Maricopa Cnty. v. Rana
| Decision Date | 25 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 1 CA-CV 18-0256,1 CA-CV 18-0256 |
| Citation | 461 P.3d 439,248 Ariz. 419 |
| Parties | MARICOPA COUNTY, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Tariq M. RANA, et al., Defendants/Appellants. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Scharff PLC, Phoenix, By Spencer G. Scharff, Counsel for Defendants/Appellants
Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Civil Services Div., Phoenix, By Wayne J. Peck, Joseph Branco, D. Chad McBride, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
Arizona Center for Disability Law, Tucson, By Rose A. Daly-Rooney, Maya S. Abela, Counsel for Amicus Curiae
¶1 Tariq M. and Shahnaza Rana ("Ranas"), and their lessee, Ascend Behavioral Health and Wellness, LLC ("Ascend"),1 appeal the superior court’s judgment granting Maricopa County’s request to permanently enjoin alleged violations of the County’s zoning ordinance ("MCZO") relating to group homes. The Ranas argue their group home does not violate the MCZO. They raise other issues that we address in a separate memorandum decision. For the following reasons, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
¶2 The Ranas own a nine-bedroom house located on 1.25 acres in an unincorporated area of the County where group homes are an as-of-right use.2 The applicable zoning regulations limit such homes to no more than ten residents and provide that if licensing is required by the State of Arizona, proof of such licensure must be provided before the use is established. MCZO §§ 201, 501.2(4), 503.2. The MCZO defines a "group home" as follows:
A dwelling unit shared as their primary residence by minors, handicapped or elderly persons, living together as a single housekeeping unit, in a long term, family-like environment in which staff persons provide on-site care, training, or support for the residents. Such homes or services provided therein shall be licensed by, certified by, approved by, registered with, funded by or through, or under contract with the State. (Group homes shall not include homes for the developmentally disabled, defined as persons afflicted with autism, cerebral palsy, epilepsy or mental retardation, as regulated by Arizona Revised Statutes, § 36-582.)
¶3 In 2014, the Ranas submitted an application to the County for approval to use the house as an assisted living group home ("the Home") for the elderly. After administrative review, the County issued a "zoning clearance," which is "a permit or authorization ... indicating that a proposed building, structure or use of land meets all the standards contained in this ordinance." MCZO § 201. The zoning clearance stated that before the Ranas could begin operating the group home, they were required to submit a copy of their "State of Arizona license."
¶4 The Ranas then leased the Home to Ascend, which in turn obtained a license from the Arizona Department of Health Services in May 2016 to operate a "behavioral health residential facility," defined by state regulations as a "health care institution that provides treatment to an individual experiencing a behavioral health issue" that "[l]imits the individual’s ability to be independent" or "[c]auses the individual to require treatment to maintain or enhance independence." See A.A.C. R9-10-101(36) ; see also A.R.S. § 36-407(A).3
¶5 In January 2017, the County issued a "Notice and Order to Comply," alleging the Ranas were operating "a group home for adjudicated persons or a drug rehabilitation home without a special use permit" in violation of the MCZO. Several months later, the Ranas entered into a compliance agreement with the County that stated they had violated the MCZO by operating "a group care facility for a variety of patient residents" where the approved permit "only permits care for the elderly."4 The Ranas agreed to stop "all supervised care ... for other than up to ten (10) elderly patient residents and to use the Home in accordance with pertinent zoning regulations."
¶6 Around the same time, the Ranas sought approval to use the Home to provide group care for six to ten disabled residents. The County approved the application but required Ascend to submit a "State of Arizona license" to the County before commencing operation as a group home for disabled individuals. The County’s approval was also subject to the earlier compliance agreement, including the requirement that "[Ascend] maintain a log of the number of patient residents indicating each age and condition," as well as "vehicles on site by license plate and drivers, who must be either a caregiver, family, or visitor of a caregiver or patient resident." Ascend was also required to ensure that residents would be long-term, meaning they would live in the Home for at least one year.
¶7 After an inspection, the County informed the Ranas they were not complying with the second zoning approval and were again violating the MCZO. The County then filed suit under A.R.S. § 11-815(H), which allows a county attorney to seek an injunction to "prevent, abate or remove" any use or proposed use of land that violates a zoning ordinance.
¶8 The superior court held a trial on the County’s request for a permanent injunction, hearing testimony from Ascend’s executive director and Carol Johnson, the County’s Planning and Development Director. The court ruled in the County’s favor, finding that based on the totality of circumstances, the residents of the Home did not live in a "family-like environment," in part because Ascend was operating the Home too much like a traditional in-patient treatment facility. The court also found that in the absence of a special use permit, the MCZO does not allow "a facility whose main purpose is to provide treatment to residents" because the word "treatment" is not included in the MCZO’s group home definition.
¶9 After entry of a final judgment outlining the general terms of the permanent injunction, the Ranas timely appealed. The superior court stayed the injunction pending appeal, subject to several conditions, including the prohibition of (1) any on-site staff meetings for employees other than those working at the Home and (2) any non-emergency "in-home treatment," which the court "defined as any physical, psychological, or mental health treatment or therapy from any licensed professional."
¶10 Reviewing a permanent injunction, we accept the superior court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, Nordstrom, Inc. v. Maricopa Cty. , 207 Ariz. 553, 558, ¶ 18, 88 P.3d 1165, 1170 (App. 2004), but review its legal conclusions de novo, City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. , 218 Ariz. 172, 178, ¶ 5, 181 P.3d 219, 225 (App. 2008).
¶11 The normal rules of statutory construction generally apply to zoning ordinances. See Ariz. Found. for Neurology & Psychiatry v. Sienerth , 13 Ariz. App. 472, 475, 477 P.2d 758 (1970). Unless the context suggests otherwise, we give undefined words their common meaning, often drawing on authoritative dictionaries to do so. Stout v. Taylor , 233 Ariz. 275, 278, ¶ 12, 311 P.3d 1088, 1091 (App. 2013). We apply unambiguous text without further inquiry. State v. Burbey , 243 Ariz. 145, 147, ¶ 7, 403 P.3d 145, 147 (2017). But if conflicting reasonable interpretations exist after examining the text, context, and related laws, Glazer v. State , 244 Ariz. 612, 614, ¶ 12, 423 P.3d 993, 995 (2018), we may use secondary tools, such as the law’s subject matter, historical background, and purposes, Burbey , 243 Ariz. at 147, ¶ 7, 403 P.3d at 147. We must also recognize that because zoning ordinances "exist in derogation of property rights," they will be strictly construed in favor of the property owner. Kubby v. Hammond , 68 Ariz. 17, 22, 198 P.2d 134 (1948) ; County of Cochise v. Faria , 221 Ariz. 619, 623, ¶ 10, 212 P.3d 957, 961 (App. 2009).
¶12 As noted above, the ordinance defines a "group home" as a "dwelling unit shared as [a] primary residence by minors, handicapped or elderly persons, living together as a single housekeeping unit, in a long term, family-like environment in which staff persons provide on-site care, training, or support for the residents." MCZO § 201 (emphasis added). The superior court found that Ascend did not maintain a "family-like environment" in the Home, but instead, treated it "largely as a treatment facility that just happens to be in a neighborhood." The court noted that Ascend held staff meetings at the Home for employees of other group homes and transported residents of other Ascend group homes there for group events and to receive care. The court also pointed to rules Ascend imposed on residents of the Home, which it found "significantly regulate the lives of residents and restrict their freedom."
¶13 The Ranas argue that a "family-like environment" necessarily contemplates something similar to, but broader than, the meaning of the word "family." See generally -like , American Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2011) ("Resembling or characteristic of ...."). Without denying that Ascend sometimes used the Home for staff meetings or to provide events or care for residents of its other facilities, the Ranas argue that Ascend nevertheless maintained a "family-like" atmosphere for the several residents of the Home. Although it offers no analysis of the text of the ordinance, and relies almost entirely on Johnson’s testimony, the County argues substantial evidence supports the superior court’s conclusion that Ascend conducted activities at the Home in ways that went beyond a "family-like environment."
¶14 We must first consider whether the MCZO itself includes any provisions that guide our understanding of the group home definition. The MCZO does not define "family-like environment," but does define "family" to include "a group of not more than five (5) persons, who need not be related, living together as a single housekeeping unit in a dwelling unit." MCZO...
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