Markham v. City of Newport News, Va.
Decision Date | 07 June 1960 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 684. |
Citation | 184 F. Supp. 659 |
Parties | Marvine MARKHAM v. CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS, VA., a municipal corporation, et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Sacks & Sacks, Norfolk, Va. (Harold M. Stern, Norfolk, Va., of counsel), for plaintiff.
Harry L. Nachman, City Atty., Newport News, Va., for City of Newport News.
This is an action brought by a resident of California against the City of Newport News, Virginia, seeking to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained as the result of negligence on the part of the city in the maintenance of a street. The plaintiff contends that this court has jurisdiction under the provisions of Title 28, § 1332 ( ).
The city has filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction of the Federal Court because of the provisions of Section 8-42.1, Code of Virginia, 1958 Supplement.
In 1958 the General Assembly of Virginia enacted a statute (Chapter 520), entitled:
"An Act to amend the Code of Virginia by inserting in Chapter 34 of Title 8 a section numbered 8-757.1, relating to courts in which claims, suits or proceedings may be asserted, instituted, or maintained against counties, cities, towns, districts, boards, commissions, officers, agencies and other political subdivisions of the Commonwealth and of counties, cities and towns."
Because of an emergency clause the statute became effective from its passage on March 29, 1958. That was before the occurrences here involved.
Chapter 34, Title 8, of the Code of Virginia is entitled "Recovery of Claims against the State". However, nowhere in that chapter is found authorization to sue the state or any of its political subdivisions for damages resulting from the tortious act of an agent. The chapter prescribes only which suits may, and how they may, be brought against the state. Eriksen v. Anderson, 195 Va. 655, 79 S.E. 2d 597.
The pertinent language of the 1958 act (c. 520) is:
In some unexplained manner this section was incorporated into the permanent volume of the Code of Virginia, not as a part of Chapter 34, Title 8 as specifically provided by the Legislature, but as a part of Chapter 3, Title 8, of the Code. Chapter 3 of the Code is entitled simply "Venue". Instead of being carried in the permanent volume as Section 8-757.1 in Chapter 34 of Title 8, the statute appears in the Code as Section 8-42.1 of Chapter 3. Whether this is attributable to a clerical error or to an interpretation of the editors is not material. What is material is, first, the intention of the Legislature and, second, whether the statute is or is not in violation of any provisions of the federal Constitution.
The intention of the Legislature to limit jurisdiction is too clearly shown by the language of the statute to require elaboration. Patterson v. The Bark Eudora, 190 U.S. 169, 23 S.Ct. 821, 47 L.Ed. 1002; United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 2 L.Ed. 304; McGhee v. General Finance Corp., D.C.W.D.Va., 84 F.Supp. 24.
From the foregoing recital it is seen that the issue here concerns the right of a state to limit or prescribe the conditions upon which it, as a sovereign, or its political or municipal subdivisions, may be held answerable for a tort.
If the statute involves only venue, it follows that the federal court has jurisdiction and the motion of the City should be overruled. Upon the other hand, if the jurisdiction or right to sue is limited by the statute, the motion should be sustained.
The liability or non-liability of a municipal corporation is purely a matter local in nature. City of Detroit v. Osborne, 135 U.S. 492, 10 S.Ct. 1012, 34 L.Ed. 260. A suit against a municipal corporation is a local cause of action which may be tried only where the municipality is situated, regardless of the theory underlying the cause of action; that is, whether it be tort or contract. O'Toole v. United States, D.C.Del., 106 F.Supp. 804, 809; Parks Co. v. City of Decatur, 6 Cir., 138 F. 550. In such cases venue may be jurisdictional. Thus, it is the law in Virginia that where the sole forum for a suit against the Highway Commission is prescribed by statute, Davis v. Marr, 200 Va. 479, 106 S. E.2d 722, or where an action of ejectment may be brought, Stowers v. Harman, 128 Va. 229, 104 S.E. 703, the suit must be brought in the court specified in each instance by the appropriate statute. No other court has jurisdiction to hear the case. See also Burks Pleading and Practice, Section 37, at page 55 (4th Edition, Boyd and Koontz). It seems clear that an action against a municipality must, as a matter of jurisdiction, be brought in the court where the municipality is located because it is a local cause of action regardless of the underlying theory of the liability.
The issue presented seems to have been definitely settled by City of Detroit v. Osborne, supra.
In that case the plaintiff brought suit against the City of Detroit for personal injuries received in consequence of a defect in a sidewalk. In stating the issue on appeal Mr. Justice Brewer said:
After discussing decisions of the courts of Michigan, Justice Brewer continued:
"In answer to the first inquiry, it must therefore be affirmed that the law of Michigan is against any liability on the part of the city for injuries like those in this action."
Continuing the Court said:
After pointing out that the holding is not in harmony with the general rule nor in accord with views previously expressed by the Supreme Court, the opinion continues:
Quoting Claiborne County v. Brooks, the Court said:
"`It is undoubtedly a question of local policy with each state what shall be the extent and character of the powers which its various political and municipal organizations shall possess, and the settled decisions of its highest courts on this subject will be regarded as authoritative by the courts of the United States; for it is a question that relates to the internal constitution of the body politic of the state.'"
In Detroit the local policy of the State had been declared by the courts of the State. In the case at bar the local policy of the State has been declared by the Legislature. Considering the respective functions of the two branches of the government involved it would seem that such a declaration by the Legislative branch might be considered as the more authoritative in declaring local policy.
This clear statement of the rule of law applicable and the reason for the rule, should be sufficient to foreclose any further discussion of the subject. However, Detroit was decided in 1889 and the...
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Markham v. City of Newport News
...relegation of the diversity jurisdiction to the mercies of the legislatures of fifty separate states. Reversed. 1 Markham v. City of Newport News, D.C.E.D.Va., 184 F.Supp. 659. 2 As enacted in 1958, Acts 1958, c. 520, the statute was entitled and provided in pertinent "An Act to amend the C......
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Moss v. CALUMET PAVING COMPANY
...it follows that from this standpoint the federal district court has jurisdiction to try these actions. Cf. Markham v. City of Newport News, Va., 184 F.Supp. 659 (E.D.Va.1960), distinguishing Popp v. Archbell, 203 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1953). See also Indiana State Toll-Bridge Comm. v. Minor, s......
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Gerr v. Emrick
...matters. * * *" We find it unnecessary to decide this very interesting issue as posed by the parties. See Markham v. City of Newport News, D.C.E.D.Va.1960, 184 F.Supp. 659; Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 609 (1953); Note, Waiver of State Immunity to Suit With Spe......