Marose v. Hennameyer, C7-83-1211
| Decision Date | 24 April 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. C7-83-1211,C7-83-1211 |
| Parties | Shirlee MAROSE, Appellant, v. Beverly HENNAMEYER, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
Absent any facts Marose had suffered a permanent injury, or was disabled for more than sixty days as required by the Minnesota No-Fault Act, summary judgment is proper.
Kevin L. Callahan, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Richard N. Newcome, St. Paul, for respondents.
Considered and decided by POPOVICH, C.J., PARKER and WOZNIAK, JJ., with oral argument waived.
This appeal involves a negligence action filed by appellant, Shirlee Marose, against respondent, Beverly Hennameyer, for injuries allegedly suffered by Marose in an automobile accident in which both were involved. Hennameyer moved for summary judgment on the ground that Marose had failed to meet the tort thresholds necessary to initiate a negligence suit under the Minnesota No-Fault Act. The court granted Hennameyer's motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. We affirm.
Marose was injured in a three-car accident on August 27, 1980. The vehicle in which she was riding as a passenger was struck from behind by a vehicle driven by Hennameyer and owned by Schuchard.
At the time of the accident, Marose was employed part time at Brown Photo. Marose claims her injuries caused her to miss work from August 28, 1980 to September 5, 1980 and October 27 to October 29, 1980. Additionally, Marose was seen at a SHARE Health Plan Medical Clinic six times between September 12, 1980 and March 5, 1981.
In opposition to Hennameyer's motion for summary judgment, Marose submitted all her medical records. These included a note dated May 5, 1982 from the Saint Anthony Orthopaedic Clinic, which stated, "I do not anticipate, based upon her clinical and radiographic examination, any permanent physical impairment," (emphasis supplied) and was signed by her treating orthopedist, Dr. John Dowdle, Jr. The statements and notations of Dr. Dowdle are in the record.
In an affidavit dated May 18, 1983, Marose stated she still suffered pain from the accident and was unable to perform various household tasks such as laundry and vacuuming. She claimed she had been fitted with a back brace by a Dr. Ault, who informed her that the injuries could be lasting and permanent in nature. Yet neither the statements of Dr. Ault nor supporting medical reports are found in the record. In interrogatories previously answered, Marose attributes the statement that her injuries would be permanent to Dr. Dowdle.
1. Did Marose produce material facts in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment showing that she had suffered a permanent injury or was disabled for more than sixty days as required by the Minnesota No-Fault Act?
Summary judgment is proper under Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure when:
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Minn.R.Civ.P. 56.03. Facts shall be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. In such instances, the sole question before the court is whether an issue of established material fact exists. Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 270 Minn. 525, 531, 134 N.W.2d 892, 897 (1965).
When a motion for summary judgment is made and properly supported:
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere averments or denials of his pleading but must present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Minn.R.Civ.P. 56.05. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot rely upon naked allegations of his pleadings but must present specific facts showing genuine issues for trial. Morgan v. McLaughlin, 290 Minn. 389, 393, 188 N.W.2d 829, 832 (1971).
Under Minnesota's No-Fault Act, as a quid pro quo for the right to receive Basic Economic Loss Benefits regardless of fault, injured parties covered by the Act are limited in their right to recover general damages in Tort. M. Steenson, Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance 23 (1982). Uncompensated economic loss is recoverable under Minn.Stat. Sec. 65B.51(2) (1982); Non-economic loss is recoverable if the tort thresholds of Minn.Stat. Sec. 65B.51(3) (1982) are met.
An injured party can sue for economic loss:
not paid or payable by a reparation obligor because of daily or weekly dollar limitations of section 65B.44, the seven-day services exclusion of section 65B.44, the limitations of benefits contained in section 65B.44, subdivision 1, or an exclusion from coverage by sections 65B.58 to 65B.60.
Minn.Stat. Sec. 65B.51(2) (1982). Here, Marose claimed future economic loss in the form of future medical...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Musicland Group, Inc. v. Ceridian Corp.
...a genuine issue of material fact and may not rely upon mere averments in the pleadings or unsupported allegations. Marose v. Hennameyer, 347 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Minn.App.1984). The party cannot depend upon the possibility of developing evidence at trial. O'Neil v. Kelly, 307 Minn. 498, 499, 23......
-
McNair v. Farris
...the permanency of the injury" and "failed to raise any genuine issue to overcome the statutory tort threshold"); Marose v. Hennameyer, 347 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Minn.Ct.App.1984) (holding plaintiff's subjective testimony insufficient to counter objective medical 2. Dismissal With Prejudice McNai......
-
Ellingson v. Knudson, 920275
...of material fact that his injuries constitute a "disability." Consequently, summary judgment is appropriate. See Marose v. Hennameyer, 347 N.W.2d 509 (Minn.App.1984). The summary judgment and order denying Ellingson's post-summary-judgment motions are VANDE WALLE, C.J., and MESCHKE, LEVINE ......
-
State v. Sorgine, No. A07-0032 (Minn. App. 2/26/2008)
...appellant could not relate his symptoms to a specific illness or diagnosis was not an abuse of discretion. See Marose v. Hennameyer, 347 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Minn. App. 1984) (concluding that lay person was not qualified to give opinion on her need for medical Appellant argues that the district......