all, and that she was not given proper medical care during a period of illness. She sought money damages and injunctive relief. During the trial she voluntarily dismissed her case against the Mayor and City Manager.

Rulings on Motions

At the close of the plaintiff's case, the defendants moved for a dismissal of her case against Albert Benefield. The undisputed proof showed that Mr. Benefield had retired as jail administrator six months before the incidents alleged in the complaint and that he had no part in anything transpiring at the city jail in September of 1979. Plaintiff does not seriously question Benefield's entitlement to a dismissal but moves to substitute Lt. Claude Campbell, the actual jail administrator, as a party defendant. In paragraph B(4) of the complaint (filed April 4, 1980) Benefield is described as chief jail administrator. Paragraph (B) entitled "Parties" describes the identity, address and position of the plaintiff (par. 2) and the five defendants (pars. 3, 4 and 5).

In paragraph III of the answer, the defendants admitted paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of plaintiff's complaint. The answer was not correct as to Benefield. The undisputed proof is that Lt. Claude Campbell was the jail administrator during the pertinent period. Plaintiff's counsel says that he was "blindsided" and misled by this answer and was not aware of the mistake until the trial. The answer was filed for all the named defendants on April 24, 1980 by Robert Taylor, Assistant City Attorney, for Jack Magruder, III, City Attorney of Little Rock, Arkansas. Plaintiff's position would be deserving of much more sympathy if defendants had not identified Lt. Campbell as the jail supervisor in answers to interrogatories by defendants filed with the Clerk on May 15, 1980 and served on plaintiff's counsel on May 13, 1980.

This case was set for trial on February 1983 by an order dated October 25, 1982. Between the date the answers to interrogatories were served on plaintiff's counsel and the trial date, a period of two years and nine months elapsed. Until the trial was already in progress, there was no attempt to amend and substitute Lt. Campbell as a party defendant. The problem with such a substitution is that the three-year statute of limitations had already run as to any claim against Lt. Campbell. Glassoe v. Howell, 431 F.2d 863 (8th Cir.1970). He had not been served with process, had no opportunity to hire counsel, and had no intimation whatsoever that he would be a party in a trial which had already begun.

Rule 15(c) Fed.R.Civ.P. covers the relation back of amendments to the pleadings. It provides as follows:

Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him.

There is not one iota of proof that the requirements of 15(c) were met as to the substitution of Lt. Campbell as a party defendant. In fact there was no attempt to make such proof. Both the text of the rule and the case law is adverse to plaintiff's position. See Cohn v. Federal Security Adm., 199 F.Supp. 884 (W.D.N.Y.1961); Cunningham v. U.S., 199 F.Supp. 541 (W.D. Mo.1958); Hall v. Department of HEW, 199 F.Supp. 833 (S.D.Tex.1960); Sandridge v. Folsom, 200 F.Supp. 25 (M.D.Tenn.1959). These cases followed the decisions of the Supreme Court in Davis v. L.L. Cohen & Co., 268 U.S. 638, 45 S.Ct. 633, 69 L.Ed. 1129 (1925) and Mellon v. Arkansas Land & Lumber Co., 275 U.S. 460, 48 S.Ct. 150, 72 L.Ed. 372 (1928). After the decisions in the above cited U.S. District Court cases interpreting Rule 15(c), the Rule was amended in 1966 to provide for a relation back of amendments if certain conditions were met before the statute of limitations had expired. Here these conditions were not met. "Indeed, the very purpose of the 1966 amendment to Rule 15(c) is the protection of the added party's rights by enumerating the conditions that must be satisfied before relation back of the amendment will be allowed." Travelers Indemnity Co. v. U.S., 382 F.2d 103, 106 (10th Cir.1967). The Court of Appeals of this Circuit has held that the requirements of Rule 15(c) must be met before a party can be added after the statute of limitations has expired. Gridley v. Cunningham, 550 F.2d 551, 552-53 (8th Cir.1977). As is pointed out in a leading treatise, Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1498 (1981 Pocket Part):

In order for an amendment adding a party to relate back under Rule 15(c), the party to be added must have received notice of the action before the statute of limitation has run. Otherwise, the deprivation of the new party's right to invoke a statute of limitation defense might raise a question of procedural due process.

Nor is plaintiff assisted by Rule 25(d)(1) because Benefield was not a party to this suit at the time he retired. He had retired more than a year before the suit was filed. In his post-trial brief, plaintiff argued that Rule 15(b) is applicable to this issue. Such argument is without merit. It is clear from the text of the Rules above cited and from the above authorities that plaintiff's motion to amend her pleadings during the trial and to substitute Lt. Claude Campbell as a party defendant instead of Albert Benefield must be denied. The defendants' motion to dismiss Albert Benefield, which was made and taken under advisement at the close of plaintiff's case, is hereby granted. Plaintiff does not seriously contend that Benefield should remain in the case. Regardless of the pleadings, there is no proof that he had anything whatsoever to do with the incidents of which plaintiff complains. We feel obliged to point out that even if plaintiff had prevailed on the procedural point discussed, supra, it is apparent from the findings of fact and conclusions of law hereinafter set forth that she would have lost her case on the merits. Success on the amendment question in the case is not determinative of defendants' entitlement to judgment in their behalf.

Findings of Fact

1. The plaintiff, Winnie Marchant, is a citizen of the United States and a resident of Pulaski County, Arkansas.

2. The City of Little Rock, Arkansas is a municipality organized and existing under the laws of Arkansas.

3. Walter E. "Sonny" Simpson is the Chief of the Little Rock Police Department, which is located at 700 West Markham, Little Rock, Arkansas.

4. Albert Benefield was not in charge of administration of the Little Rock City Jail at the time this lawsuit was filed on April 4, 1980; but rather he was succeeded by Lt. Claude Campbell who was the jail supervisor during plaintiff's incarceration in September, 1979.

5. The case of Wilburn v. Simpson, et al., LR-C-78-137 and the Consent Judgment that was based upon a stipulated "settlement agreement" entered into by the parties, through their respective attorneys, on September 28, 1979 has no relevance to this case.

6. At approximately 16:15 hours on September 6, 1979, plaintiff was arrested by officers of the Little Rock Police Department at the North Little Rock City Jail.

7. On September 6, 1979, after arrest on the said warrant, the plaintiff was transported to the Little Rock City Jail.

8. On September 7, 1979, plaintiff was brought before the Little Rock Municipal Court (Traffic Division) for a plea to the charges against her. Plaintiff's statements to the Court were construed as a "not guilty" plea.

9. On September 7, 1979 the Judge of the Little Rock Municipal Court (Traffic Division) set the matter for trial on September 27, 1979 and notified plaintiff of the time and date.

10. The plaintiff did not obtain bail for herself from September 7, 1979 through September 27, 1979. She remained in the Little Rock City Jail during that period of time.

11. On September 27, 1979 plaintiff was tried before the Little Rock Municipal Court (Traffic Division) on the charges for which she was arrested.

12. The plaintiff was released from the Little Rock City Jail at 12:00 hours on September 27, 1979.

13. During plaintiff's stay in the Little Rock City Jail from September 6, 1979 through September 27, 1979 the plaintiff was given those prescribed drugs shown on Plaintiff's Exhibits 4 and 4A at the time and on the dates shown on the Exhibits and by the...