Marranzano v. Riggs Nat. Bank of Washington, DC

• Decision Date: 12 July 1950
• Docket Number: No. 10416.,10416.
• Parties: MARRANZANO v. RIGGS NAT. BANK OF WASHINGTON, D. C. et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

87 US App. DC 195, 184 F.2d 349 (1950)

MARRANZANO v. RIGGS NAT. BANK OF WASHINGTON, D. C. et al.

No. 10416.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued April 14, 1950.

Decided July 12, 1950.

Mr. Benjamin C. Sigal, Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Mr. Louis G. Caldwell, Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. Donald C. Beelar, Washington, D. C., and Herbert J. Miller, Jr., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellees.

Mr. Kelley E. Griffith, Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for appellees.

Before WILBUR K. MILLER, FAHY and BAZELON, Circuit Judges.

WILBUR K. MILLER, Circuit Judge.

Tina Marranzano sued the Washington Times-Herald¹ to recover damages for alleged wrongful discharge from its editorial department where she had been employed some eleven years. Her theory was that she had been dismissed in violation of a collective bargaining contract between the newspaper and the union of which she was a member. The complaint was dismissed by the United States District Court pursuant to a motion based upon its alleged failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Dissatisfied with this result, she appeals.

The trial judge dismissed the complaint because he concluded an individual member of the union cannot sue for damages because of a breach of the collective bargaining agreement; and because of his further conclusion that the terms of the contract do not restrict the employers' right to discharge and that consequently appellant's dismissal does not violate it. This is manifest from the memorandum opinion of the trial judge which makes no reference to the question whether the complaint stated facts sufficient to form, constitute or support a cause of action, but does say, "This Agreement as drawn grants no right of suit * * *", and construes the agreement as not restricting the right of the appellees to discharge employees.

But the contractual provision that "There shall be no discharges except for good and sufficient cause" restricts the employers' right to discharge; the agreement is breached, therefore, if an employee is let out without such cause, and the court erred in holding otherwise. It remains to determine whether the appellant, an individual member of the union but not directly and personally a party to the contract, can maintain an action for damages personally suffered because of its breach.

The right of the party to a contract to sue when damaged by the other party's violation of it does not depend upon the grant of such right by the terms of the contract itself. So the fact that "This Agreement as drawn grants no right of suit" does not prevent appellant from maintaining this action. The question is, does the appellant fall within any exception to the general rule² that a stranger to a contract may not sue to enforce its terms or to recover damages for a violation thereof?

According to the agreement, it was made between Eleanor Patterson, the publisher, and the union "for itself and on behalf of all employees in the Editorial Department of the Publisher". It was made, therefore, on behalf of the appellant and directly for her benefit, its object being to define and protect her rights in regard to job security, salary, working hours and conditions, as well as in other respects. Each employee was directly interested in and affected by the contractual obligations of the employer. We hold that an individual employee may sue for damages suffered through the employers' violation of this collective bargaining agreement.³

Although the District Court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that the appellant had no right to sue for damages suffered through the employers' breach of the contract with the union, it does not follow that the complaint was good against the motion to dismiss. In order to state a cause of action it was necessary, of course, for the appellant to allege facts showing a breach of the agreement by the employer in discharging her.⁴ The complaint is wholly lacking in that respect. Its only averment of fact concerning the discharge is that it occurred "without any prior notice by the defendants". The appellant did not allege facts showing either (a) that the employers' reason for releasing her, which she could have learned if she did not know what it was,⁵ was not "good and sufficient", or (b) that she was entitled to notice prior to discharge, which the contract does not require in all cases.⁶

Moreover, although the appellant pleaded the terms of the contract which require the employer, in some instances, to grant severance pay, she did not plead she...