Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. White

• Decision Date: 25 November 1970
• Docket Number: 70--92,Nos. 70--82,s. 70--82
• Citation: 242 So.2d 771
• Parties: AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY and Stella B. Hoffman, Appellants, v. Eleanor S. WHITE, as curator of the Estate of William Oakley White, Deceased, and Patricia Ann Johnson, Appellees. Stella B. HOFFMAN, Appellant, v. Eleanor S. WHITE and Aetna Life Insurance Company, etc., et al., Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 771

242 So.2d 771

AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY and Stella B. Hoffman, Appellants, v. Eleanor S. WHITE, as curator of the Estate of William Oakley White, Deceased, and Patricia Ann Johnson, Appellees.

Stella B. HOFFMAN, Appellant, v. Eleanor S. WHITE and Aetna Life Insurance Company, etc., et al., Appellees.

Nos. 70--82, 70--92.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Nov. 25, 1970.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 29, 1971.

Eugene L. Heinrich, of McCune, Hiaasen, Crum, Ferris & Gardner, Fort Lauderdale, for Aetna Life Ins. Co.

Peter A. Portley, Pompano Beach, for Stella B. Hoffman.

Theodore P. Sobo, Fort Lauderdale, for Patricia Ann Johnson.

McCAIN, Judge.

The question before the court on this consolidated appeal is the proper disposition of proceeds of a group life insurance policy on the life of William Oakley White, deceased. Decedent purchased the policy in question during the continuance of his marriage to his first wife, Eleanor S. White, now curator of his estate and one of the appellees on this appeal. Upon divorcing her and marrying his second wife, Stella B. White, now Stella B. Hoffman, he changed the beneficiary designations under the policy to name Stella B. White primary beneficiary and, in the event that she predeceased him, to name Patricia Ann Johnson, his sister, secondary beneficiary. Subsequently he also divorced Stella B. White but did not again shift the beneficiary designations under the policy before his death, which occurred two months after the final decree of divorce was entered.

Aetna Life Insurance Company, decedent's insurer, upon receiving the claim of Stella Hoffman, distributed the proceeds to her as designated beneficiary under the policy. Subsequent to Aetna's distribution of the proceeds, Eleanor S. White, as curator of her former husband's estate, filed the instant declaratory judgment action to determine the ownership of the proceeds, naming Stella Hoffman and Aetna as defendants. The contingent beneficiary under the policy, Patricia Ann Johnson, was later joined as a defendant in the suit.

During the course of the proceedings all three defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial judge denied the motions of Aetna and Stella Hoffman, but granted that of Patricia Ann Johnson, based on a finding that Mrs. Hoffman, as primary beneficiary, was precluded from taking by virtue of a property settlement entered into between her and decedent at the time of their divorce, and that therefore the designated contingent beneficiary was entitled to the proceeds. In his order making the award entitled 'Order, Injunction and Summary Final Judgment,' the trial judge stated:

'The beneficiary's interest of Stella B. Hoffman, a/k/a Stella B. White, in and to the proceeds of the subject Aetna policy was terminated by the aforementioned property settlement agreement between the deceased and Stella B. Hoffman, a/k/a Stella B. White. The specific language of the property settlement clearly stated the intention and desire of the parties that their relations with respect to property and financial matters be fixed by the agreement. Therefore, the issue of interpretation of said agreement leaves no genuine issue of material fact, particularly when considering the condition of Stella B. Hoffman, a/k/a Stella B. White, and William Oakley White; the objects which they had in mind and the nature of the agreement. It is plain, and the Court so finds, that Stella B. Hoffman, a/k/a Stella B. White, relinquished any interest in the proceeds of the subject Aetna Life Insurance Company policy.'

The court's order also determined that interest and attorney's fees were to be assessed against Aetna Life Insurance Company, and permanently enjoined and restrained Stella Hoffman from dissipating the proceeds of the policy in question, and directed her to turn over the money to Patricia Ann Johnson. A motion to set supersedeas bond was granted and bond was set at $25,000.

The property settlement upon which the lower court's conclusions are based nowhere deals directly with the question of insurance. In the 'whereas' section of the agreement, the following statement is made: 'Whereas, it is the desire and intention of the parties that their relations with respect to property and financial matters be fixed by this Agreement.' It is presumably this statement to which the trial judge's order has reference. However, in the body of the agreement itself we also find the following provision:

'VI. RELEASE OF THE WIFE: The Husband does hereby release the wife of and from any claims, demands, dues, debts, rights or causes of action excepting any possible cause of action for divorce which he may have against the wife, and except such claims, demands, dues, debts and rights as are provided for in this agreement.'

The significance of this release is simply that it is not accompanied by any corresponding release by the wife to the husband of any claims she may have against him.

It is clear that divorce alone will not serve to divest a wife of her expectancy in the proceeds of insurance on her husband's life. 44 Am.Jur.2d, Insurance, § 1740 and cases cited therein. Although Florida does not appear to have explicitly considered this proposition, the Third District has inferentially approved it in Raggio v. Richardson, Fla.App.1969, 218 So.2d 501, cert. den. 225 So.2d 917, by discussing in detail those circumstances in addition to divorce which will operate to divest the right of the wife to insurance proceeds. While that case is not in point here because the insurance policy in question there was purchased in the name of the ex-wife After a property settlement was entered into, and the agreement covered only claims existing at the time of the settlement, it serves to elucidate the proposition that the court in determining the right of the ex-wife to proceeds will consider all the circumstances including a husband's failure to change beneficiaries after the divorce.

While we agree that generally a property settlement may serve to divest a wife of her expectancy in her ex-husband's insurance policy, we believe that in view of the general rule that divorce alone will not accomplish this end, any divestment by a property settlement should be, if not explicit, at least based on a reasonable construction of the agreement. In making such a constructional determination, ordinary rules of construction of contracts should be followed. The cardinal rule in this regard is that the intention of the parties will be ascertained from a consideration of the whole agreement. Canal Lumber Co. v. Florida Naval Stores & Mfg. Co., 1922, 83 Fla. 501, 92 So. 279; Marion Mortgage Co. v. Howard, 1930, 100 Fla. 1418, 131 So. 529; McGhee Interests v. Alexander Nat. Bank, 1931, 102 Fla. 140, 135 So. 545; Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Neuhoff, 1946, 157 Fla. 98, 24 So.2d 906; George G. Tapper Company, Inc. v. Bank of Fort Walton, Fla.App.1959, 117 So.2d 8; Curtiss-Wright Corporation v....