Marks v. Sconyers

• Decision Date: 23 August 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:13-CV-357-WHA [WO]
• Parties: JULIUS MARKS, # 191 094, Petitioner, v. KENNETH SCONYERS , et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

JULIUS MARKS, # 191 094, Petitioner, v. KENNETH SCONYERS , et al., Respondents.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:13-CV-357-WHA [WO]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

August 23, 2016

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the court on a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Petitioner, Julius Marks, an inmate in the custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections.¹ After due consideration, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the petition for habeas corpus relief filed by Petitioner Julius Marks be DENIED, and that this action be DISMISSED with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 10, 2011, Petitioner entered a guilty plea on eleven counts of unlawful breaking and entering a vehicle in violation of Alabama Code § 13A-8-11. The trial court sentenced Petitioner, as a habitual offender, to a 20-year term of imprisonment on each count with all sentences to run concurrently. Docs. 1 & 7.

Petitioner filed a direct appeal of his conviction. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions on January 27, 2012. Petitioner filed no application for rehearing. The appellate court entered a certificate of judgment on January 27, 2012. Docs. 7-2 to7-4. Petitioner filed a Rule 32 petition with the trial court on March 5, 2012. He presented these issues:

1. The trial court erred in accepting Petitioner's guilty plea when it knew he did not voluntarily enter the plea in his best interest.

2. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to fully explain to Petitioner the trial court's guilty plea colloquy.

3. The trial court erred in accepting evidence of testimonial discourse to enhance Petitioner's sentence.

Doc. 7-5.

On August 29, 2012, the trial court summarily dismissed the Rule 32 petition. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision on November 30, 2012. The Alabama Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for writ of certiorari on February 15, 2013, and issued a certificate of judgment on the same day. Docs. 7-6 to 7-11.

Petitioner filed this application for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 20, 2013,² claiming:

1. The trial court erred when it accepted Petitioner's guilty plea knowing it was not voluntarily made in his best interest;

2. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to fully explain to Petitioner the guilty plea colloquy given by the trial court;

3. The trial court erred by accepting evidence of testimonial discourse to enhance Petitioner's sentence in violation of Ala. Code § 13A-5-9.

Doc. 1.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Disposition of Claims

Respondents filed an answer to the petition. Doc. 7. They contend that the present habeas corpus petition is due to be denied because the claims presented by Petitioner provide no basis for relief. Specifically, Respondents maintain that Petitioner's allegations were properly adjudicated on the merits by the state courts. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05 (2000). To the extent Petitioner challenges the enhancement of his sentence based on a prior conviction, Respondents argue that the claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review. See Wilcox v. Ford, 813 F.2d 1140, 1145 n.7 (11th Cir. 1987); Beverly v. Jones, 854 F.2d 412, 416 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that a "state's interpretation of its own laws and rules provides no basis for federal habeas corpus relief"). Petitioner did not respond to Respondents' answer despite being granted an opportunity to do so. Doc. 10. After reviewing the § 2254 petition and Respondents' answer, the court concludes that no evidentiary hearing is required, and that the petition is due to be denied under Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Courts.

B. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") significantly limits the circumstances under which a habeas petitioner may obtain relief. To prevail on a § 2254 claim adjudicated on the merits by the state courts, a petitioner must show that a decision by the state courts was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) & (2);³ see Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-13. A state court's decision is "contraryto" federal law only if (1) it fails to apply the correct controlling authority or (2) it applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts "materially indistinguishable" from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Id. at 405-06. A state court's decision can involve an "unreasonable application" of federal law only if it (1) correctly identifies the governing rule but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable. Id. at 407. Therefore, "[f]ederal habeas relief is available under the 'unreasonable application' standard only if the state court's application of clearly established federal law was 'objectively unreasonable.'" Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 409).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), federal courts are directed to determine whether the state court based its findings on "an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." A state court's determinations of fact shall be "presumed to be correct," and the habeas petitioner "shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). However, even when the state court addresses a question of law, this court is not authorized "to evaluate [a petitioner's] claim de novo rather than through the lens of § 2254(d)." Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 639 (2003). "This is a 'difficult to meet,' and 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Cullen v.Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington, 562 U.S. 101 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Additionally, a state court's summary rejection of a federal constitutional issue qualifies as an adjudication on the merits under § 2254(d) so that the summary rejection is entitled to the same deference as a written opinion. See Wright v. Sec. of Dept. of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2002).

C. Issues

1. Challenge to the Voluntariness of the Guilty Plea

Petitioner claims the trial court erred in accepting his plea of guilty because the court knew the plea was not made voluntarily in the best interest of Petitioner. Petitioner provides little support for this claim other than referencing these excerpts from the record of the guilty plea transcript:

The Court: Okay, did you break into those cars on the lot?

Defendant: I didn't break into them. I just opened the door up.

... [L]ater in the hearing...

The Court: Do you recommend I accept the plea?

Mr. Kidd: I do, your Honor.

Doc. 1 at 4.

Petitioner presented this same argument, in its totality, in his Rule 32 petition. On appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals noted this argument was "clearly insufficient to satisfy his burden of pleading." Doc. 7-8 at 5. Even if Petitioner had satisfied his burden of pleading, the appellate court found the claim to be without merit. Characterizing Petitioner's argument on appeal regarding the voluntariness of his guilty plea as a claim that the circuit court failed to "undertake a factual inquiry to determine if the plea is involuntary," the Court of Criminal Appealsdetermined:

The record on direct appeal, however, clearly refutes [Petitioner's] claim that the circuit court knew that [Petitioner's] plea was involuntary and that it did not undertake a factual inquiry. SeeMcNabb v. State, 991 So. 2d 313, 320 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) (holding that "because [McNabb's] claim was clearly refuted by the record, summary denial was proper pursuant to Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim. P.")

Doc. 7-8 at 6. From its review of Petitioner's guilty plea transcript, the appellate court found the trial court did not err in summarily dismissing Petitioner's Rule 32 challenge to the voluntariness of his guilty plea where the trial court had a factual basis for accepting Petitioner's plea and nothing in the record demonstrated the trial court knew Petitioner's plea was involuntary. Doc. 7-8 at 6-9. Because Petitioner's challenge to the constitutionality of his guilty plea was adjudicated adversely to him by the state courts, this court reviews the claim in accordance with the directives in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). See Williams, 529 U.S. at 403.

To satisfy the requirements of due process, a guilty plea must be voluntary, intelligent, and uncoerced. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969); United States v. Moriarity, 429 F.3d 1012, 1019 (11th Cir. 2005). "The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is 'whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.'" Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (citations omitted). Thus, there is no violation of the Constitution where a guilty plea results from an intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 766 (1970).

The state courts did not decide Petitio...