Marine Power & Equipment Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Com'n Hearing Tribunal, 13051-0-I

• Citation: 694 P.2d 697,39 Wn.App. 609
• Decision Date: 21 January 1985
• Docket Number: No. 13051-0-I,13051-0-I
• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Parties: MARINE POWER & EQUIPMENT CO., Respondent, v. WASHINGTON STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION HEARING TRIBUNAL, The Washington State Human Rights Commission and Nadim Shah, therein identified as Complainant, Appellants.

Page 609

39 Wn.App. 609

694 P.2d 697

MARINE POWER & EQUIPMENT CO., Respondent, v. WASHINGTON STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION HEARING TRIBUNAL The Washington State Human Rights Commission and Nadim Shah, therein identified as Complainant, Appellants.

No. 13051-0-I.

Court of Appeals of Washington Division 2.

Jan. 21, 1985.

Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., Morton Tytler, Winslow Whitman, Asst. Atty. Gens., Seattle, for appellants.

Elizabeth J. Blagg, George S. Martin, James K. Lockett, Seattle, for respondent.

COLEMAN, Judge.

Nadim Shah, a former employee of respondent Marine Power, filed a complaint with the Washington State Human Rights Commission ("Commission"), alleging that Marine Power had discriminated against him because of his national origin. A hearing tribunal ordered Marine Power to pay Nadim Shah $7,500. Five thousand dollars was to compensate Shah for "emotional distress caused by slurs based on his national origin," and the remaining $2,500 was "for emotional distress caused by discriminatory work assignments." Marine Power sought review of this order in the King County Superior Court.

Subsequent to filing its petition for review, the Commission moved for and was granted a stay of the superior court proceedings pending the Washington Supreme Court's decision in Human Rights Comm'n v. Cheney Sch. Dist. 30, 97 Wash.2d 118, 641 P.2d 163 (1982). In its motion for a stay, the Commission asserted:

If this action is not stayed, the Washington State Human Rights Commission has the statutory duty to promptly certify the record of the administrative hearing to this Court. RCW 34.04.130(4). [See also, RCW 49.60.270.] This will involve the expense of transcribing the testimony and proceedings in a hearing that lasted five days. This expense may be rendered unnecessary by the Supreme Court's decision in the [Human Rights Comm'n v. Cheney Sch. Dist. 30 ] case.

Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court filed its opinion in Cheney, holding that Washington State Human Rights Commission hearing tribunals lack the statutory authority to award compensation for humiliation and mental suffering caused by unlawful age discrimination.

Relying on Cheney, Marine Power moved for partial summary judgment in superior court, seeking reversal of the hearing tribunal's damage award. In response, the Commission argued that Cheney applied only to age discrimination cases, and that it could not, in any event, apply to cases decided by commission hearing tribunals before the court's opinion was filed. It was also argued that it would be improper to resolve these issues on a motion for summary judgment because the trial court would not have the benefit of a complete record of the proceedings before the hearing tribunal. The Commission requested the opportunity to file written briefs and an opportunity to fully present oral argument on all issues pertinent to the superior court's review. The superior court found Cheney controlling, and, in granting Marine Power's motion for partial summary judgment, reversed the tribunal's award of monetary relief. The Commission sought direct review of the partial summary judgment in the Washington Supreme Court. That request for review was denied, and the matter was referred to this court for resolution.

After the original briefs for this appeal were filed, the Legislature amended RCW 49.60.250. The 1983 act added the following underlined language to RCW 49.60.250:

(5) If, upon all the evidence, the administrative law judge finds that the respondent has engaged in any unfair practice, the administrative law judge shall ... take such other action as, in the judgment of the administrative law judge, will effectuate the purposes of this chapter, including action that could be ordered by a court, except that damages for humiliation and mental suffering shall not exceed one thousand dollars, and including a requirement for report of the matter on compliance.

Laws of 1983, ch. 293, § 1.

Initially we address the Commission's contention that Cheney, supra, is limited to its facts and applies only to age discrimination. This analysis is clearly incorrect. The Supreme Court examined the relevant statute and stated:

Pursuant to RCW 49.60.250 and the italicized language "or to take such other action," the Legislature granted the Commission the power to give hearing tribunals acting in its behalf "general jurisdiction and power" to eliminate and prevent prohibited discrimination. Both parties agree that the Legislature did not expressly give such a tribunal the power to award damages for humiliation and mental suffering. However, appellant claims this power by inference under the statutory language of "or to take such other action".

Cheney, at 120-21, 641 P.2d 163.

The authority for a tribunal to award damages for humiliation and mental suffering is not provided for, either expressly or by inference. A person who has suffered humiliation caused by discrimination may seek relief through a civil action as provided for under RCW 49.60.030. For these reasons, we hold that a hearing tribunal of the Washington State Human Rights Commission has no authority to award compensation for humiliation and mental suffering caused by unlawful age discrimination.

Cheney, at 130, 641 P.2d 163. This language leaves no doubt as to the breadth of the Cheney holding. Hearing tribunals operating pursuant to this statute simply lack authority to award monetary damages for any type of discrimination. Neither the nature nor the extent of the discrimination alleged was relevant to the Cheney court's reasoning. Their reasoning was entirely predicated upon statutory analysis. ¹

We next address the Commission's contention that Cheney does not apply because the present case was fully adjudicated prior to that decision. This argument is without merit. It is well settled in Washington that once a statute has been construed by the state's highest court, that construction operates as if it were originally written into the statute. Johnson v. Morris, 87 Wash.2d 922, 927-28, 557 P.2d 1299 (1976); Fairley v. Labor & Indus., 29 Wash.App. 477, 482, 627 P.2d 961 (1981). In other words, the judicial construction relates back to the time of the original statutory enactment. Thus, even though the Cheney court's construction was not enunciated when the hearing tribunal entered its award, that construction is, under the relation-back rule, what the statute always meant. Fairley, at 482, 627 P.2d 961. Therefore, appellants' argument for prospective application of the Cheney decision must fail.

We now address the significance of the 1983 amendment. The Commission contends the 1983 amendment applies retroactively because it clarifies the original statute and thereby overrules the Cheney decision. Alternatively, the Commission argues that the 1983 amendment applies to the present case because the legislative action is remedial, and remedial statutes, absent legislative intent to the contrary, apply retroactively. Concerning the first prong of their argument, the Commission asserts that the 1983 amendment is an interpretation or a clarification correcting an erroneous judicial interpretation of the Legislature's original intent. Though legislative clarifications, as opposed to amendments, are generally retroactive and effective from the original date of the statute, Johnson v. Morris, 87 Wash.2d 922, 925, 557 P.2d 1299 (1976), an exception to this rule is applicable here. The exception may be stated as follows:

The usual purpose of a special interpretive statute is to correct a judicial interpretation of a prior law which the legislature determines to be inaccurate. Where such statutes are given any effect, the effect is prospective only. Any other result would make the legislature a court of last resort.

(Footnote omitted. Emphasis added.) 1A C. Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction, § 27.04 at 313 (4th Ed.1973). The Washington Supreme Court recognized this exception in Johnson v. Morris, supra at 925-26, 557 P.2d 1299. The Johnson court did not decide whether the Legislature may retroactively clarify an existing statute when that clarification contravenes a prior state Supreme Court interpretation of the statute. However, citing the treatise quoted above, the court suggested that such legislative authority would create serious issues concerning the doctrine of separation of powers. Johnson, at 926, 557 P.2d 1299. We find this dicta persuasive. The Legislature may not, under the guise of clarification, overrule by legislative enactment a prior authoritative Supreme Court opinion construing a statute. However, direct confrontation of this issue may be avoided in this case if the 1983 enactment amends, rather than clarifies, an existing statute. ² Johnson, at 926-27, 557 P.2d 1299.

Under Washington law, a new legislative enactment is presumed to be an amendment rather than a clarification of existing law. Johnson, at 926, 557 P.2d 1299. This presumption may be rebutted, however, if circumstances indicate that the Legislature intended to clarify an existing statute. Johnson, at 926, 557 P.2d 1299. One well-recognized indication of legislative intent to either clarify or amend is the existence or nonexistence of ambiguities in the original act. Bowen v. Statewide City Employees, 72 Wash.2d 397, 403, 433 P.2d 150 (1967). In general, legislative amendments change unambiguous statutes and legislative clarifications interpret ambiguous statutes. Overton v. Economic Assistance Auth., 96 Wash.2d 552, 557, 637 P.2d 652 (1981); Vita Food Prods., Inc. v. State, 91 Wash.2d 132, 134, 587 P.2d 535 (1978); see Bowen v. Statewide City Employees, supra 72 Wash.2d at 403, 433 P.2d 150. In the present case, since the Cheney court held that the original discrimination statute contained no express or implied authority for granting the damage awards at issue, any ambiguities in the statute regarding such authority were resolved as of the date of...