Marion Mortg. Co. v. Howard
Decision Date | 09 December 1930 |
Citation | 131 So. 529,100 Fla. 1418 |
Parties | MARION MORTGAGE CO. v. HOWARD et al. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Commissioners' Decision.
Suit by the Marion Mortgage Company, as trustee, against G. Norton Howard and others. From an order sustaining exceptions to the master's report and from the final decree, complainant appeals.
Affirmed. Appeal from Circuit Court, Dade County; H. F Atkinson, judge.
Redfearn & Ferrell, of Miami, for appellant.
Philip Clarkson, of Miami, for appellees.
The appellant, whom we will hereafter refer to as the complainant, was engaged in business in the city of Miami under the name of G. L. Miller Bond & Mortgage Company; its name being subsequently changed to Marion Mortgage Company. The defendant G. Norton Howard was the owner of certain real estate upon which she desired to erect an apartment house. One George W. Langford was engaged in building operations, and the owner of the land entered into a contract with him to erect a building upon her land. It being necessary for the owner to borrow money in order to complete the building, she and Langford took the matter up with the complainant, who agreed to make the loan. A 'temporary' mortgage was prepared by the complainant covering the land, and also purporting to create a lien upon furniture and furnishings which might be put in the building after its completion. When the defendant G. Norton Howard accompanied by Langford, went to the offices of the complainant to execute this mortgage, Langford stated that the furniture and furnishings could not be covered by the mortgage because they were to be purchased on a retain title contract. The complainant then agreed to take a mortgage that did not include the furniture and furnishings, and prepared another paper which, as agreed by the parties, was to be only a 'temporary' mortgage to be later superseded by a permanent mortgage. It was also agreed by all parties that the mortgage to complainant was to be a first mortgage upon the land. This 'temporary' mortgage was executed by the owner of the land, upon Langford's advice, on October 16, 1924, and recorded October 18, 1924, and no mention was made of furniture or furnishings in this paper. After the execution of the 'temporary' mortgage, Langford as trustee took a mortgage on the land and on the furniture and furnishings, the same being dated as of September 1, 1924 but not recorded until November 19, 1924. Still later it was discovered by the complainant that there was an error in the description of the land as set out in the 'temporary' mortgage, and thereupon complainant drew another mortgage correcting the error in description, but making no reference to the furniture and fixtures. This mortgage was signed by the owner of the land upon the advice of Langford, and was recorded about December 11, 1924. This last mortgage is referred to in the record as the 'corrective' mortgage. After the completion of the building, the complainant, wishing to have what is termed a 'permanent' mortgage on the property, prepared one to its liking, but included therein, not only the land, but also the furniture annd furnishings. Langford, without seeing the paper and taking it for granted that it created a lien only on the real estate, advised Mrs. Howard to execute it, which she did. This last or 'permanent' mortgage was dated as of September 1, 1924, acknowledged on January 17, 1925, and recorded on the 24th day of January, 1925. The complainant thereupon drew what is termed a 'subordinating' agreement to be executed by it as 'first mortgagee,' by Mrs. Howard, the 'owner,' and by Langford, as trustee, as 'second mortgagee.' This 'subordinating' agreement was dated January 20, 1925, acknowledged the next day and recorded on the same day as was the permanent mortgage--January 24, 1925. Among others, it contains the following recitals:
The complainant instituted suit to foreclose the 'permanent' mortgage, and the bill therein prayed among other things, that the court decree the complainant's lien to be superior to the rights of the defendant. The defendant Langford, as trustee, filed an answer in which he set up a state of facts in substance as we have stated them, and further 'shows to the court that in violation of the true intent, meaning and purpose of said subordinating agreement, and for the purpose of defrauding defendant with respect to his said lien on said furniture, furnishings, fixtures and equipment, the said G. L. Miller Bond & Mortgage Company fraudulently drew said 'permanent' mortgage so as to make the same appear to give a lien on said furniture, furnishings, fixtures and equipment, superior to the lien thereon of defendant, notwithstanding that the said G. L. Miller Bond & Mortgage Company then and there well knew that defendant had not subordinated the priority of the said lien with respect to the furniture, furnishings, fixtures and equipment, and that he had not so intended to do; that, without defendant's knowledge or consent, and without the knowledge or consent of the said G. Norton Howard, and with the purpose and intent of defrauding defendant, said G. L. Miller Bond & Mortgage Company surreptitiously and fraudulently inserted in said 'permanent' mortgage a provision whereby said furniture, furnishings, fixtures and equipment were therein included, in addition to said real estate, contrary to the said agreement; that defendant relied upon said G. L. Miller Bond & Mortgage Company, pursuant to said agreement, to so draw its said 'permanent' mortgage that the same should include and convey only real estate as the same was described in said 'corrective' mortgage. And defendant says that complainant's alleged lien upon said furniture, furnishings, fixtures and equipment is secondary, subordinate, and inferior to the lien of defendant's said mortgage with respect to said furniture, furnishings, fixtures and equipment, and should be so...
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