Jones v. Multi-Color Corp., MULTI-COLOR

• Decision Date: 29 December 1995
• Docket Number: MULTI-COLOR,No. C-940722,C-940722
• Citation: 670 N.E.2d 1051,108 Ohio App.3d 388
• Parties: JONES et al., Appellants, v.CORPORATION et al., Appellees. *
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 388

108 Ohio App.3d 388

670 N.E.2d 1051

JONES et al., Appellants, v. MULTI-COLOR CORPORATION et al., Appellees. ^*

No. C-940722.

Court of Appeals of Ohio First District, Hamilton County.

Decided Dec. 29, 1995.

Clements, Mahin & Cohen, and William E. Clements, Cincinnati, for appellants.

Keating, Muething & Klekamp, and Robert W. Maxwell II, Cincinnati, for appellee Multi-Color Corporation.

William D. Haders, Cincinnati, for appellees Wesley Trimble and Industrial Commission.

BETTMAN, Judge.

This is a workers' compensation case involving entitlement to death benefits. Raymond Jones was employed by defendant-appellee Multi-Color Corporation. During an employer-sponsored fitness day, Jones collapsed and died of a heart attack after running a foot race. Caron and Laura Jones, his wife and daughter and plaintiffs-appellants herein, filed a workers' compensation claim seeking death benefits as the result of Jones's death. The claim was denied at all levels administratively. The Joneses properly filed a de novo appeal pursuant to R.C. 4123.519 (now R.C. 4123.512), naming the Administrator of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation, the Industrial Commission and Multi-Color as defendants. Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed. The trial court granted summary judgment to all defendants. This appeal followed.

All parties agree that the facts in this case are undisputed. Jones was an employee of Multi-Color. Caron and Laura Jones were his dependents. Jones elected to participate in his employer's fitness-day program. Before doing so, he signed a waiver form entitled "Waiver of Workers' Compensation Benefits for a Voluntary Participant in an Employer-Sponsored Recreation or Fitness Program/Activity" ("the waiver"). The waiver, which was on a form obtained from the Industrial Commission for this purpose, reads as follows:

"The undersigned declares that he or she is a voluntary participant in the employer's sponsored recreation fitness activity(s) listed above and hereby waives and relinquishes all rights to Workers' Compensation benefits under Chapter 4123 of the Revised Code for any injury or disability incurred while participating on an annual basis in the listed activity(s)."

Normally, an injury, occupational disease, or death of an employee occurring in the course of and arising out of employment is compensable exclusively under the workers' compensation system. Waller v. Mayfield (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 118, 121, 524 N.E.2d 458, 461.

An injury for workers' compensation purposes is defined in R.C. 4123.01(C) as:

"any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of the injured employee's employment."

Further, as a general rule, an agreement by an employee to waive his or her rights to workers' compensation benefits is invalid. R.C. 4123.80.

Over the years, the subject of injuries received during employer-sponsored recreational activities was often litigated. Courts struggled in determining whether such injuries were "received in the course of, and arising out of the injured employee's employment." ¹ Apparently in response to the large number of employer challenges to compensation for recreational injuries and the employers' desire to continue such activities, in 1986, the legislature enacted two statutes to address the problem. Both statutes are exceptions to the general rules allowing for workers' compensation. R.C. 4123.01(C)(3) provides that an "injury" for workers' compensation purposes does not include:

"Injury or disability incurred in voluntary participation in an employer-sponsored recreation or fitness activity if the employee signs a waiver of his rights to compensation or benefits under this chapter prior to engaging in the recreation or fitness activity."

R.C. 4123.80(B) provides:

"An employee may waive his rights to compensation or benefits as authorized pursuant to division (C)(3) of section 4123.01 of the Revised Code."

The first statute, R.C. 4123.01(C)(3), provides that if an employee signs a waiver, he cannot suffer an injury that is compensable under the workers' compensation system at an employer-sponsored recreation or fitness event. The second statute, R.C. 4123.80(B), recognizes that an employee may suffer an otherwise compensable injury at an employer-sponsored recreation or fitness event, but by virtue of his voluntary participation and his signing of the waiver, he waives his rights to this compensation in order to participate.

The sole basis of the administrative rulings denying benefits, and the argument now urged upon us by appellees, was that Jones signed a waiver contemplated by the statute, and that because of the express provisions of R.C. 4123.01(C)(3), all such injuries by definition are not in the course of or arising out of employment, and therefore are not compensable injuries under the workers' compensation system. Without a compensable injury to Jones, his dependents could not recover death benefits. The trial court apparently agreed and granted summary judgment to all defendants. ²

In their first assignment of error, appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to all appellees herein. They advance several arguments in support of their position, all challenging the effect of the waiver on their entitlement to death benefits. ³

The resolution of this case depends on the interpretation of the two code sections authorizing the waiver, R.C. 4123.01(C) and 4123.80(B), and on the effect of the waiver on appellants' rights.

We do not agree with appellees that by virtue of R.C. 4123.01(C)(3), Jones's injury is not in the course of or arising out of employment. If we were to allow this interpretation, which would remove such injuries from the workers' compensation system, employees injured in recreational activities could sue their employers for common-law negligence, and in the event of a fatal injury, dependents could bring wrongful death claims. Such an interpretation is completely at odds with the entire workers' compensation scheme. " * * * The Act [R.C. Chapter 4123] operates as a balance of mutual compromise between the interests of the employer and the employee whereby employees relinquish their common law remedy and accept lower benefit levels coupled with the greater assurance of recovery and employers give up their common law defenses and are protected from unlimited liability * * *." Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 608, 614, 23 O.O.3d 504, 508, 433 N.E.2d 572, 577. Further, such an interpretation conflicts with R.C. 4123.74, which furthers the goal of the workers' compensation system by specifically providing immunity to complying employers from common-law liability for "any injury, occupational disease, or bodily condition, received or contracted by an employee in the course of or arising out of his employment, or for any death resulting from such injury, occupational disease, or bodily condition * * *." Finally, such an interpretation also conflicts with Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, which provides:

"For the purposes of providing compensation to workmen and to their dependents, for death, injuries or occupational disease, occasioned in the course of such workmen's employment, laws may be passed establishing a state fund to be created by compulsory contribution thereto by employers, and administered by the state, determining the terms and conditions upon which payment shall be made therefrom. Such compensation shall be in lieu of all other rights to compensation, or damages, for such death, injuries, or occupational diseases, and any employer who pays the premium or compensation provided by law, passed in accordance herewith, shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for such deaths, injuries or occupational disease. * * * " (Emphasis added.) Cf. Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 624, 633-634, 576 N.E.2d 722, 728-729.

Thus, we first hold that the waiver which Jones signed does not remove his injury from the course of his employment and thus from the workers' compensation system. We are dealing only with an injury for which workers' compensation arguably can be waived, not with an injury which can be removed from the course of employment. ⁴ It does not remove the injury from the workers' compensation system.

The next question we must answer is whether the release Jones signed effectively waived the rights of his dependents to death benefits.

Looking first at the release itself, even if a worker could waive benefits other than his own, we hold that the release in this case is wholly insufficient in law to accomplish such a waiver. It simply does not inform Jones that he is or might be waiving the right of his dependents to any death benefits. The form does not even mention death benefits. Any limitation on workers' compensation benefits must be strictly construed to effect the purposes of the act as set forth in R.C. 4123.95. Mentzer v. Westinghouse Corp. (1983), 10 Ohio App.3d 198, 201, 10 OBR 271, 274, 461 N.E.2d 24, 26. Further, the form itself must be strictly construed against the drafter, in this case one or all of the defendants. See O'Neill v. German (1951), 154 Ohio St. 565, 571, 44 O.O. 11, 14, 97 N.E.2d 8, 11; Farmers' Natl. Bank v. Delaware Ins. Co. (1911), 83 Ohio St. 309, 94 N.E. 834, paragraph seven of the syllabus. This is especially so when we are dealing with statutes that are exceptions to the general rules allowing for workers' compensation.

Many years ago, in discussing the nature of workers' (then workmen's) compensation, the Ohio Supreme Court wrote that "we particularly agree that the law is founded on the principle of insurance, and that it is in no sense a pension, or bounty, or gratuity." State ex rel. Crawford v. Indus. Comm. (1924), 110 Ohio St. 271, 143 N.E. 574. Therefore, some...