Markham v. Theobald, 20320

Decision Date15 July 1963
Docket NumberNo. 20320,20320
PartiesLarry Dale MARKHAM, Plaintiff in Error, v. Robert A. THEOBALD as Director of the Department of Revenue and the Motor Vehicle Division, State of Colorado, Defendants in Error.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Ed Conly, Denver, for plaintiff in error.

Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., State of Colorado, Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Floyd B. Engeman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant in error.

McWILLIAMS, Justice.

This writ of error poses a question as to the interpretation and construction to be given certain language appearing in C.R.S. '53, 13-3-24 (1960 Perm.Supp.)

Markham brought this action against Robert A. Theobald as Director of the Department of Revenue and the Motor Vehicle Division, State of Colorado, and in his complaint alleged that after a hearing before the Motor Vehicle Division on July 11, 1961 his operator's license was suspended for a period of one year, and on rehearing this order of suspension was upheld; that the suspension order was purportedly based on C.R.S. '53, 13-3-24 (1960 Perm.Supp.) and a 'departmental interpretation of such statutory section contrary to the express language thereof, and at a time when * * * [he] * * * did not have sufficient points accumulated under such section to warrant the suspension of his license * * *'.

Markham asked that the defendants be required to certify to the court the record of the proceedings before the department; that upon review of such record the court 'hold unlawful and set aside the action' taken by defendants, and that pending a final determination of the matter Markham's license be delivered to him.

In an ex parte proceeding the department was ordered to immediately 'restore the right' of Markham to drive, and when the trial court thereafter on appropriate motion declined to vacate this order Theobald, as director of the Motor Vehicle Division, brought an original proceeding in this Court seeking a writ of prohibition against the trial court. Rule to show cause issued and was eventually made absolute. See Theobald v. District Court, 148 Colo. 466, 366 P.2d 563.

Thereafter, the record of the proceedings before the department was certified to the trial court. Upon trial one witness was called, namely Theobald, who over objection by Markham testified as to the legislative intent behind C.R.S. '53, 13-3-24 (1960 Perm.Supp.).

In our view the legislative intent may be found from a reading of the statute itself, and it is unnecessary to go elsewhere in an effort to ascertain such intent. Incidentally, this is the conclusion eventually reached by the trial court, even though it had previously permitted the director to testify.

C.R.S. '53, 13-3-24 (1960 Perm.Supp.) pertains to the authority of the Department of Revenue to suspend operator and chauffeur drivers' licenses and in connection therewith set up a so-called point system. This statute provides that '[t]he department shall have the authority to suspend the license of any operator * * * who has, in accordance with the schedule of points set forth in this section, been convicted of traffic violations resulting in the accumulation of twelve points in one year * * *'. Sub-section 6 of that statute then lists some 22 different traffic violations, and assigns to each a numerical rating, the more serious violations, such as 'hit and run' and drunken driving, being assigned the highest rating of 12 points and the gradations thereafter being downward to the least serious violation, namely, 'improper, dangerous parking' to which is assigned only one point.

C.R.S. '53, 13-3-16 provides that '[e]very operator's license shall expire on the birth anniversary of the operator occurring within the third year after the year in which such license is issued. * * * [and] [e]very such license shall be renewable within ninety days prior to its expiration * * *', which in practical effect means that a license, when renewed, dates from the birth anniversary of the applicant and is valid, unless otherwise revoked, for the succeeding 3 years.

The first issue to be resolved is the meaning to be given the word 'year', as this word is used in the phrase 'accumulative of twelve points in one year', appearing in C.R.S. '53, 13-3-24 (1960 Perm.Supp.)

The Department...

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  • Zaba v. Motor Vehicle Division, Dept. of Revenue
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • December 10, 1973
    ...the Motor Vehicle Division to consider that period of time ending with the date of the last violation involved. In Markham v. Theobald, 152 Colo. 540, 383 P.2d 791 (1963), we held that an earlier version of this statute required that the 24-month period is to be computed from the anniversar......

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