Marr v. Marr

Decision Date26 March 1992
PartiesLaura MARR, Appellant, v. Donald MARR, Respondent.
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Carter, Conboy, Bardwell, Case, Blackmore & Napierski (Loretta Branigan Tobin, of counsel), Albany, for appellant.

Friedman & Manning (Stephen L. Molinsek, of counsel), Delmar, for respondent.

Before WEISS, P.J., and YESAWICH, CREW, MAHONEY and HARVEY, JJ.

YESAWICH, Justice.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Harris, J.), entered December 28, 1990 in Albany County, which, inter alia, partially granted plaintiff's motion for certain pendente lite relief.

After nine years of marriage, plaintiff commenced an action against defendant for divorce based on cruel and inhuman treatment. With defendant's consent, Supreme Court awarded plaintiff pendente lite relief in the following respects: residential care and supervision of the parties' two children, child support in the amount of $230 per week, exclusive use and possession of the marital residence, health and dental insurance for herself and the children, and payment by defendant of 100% of the children's uninsured medical and dental expenses. Supreme Court also awarded plaintiff $100 per week in temporary maintenance. Defendant was granted visitation, the right to take the children as dependency exemptions, and access to the marital residence to remove his personal belongings and to have the residence and contents thereof appraised. Plaintiff appeals from so much of the court's order as denied her request to have defendant pay the mortgage and utility bills on the marital residence, granted her child support in an amount less than she sought, and denied her request for interim counsel fees.

Pendente lite awards may be modified when exigent circumstances are shown, such as where a party is unable to meet his or her financial obligations or justice otherwise requires (Suydam v. Suydam, 167 A.D.2d 752, 753, 563 N.Y.S.2d 315). Modification of the instant award is not, however, warranted. Plaintiff, who is in her early 30s and is in good health, receives maintenance and the full amount of statutorily calculated basic child support from defendant (see, Krantz v. Krantz, 175 A.D.2d 863, 573 N.Y.S.2d 736, [1991, 2d Dept]; Lenigan v. Lenigan, 159 A.D.2d 108, 112, 558 N.Y.S.2d 727; Domestic Relations Law § 240[1-b][b][3][ii]. Although plaintiff maintains that these payments are insufficient to support a reasonable standard of living for herself and the children, defendant disputes the amount of her actual reasonable expenses and potential earnings. The remedy, if there is any inequity here, is a prompt trial (see, Quilty v....

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  • Colley v. Colley
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • 13 de janeiro de 1994
    ...or her financial obligations or justice otherwise requires (see, Newkirk v. Newkirk, 194 A.D.2d 842, 598 N.Y.S.2d 589; Marr v. Marr, 181 A.D.2d 974, 975, 581 N.Y.S.2d 873). Indeed, this court has consistently held that the most appropriate remedy for any claimed inequity in a temporary awar......
  • Newkirk v. Newkirk
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • 3 de junho de 1993
    ...that justice requires our departure from the general rule. A prompt trial is the remedy for any claimed inequity (see, Marr v. Marr, 181 A.D.2d 974, 975, 581 N.Y.S.2d 873; Wachob v. Wachob, 179 A.D.2d 912, 913, 579 N.Y.S.2d ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs. WEISS, P.J., and MI......
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    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • 17 de novembro de 1994
    ...such as the type of property involved, the difficulty in evaluating the property and the parties' financial status (see, Marr v. Marr, 181 A.D.2d 974, 581 N.Y.S.2d 873; Dzembo v. Dzembo, 160 A.D.2d 1144, 554 N.Y.S.2d In the instant case, plaintiff is a successful restauranteur with numerous......
  • Holbrook v. Holbrook
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • 11 de abril de 1996
    ...attorney, was not unreasonable given plaintiff's inability to pay those fees from her own limited funds (see, Marr v. Marr, 181 A.D.2d 974, 975, 581 N.Y.S.2d 873; Weber v. Weber, 156 A.D.2d 189, 548 N.Y.S.2d 445), the parties' disparate incomes, assets and expenses (see, DeCabrera v. Cabrer......
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