Marion Mfg. Co. v. Buchanan

• Decision Date: 25 February 1907
• Citation: 99 S.W. 984
• Parties: MARION MFG. CO. v. BUCHANAN et ux.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 984

99 S.W. 984

MARION MFG. CO. v. BUCHANAN et ux.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

February 25, 1907.

Appeal from Chancery Court, Williamson County; John Allison, Chancellor.

Action by the Marion Manufacturing Company against R. G. Buchanan and wife. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Eggleston & Eggleston, for appellants. John T. Allen, for appellee.

McALISTER, J.

Complainant, a manufacturer, brought this suit against the defendants to recover the purchase price of a threshing machine. The defendants resist the right to recover upon the ground that the machine had been consumed by fire within a few days after it was purchased, and that the fire originated in consequence of the defective construction of the machine. Defendants also resist complainant's claim upon the ground that, when they purchased the threshing machine, complainant retained title thereto until the purchase money should be paid in full, and that when the machine was destroyed by fire the sale had not been perfected and the legal title to the property was still in the complainant.

The wife of defendant R. G. Buchanan is also sued, for the reason that she bound her separate estate as security for the purchase price of the machine.

The chancellor and the Court of Chancery Appeals overruled the contentions of defendants and pronounced a decree in favor of the complainant for the sum of $342.50, amount of the debt, and $34.25 attorney's fee, together with the costs of the cause. The decree also ordered the sale of the separate estate of Mrs. Sallie C. Buchanan, the wife, for the payment of said recovery. Defendants again appealed, and have assigned errors. It should have been stated that a cross-bill was filed on behalf of the defendants against the complainant for the purpose of recovering the value of certain machinery and a stack of wheat straw destroyed by said fire in consequence of the negligence of complainant in furnishing a defective separator. The principal controversy waged on the record was, first, whether the threshing machine and separator were defective; and, secondly, if so, did the fire which destroyed the machinery result from this defect?

The facts found by the Court of Chancery Appeals are that on the 13th of June, 1900, defendants ordered from complainant one Leader thresher, 33-inch cylinder, and 48-inch separator, and plain stacker, to be shipped to Nashville, Tenn. The defendants agreed to receive said machinery, pay the freight on the same, and execute their several notes, falling due, respectively, in one, two, and three years, for the sum of $114 each, with interest from date. In said order, the defendant Sallie C. Buchanan bound her separate estate to secure the payment of the purchase money notes. The machinery was shipped about the 15th of June, 1900, and was received at Nashville by the defendant Buchanan, who paid the freight on the same and carried it to his farm in Williamson county, about eight miles from Franklin. One Snow, acting for the complainant company, went with the defendant, and superintended the setting of the thresher in the field, and started it in operation.

The Court of Chancery Appeals reports that the thresher was taken out on Wednesday, and worked on by Mr. Snow until the next day. On Friday Mr. Davis, the agent of the complainant company, visited the thresher, and on Saturday Buchanan and wife went to Nashville in accordance with an agreement with Davis to sign the notes. It appears, however, that Mr. Davis was absent, and the matter was not closed for that reason, though Buchanan and wife went to Nashville for that purpose, and only failed to sign the notes and complete the contract according to the order for the reason Davis was not there.

The Court of Chancery Appeals finds that the machinery had been actually delivered to the defendants, set up by an agent of the complainant company, and started in operation. The Court of Chancery Appeals reports that within 4½ days after the machinery was delivered it was destroyed by fire. The particular defect averred in the answer which caused the destruction of the machinery was in the construction of the beaters in the separator. These beaters are cylinders, two in number, which are placed in the body of the separator, back of the main cylinder, and the ends of these cylinders are located in the metal bearings in which they revolve. The defect complained of is that there were spaces between the ends of the main body of the cylinder and the sides of the separator, and that these spaces should have been, but were not, protected by shields of metal, leather, or some other substance, and it was claimed that on account of the defect in not protecting the ends of these cylinders by shields, so as to keep out the straw and prevent it from wrapping around the ends of the cylinder, fire was thus generated, from the effects of which this machine was destroyed.

The Court of Chancery Appeals finds there is evidence in the record tending to show that the ends of these cylinders were protected by shields, and that there is also evidence tending to show that they were not so protected. That court, however, finds the weight of the evidence shows they were not so protected, and to this extent were defective, as it allowed the straw to accumulate around these ends, and thus clog and impede the operation of the cylinders.

The Court of Chancery Appeals, however, after a full discussion of the evidence, reports that the fire which destroyed the machinery was not caused by this defect. Said that court:

"Without reasoning the matter further, we are unable to see that the weight of the evidence shows that the fire originated from the defect complained of, and we are not satisfied that the weight of the evidence does so show, but to our minds it is a mere conjecture. And therefore we are unable to conclude and find that the fire was caused by the negligence of the complainant and by reason of the defective machinery furnished by them."

The Court of Chancery Appeals reports that it is unable to find that the destruction of this property was the result of the negligence of either party. The legal question then presented is: The machinery having been destroyed under this state of facts, upon whom does the loss fall? The Court of Chancery Appeals approved the rule on this subject thus formulated in the Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law (volume 6, p. 455):

"Where personal property is sold and delivered to the vendee under an agreement that the title is to remain in the vendor until payment, the loss or destruction of the property while in the possession of the vendee before payment, even without his fault, does not relieve him from the obligation to pay the price."

The following cases are cited for the text: Burnley v. Tufts, 66 Miss. 48, 5 South. 627, 14 Am. St. Rep. 540; Tufts v. Wynne, 45 Mo. App. 42; Tufts v. Griffin, 107 N. C. 47, 12 S. E. 68, 10 L. R. A. 526, 22 Am. St. Rep. 863; Planters' Bank v. Van Dyck, 4 Heisk. (Tenn.) 617.

Counsel for defendant reassigns in this court the same errors assigned in the Court of Chancery Appeals to the decree of the chancellor, with the additional assignment that the Court of Chancery Appeals erred in failing to find that the defect in the thresher caused the fire. Counsel then reargues the facts and points out certain evidence which is not found in the report of the Court of Chancery Appeals, nor was that court requested to embrace it in supplemental findings. The argument is able, but we are precluded from considering it.

Counsel further insists:

"Under the warranty that said machine was to be of good material and of good workmanship, suitable for the business, defendants could not be forced to accept said machine and settle for it until it came up to the warranty, and they would have the right to return the machine as soon as they found out the danger of using the machine in this defective condition; that is, as soon as they ascertained that it did not come up to the warranty. They would have this right, even after settlement in full. It would seem they would have a better right before settlement to refuse payment until the complainant had furnished and supplied them with a machine that was not defective and dangerous."

As already stated, the Court of Chancery Appeals reported that said machine was defective in respect of the beaters or cylinders in the separator, but under the contract, before the manufacturing company could be held liable for a breach of this warranty, they must have notice of it and an opportunity to replace the defective parts. When the machine was destroyed, no such defect had been complained of by the defendants, and hence the complainant company had no opportunity to repair the defect. The only question presented on this record is whether the loss of the machinery by fire must fall on the complainant or on the defendants. The Court of Chancery Appeals has found that the defect now complained of in the machinery did not cause the fire, and the whole question is resolved into a question of liability, to be settled by the contract between the parties and the status of the machinery at the date of the fire.

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