Marin–garcia v. Holder

• Decision Date: 22 July 2011
• Docket Number: No. 10–3912.,10–3912.
• Citation: 647 F.3d 666
• Parties: Ramon Humberto MARIN–GARCIA, Petitioner,v.Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General of the United States, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

647 F.3d 666

Ramon Humberto MARIN–GARCIA, Petitioner,

v.Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General of the United States, Respondent.

No. 10–3912.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued May 12, 2011.Decided July 22, 2011.

Rosalba Pina (argued), Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Petitioner.Nairi Simonian Gruzenski, Leslie M. McKay (argued), OIL, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Civil Division, Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent.Before BAUER, FLAUM, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

Ramon Humberto Marin–Garcia seeks to prevent the government from removing him from the country. He argues chiefly that doing so would violate the constitutional rights of his three daughters, natural-born United States citizens who will travel to Mexico with him if we deny his petition for review. Although we agree that he has standing to make the argument, we reject it on the merits. His secondary arguments fare no better. Accordingly, we deny his petition for review.

I. Background

Marin–Garcia is a Mexican citizen. In June 1991, he entered the United States “without inspection.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3). Because he was not properly admitted into the United States, he was eligible for removal. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), 1227(a)(1). In 2003, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. During the 12 years between his arrival and the start of removal proceedings, Marin–Garcia got married and took the helm of a small family. Although his wife also lacks legal status, he pays taxes and has a home in Beloit, Wisconsin. Each of his three daughters was born in this country. Therefore, they are citizens of the United States. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1; 8 U.S.C. § 1401.

In the proceedings against him, Marin–Garcia did not contest his removability. Rather, he sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). The provision puts discretion in the hands of the Attorney General to cancel the removal of an alien if four criteria are satisfied: (1) he has been in the United States for 10 continuous years immediately preceding the application for cancellation; (2) he has been a person of good moral character during that period; (3) he has not been convicted of certain statutorily specified offenses; and (4) he “establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [his] spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A)-(D). By the statute's terms, all four criteria must be satisfied, and we generally lack jurisdiction to question the Attorney General's decision not to exercise his discretion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).

In evaluating the four cancellation criteria, the key issue for the immigration judge (and stumbling block for Marin–Garcia) related to the fourth requirement of § 1229b(b)—whether removal would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to Marin–Garcia's citizen-children. His daughters are natural-born United States citizens, between 10 to 15 years of age (at the time of the removal proceedings). One is asthmatic, and her condition could be exacerbated by the dusty roads in the area of Mexico to which Marin–Garcia would return. The other two daughters have had medical conditions that appear less-obviously severe. All of the girls would be without health insurance in Mexico. The daughters also would face educational challenges. There is some indication that none reads or writes in Spanish, although the immigration judge stated that the “children undoubtedly ... speak Spanish in order to speak to their parents.” After considering the evidence, the immigration judge reasoned that the challenges faced by Marin–Garcia's family were not sufficiently serious to qualify as exceptional and extremely unusual. Therefore, the judge concluded that Marin–Garcia was ineligible for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b). The Board of Immigration Appeals agreed with the immigration judge's reasoning and dismissed the appeal that followed.

Marin–Garcia has now filed a petition for review with us, contending chiefly that removing him from the United States would violate the United States Constitution. Specifically, Marin–Garcia argues that the Board's framework for evaluating cancellation requests, beginning with a decision called Matter of Monreal, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56 (BIA 2001), violates the equal protection rights of his daughters. His principal argument is that the Board's application of Section 1229b(b)(1)(D)—exceptional and extremely unusual hardship—is unconstitutional because the Board's framework compares the hardship of citizen-children to the hardship of aliens in general, rather than comparing the hardship of citizen-children to “the citizen children population at large.” Petitioner's Brief at 8. Meanwhile, the government argues that a prudential limitation on the exercise of federal jurisdiction prevents us from entertaining his arguments. The government maintains that Marin–Garcia does not have standing to advance arguments based on the interests of his daughters.

II. Discussion

Although we generally lack jurisdiction to review the Attorney General's discretionary decision under the Immigration and Nationality Act not to cancel Marin–Garcia's removal, we retain jurisdiction over constitutional claims and matters of law. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Frederick v. Holder, 644 F.3d 357, 362–63 (7th Cir.2011). Typically our review of such matters is de novo, see Barradas v. Holder, 582 F.3d 754, 765 (7th Cir.2009), but in this case we view Marin–Garcia's argument for the first time; below, the Board concluded that it was not empowered to entertain the constitutional challenges that Marin–Garcia raises. We conclude as follows: Marin–Garcia has third-party standing to make the arguments he advances on behalf of his daughters. He cannot succeed on the merits, however. Among other problems, his chief constitutional argument is based on an erroneous reading of the Board's decision in Matter of Monreal, a case which sets out the agency's framework for determining whether removing an alien would cause citizen-relatives to suffer an “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).

A. Third–Party Standing

Before we address the merits, a discussion of Marin–Garcia's standing is in order. His chief argument centers primarily on the rights of his daughters. Generally, however, Person A is not entitled to advance the legal interests of Person B in federal court. That is, even though a person may suffer an injury that satisfies the constitutional case or controversy requirement of Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112–13, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976), he generally may not redress his injury by reference to someone else's rights, Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 97 L.Ed. 1586 (1953). See also U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720, 110 S.Ct. 1428, 108 L.Ed.2d 701 (1990) (observing that “[t]his is generally so even when the very same allegedly illegal act that affects the litigant also affects a third party”). The presumption against third-party standing is a “prudential limitation on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.” Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 445, 118 S.Ct. 1428, 140 L.Ed.2d 575 (1998) (O'Connor, J., concurring). It is a pre-jurisdictional, threshold question for federal courts, see Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230, 161 L.Ed.2d 82 (2005), which “recognizes that claims are best prosecuted by those who actually have been injured, rather than by someone in their stead,” Massey v. Wheeler, 221 F.3d 1030, 1035 (7th Cir.2000).

Despite the general impediment to advancing someone else's interests, the Supreme Court has held that a person may litigate another's rights in his own cause so long as three criteria are satisfied: (1) the litigant must have suffered an injury in fact; (2) the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and (3) there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interest. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410–11, 415, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) (holding that a criminal defendant had standing to raise the equal protection rights of a would-be juror excluded from service by the prosecution).

All three criteria have been satisfied in this case. Marin–Garcia has suffered a concrete injury in the form of his removal order and impending removal from the United States. He is by definition closely related to his daughters. As to the third requirement, his daughters are minor children and therefore are “hindered” from bringing suit themselves. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 841 n. 44, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977). Moreover, Marin–Garcia is in the best position to litigate the case, because he is the only party to the immigration proceeding, even though his daughters' rights may be affected. The First Circuit, on similar facts with similar arguments, has reached the same conclusion. Payne–Barahona v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.2007) (reasoning that “the requirements in Powers ... appear easily met in this instance”).

The government's argument to the contrary misunderstands the third-party-standing inquiry. The government maintains that Marin–Garcia lacks third-party standing because his daughters do not have meritorious claims. The doctrine of third-party standing is an antecedent question that we answer in order to tell us if we may reach the merits. Having answered in the affirmative, we proceed.

B. Merits

The merits are where Marin–Garcia's petition founders. As we noted above, federal appeals courts ordinarily lack jurisdiction to review the Attorney General's discretionary decisions...