Marcum v. Barry
Decision Date | 19 December 1991 |
Docket Number | No. 91AP-734,91AP-734 |
Citation | 76 Ohio App.3d 536,602 N.E.2d 419 |
Parties | MARCUM, Appellee, v. BARRY, Admr., Appellant; Columbus Auto Parts, Appellee. * |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
John R. Workman, Columbus, for appellee Harmon Marcum.
Lee I. Fisher, Atty. Gen., and Gerald H. Waterman, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant Administrator, Bureau of Workers' Compensation.
McNamara & McNamara and Mark W. Bean, Columbus, for appellee Columbus Auto Parts.
Patricia K. Barry, the Administrator of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas remanding an action initiated as an appeal from the Industrial Commission to the Industrial Commission for readjudication of the factual issues utilizing the legal standard as determined by the trial court. Appellant raises a single assignment of error, as follows:
"The trial court erred in remanding the issue of the merits of this workers' compensation claim back to the Industrial Commission for an administrative readjudication under the standard of law established in Schell v. Globe Trucking [, Inc.] (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 1 ."
The basic issue before us is application of R.C. 4123.519 and the procedure and jurisdiction to be exercised by the court of common pleas in an appeal to it from the Industrial Commission under such section. Specifically, the issue is whether the entire case is before the court of common pleas de novo so that all factual and legal issues are to be resolved by that court, or whether the appeal is an error proceedings whereby the common pleas court, when it finds legal error, may remand the matter to the Industrial Commission for redetermination of the factual issues.
Neither the trial court nor appellee makes any analysis of a basis for remand other than to cite the case of Borbely v. Prestole Everlock, Inc. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 67, 565 N.E.2d 575, wherein the Supreme Court apparently remanded a case to the Industrial Commission, rather than to the trial court for application of the appropriate law. Borbely, however, is not authority for the position taken by the trial court, the issue being neither discussed nor determined by the Supreme Court in Borbely. See the first paragraph of the syllabus of State ex rel. Gordon v. Rhodes (1952), 158 Ohio St. 129, 107 N.E.2d 206. Whatever may be the reason that the last paragraph of the decision of Borbely without further elucidation refers to a remand to the Industrial Commission upon an apparent R.C. 4123.519 appeal, nothing in Borbely suggests that, if some error of law be found, a common pleas court may avoid the responsibility of determining the merits of the matter de novo as mandated by R.C. 4123.519 by instead remanding the matter to the Industrial Commission. Most certainly, the syllabus of Borbely does not so suggest. Although we should not be and are not unmindful of the suggestion of the trend of the law that may be set forth in a Supreme Court opinion, but not included in the syllabus, we also must look to Rule 1(B) of the Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions, which states that:
"The syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion states the controlling point or points of law decided in and necessarily arising from the facts of the specific case before the Court for adjudication."
Under the circumstances, the reference to the remand being to the Industrial Commission, without further elucidation, should be considered dicta rather than the promulgation of a rule of law with respect to the application of R.C. 4123.519.
The jurisdiction of, and procedure to be followed, by the court of common pleas in an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission or a staff hearing officer is set forth in R.C. 4123.519, which provides in pertinent part:
Although labeled an appeal and commenced initially by the filing of a notice of appeal, the action in the common pleas court under R.C. 4123.519 seeking a redetermination of a decision of the Industrial Commission is not a traditional error proceedings but, instead, is somewhat similar to the law and fact appeal formerly available to the court of appeals from some trial court decisions but abolished by App.R. 2. R.C. 4123.519 contemplates not only a full and complete de novo determination of both facts and law but also contemplates that such determination shall be predicated not upon...
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Caron Jones and Laura Jones v. Multi-Color Corp., and Wesley Trimble, Administrator, Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation, and Industrial Commission of Ohio, 95-LW-4936
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