Marcott v. State
| Decision Date | 29 May 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 3-040/02-0035.,3-040/02-0035. |
| Parties | DOMINICK RONALD MARCOTT, Applicant-Appellant, v. STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
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v.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, William J. Pattinson, Judge.
Postconviction relief petitioner, Dominick Ronald Marcott, challenged the method of calculating credit for time spent in county jails prior to commencing consecutive prison sentences. AFFIRMED.
Jeffrey Lipman and Charles Hendricks of Lipman Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon Hall, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen Holmes, County Attorney, and James Scheetz, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Huitink, P.J., and Hecht, J., and Brown, S.J.*
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BROWN, S.J.
The issue in this postconviction relief action is the proper method of calculating the credit for time spent in jail prior to the commencement of multiple consecutive prison sentences. The petitioner, Dominick Ronald Marcott, contends each of the sentences he received should be credited with the amount of time spent in jail following arrest for that offense and prior to incarceration by the Iowa Department of Corrections (DOC). The State's position is that he should be credited once with the total amount of jail time against the combined consecutive sentences. We believe the State's position is correct and therefore affirm.
I. Background facts and proceedings.
In May 1998 and November 1998, following guilty pleas, Marcott was sentenced on a total of six counts in three separate cases to two concurrent prison terms and four consecutive prison terms.1 The concurrent terms were for two years and one year. Following that, consecutive five, two, one, and one year terms were imposed. Ultimately, it was determined these sentences would be considered one eleven-year term of imprisonment under Iowa Code section 901.8.
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Before being received by the DOC on October 29, 1999 to commence serving the sentences, Marcott was in and out of jail in Story County and Polk County, Iowa on these charges and also in Rock Island, Illinois on unrelated charges in that state. During that period he spent a total of 146 days in the Story and Polk County jails and 100 days in the Rock Island jail. The State now agrees he should receive credit for the 100 days in Rock Island, but the amount of credit for the Iowa jail time is disputed. Marcott understandably wishes to be credited for the maximum county jail time available against his prison incarceration.
The problem arises because the jail time on the various charges overlaps. Marcott contends he should receive credit for the amount of time he spent in the county jails against each individual sentence for all periods he was detained beginning on the day he was arrested on each charge until he was received by the DOC.2 In his brief Marcott calculates he should receive 247 days credit
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against the first case, AGCR025909; 240 days credit against the second case, OWCR026676; and 202 days against the third case, FECR026854.
The DOC calculated the allowable credit to be 135 days and this was the amount apparently incorporated into the sentence. See Iowa Code § 901.6. Marcott commenced this postconviction relief action under Iowa Code chapter 822, alleging his sentences were illegal in that he was not given proper jail credit and was therefore illegally incarcerated. Challenges to illegal sentences are not subject to ordinary error preservation rules. Tindell v. State, 629 N.W.2d 357, 358 (Iowa 2001); Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(5) (illegal sentence may be corrected at any time). The postconviction court calculated the credit to be 246 days (which includes the 100 days in the Illinois jail, as agreed) to be applied to the aggregated eleven-year prison term, and this appeal followed.
II. Discussion.
A. Statutory basis. The resolution of this problem is a matter of statutory interpretation. Thus, "the ultimate goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature." Wellsburg-Steamboat Rock Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Iowa Dep't of Ed., 523 N.W.2d 749, 751 (Iowa 1994).
We consider not only the language of the statute, but also its subject matter, the object sought to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, underlying policies, remedies provided, and the consequences of various interpretations. We will not construe a statute in a way that would produce impractical or absurd results. Finally, when searching for legislative intent, we look at the whole statute and not the separate parts.
United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Acker, 541 N.W.2d 517, 519 (Iowa 1995).
The rules of statutory construction come into play only if the applicable statutes create an ambiguity. Iowa West Racing Ass'n v. Racing & Gaming, 546
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N.W.2d 898, 900 (Iowa 1996). Ambiguities may arise when two reasonable minds might disagree on the meaning of a specific term, or on the overall meaning of a statute when its provisions are considered altogether. Miller v. Marshall County, 641 N.W.2d 742, 748 (Iowa 2002). However, if the meaning of the statute is clear on its face, statutory construction is unnecessary. Iowa West, 546 N.W.2d at 900.
The relevant parts of those statutes bearing on the problem are set forth below. The term "good conduct time" has now been replaced by "earned time," but we will quote the statutes as they were in 1997.3 The italicized parts are relied on by Marcott in support of his position.
Respecting consecutive sentences Iowa Code section 901.8 provides:
If a person is sentenced for two or more separate offenses, the sentencing judge may order the second or further sentence to begin at the expiration of the first or succeeding sentence. . . . If consecutive sentences are specified in the order of commitment, the several terms shall be construed as one continuous term of imprisonment.
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Iowa Code § 901.8 (emphasis added). The application of this section resulted in the combined eleven-year term for Marcott.
Iowa Code section 903A.5 first authorizes credit for good conduct time earned and not forfeited that will reduce the length of the sentence. It then also provides for similar credit for jail time. It states in relevant part:
An inmate shall be deemed to be serving the sentence from the day on which the inmate is received into the institution. However, if an inmate was confined to a county jail or other correctional or mental facility at any time prior to sentencing, or after sentencing but prior to the case having been decided on appeal, because of failure to furnish bail or because of being charged with a nonbailable offense, the inmate shall be given credit for the days already served upon the term of the sentence.
Iowa Code § 903A.5 (emphasis added).
Section 903A.7 deals with credit for good conduct time for consecutive sentences. It states:
When an inmate is committed under several convictions with consecutive sentences, they shall be construed as one continuous sentence in the granting or forfeiting of good conduct time.
Iowa Code § 903A.7 (emphasis added).
B. Analysis. Marcott contends the phrase "term of imprisonment" in section 901.8 has a different meaning than the phrase "term of sentence" in section 903A.5. He argues since section 903A.5 provides credit for jail time which reduces the "term of sentence," while...
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