Marriage of Benjamins, In re

• Decision Date: 29 June 1994
• Docket Number: No. B078373,B078373
• Parties: In re the MARRIAGE OF Abraham and Annette BENJAMINS, Abraham Benjamins, Appellant, Annette Benjamins, et al., Respondents.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 313

31 Cal.Rptr.2d 313

26 Cal.App.4th 423

In re the MARRIAGE OF Abraham and Annette BENJAMINS Abraham Benjamins, Appellant Annette Benjamins, et al., Respondents.

No. B078373.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7, California.

June 29, 1994.

[26 Cal.App.4th 426] David L. Sharp, San Diego, for appellant.

Stephen A. Kolodny and Carole R. Azran, Los Angeles, for respondents.

JOHNSON, Associate Justice.

In this appeal we are asked to decide whether a supporting spouse must continue to pay a supported spouse's medical insurance premium after the supported spouse's death, pursuant to a marital settlement agreement which limits the parties' right to modify its terms. We answer the question in the negative and reverse the order of the trial court which denied reimbursement of amounts paid for medical insurance covering periods after the supported spouse's death. We also reverse an award of attorney's fees and costs the trial court imposed against the supporting spouse as a sanction for filing the motion for reimbursement.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Appellant, Abraham Benjamins, and Annette Benjamins separated in July 1983, after a ten-year marriage. The marriage was terminated as to status in February 1987. Eventually the parties entered into a marital settlement agreement which resolved the remaining issues between them. On August 30, 1990, the terms of the settlement agreement were read into the record in open court. This agreement was accepted by the court as the final judgment on January 17, 1991.

Paragraphs 5 through 17 of the agreement provide for equalizing payments, security for these payments and spousal support payments in progressively descending amounts as the equalizing payments are made. Appellant was to pay Annette $1,500,000 in three equal payments of $500,000. These payments were due March 1, 1991, March 1, 1992, and September 1, 1993. In addition, appellant was to pay Annette $9,000 per month as spousal support until the first payment was made, $6,000 per month after the first payment and $4,000 per month after the second payment. After the final equalizing payment appellant's obligation for spousal support would terminate.

Paragraph 19 of the agreement required appellant to pay Annette's medical insurance premiums. That provision provides: "Petitioner is ordered to pay the Respondent the sum of Nine Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty-five Dollars ($9,855.00) on or before December 1, 1990 and the additional sum of Thirteen Thousand One Hundred Forty Dollars ($13,140.00) on or before September 1, 1991. Upon payment of the aforementioned sums, which relate to the Respondent's medical insurance premiums, the Petitioner shall have no further liability or obligation for the Respondent's medical insurance."

Paragraph 40 of the agreement is the nonmodification clause. This provision states: "The Court finds that the parties agreed, and the Court orders, that there shall be no modification of the terms, covenants and provisions of this Judgment of Dissolution, except pursuant to a writing subsequently executed by the parties."

Appellant paid the $9,855 due December 1, 1990. This payment covered three quarters of Annette's medical insurance premiums, or from December 1, 1990, through August 30, 1991, when the next annual payment would be due.

Annette died on April 11, 1991. ¹ Respondent did not dispute appellant's obligation for spousal support payments terminated by operation of law upon Annette's death. (Civ.Code, § 4801, subd. (b) [now Fam.Code, § 4337].) After her death respondent withdrew a lien against appellant's real property which provided security for future spousal support payments.

In view of her death, appellant refused to make the $13,140 payment due September 1, 1991, for the annual premium for Annette's medical insurance. In response, respondent threatened to foreclose on remaining liens on appellant's real property imposed as security for the equalizing payments. Appellant ultimately paid the $13,140 and sought reimbursement in the trial court.

Appellant filed a noticed motion for reimbursement of the advance payment of $3,285 for the quarterly medical insurance premium covering June 1, 1991, through August 30, 1991, as well as for the $13,140 payment which was to cover the following year. Respondent opposed the motion. She claimed appellant's obligation to pay these amounts was clear and unequivocal and, based on the agreement's nonmodification clause, appellant was not entitled to relief. Respondent also requested appellant be sanctioned for bringing a frivolous motion.

The trial court adopted respondent's argument the settlement agreement was nonmodifiable and denied appellant's request for reimbursement. The trial court also found appellant's motion was "frivolous" and imposed sanctions of $2,500 against appellant payable to counsel for respondent.

Appellant challenges the court's ruling and award of sanctions.

DISCUSSION

I. APPELLANT'S OBLIGATION TO PAY ANNETTE'S MEDICAL INSURANCE PREMIUMS TERMINATED BY OPERATION OF LAW ON HER DEATH.

Respondent acknowledges appellant's spousal support obligations terminated by operation of law upon Annette's death. (Civ.Code, § 4801, subd. (b) [now Fam.Code, § 4337].) However, she contends appellant's obligation to pay the specified amounts for Annette's medical insurance premiums was not similarly extinguished because this obligation did not constitute spousal support. Consequently, she argues, appellant is bound to pay this amount, and may not terminate his obligation, because the parties agreed the terms of the agreement could not be modified except by a writing. Appellant counters, because health insurance for a supported spouse is in the nature of spousal support, it should similarly terminate upon the supported spouse's death. We find appellant's argument persuasive.

Unless a more specific statute otherwise provides, agreements between spouses are construed under the statutory rules governing the interpretation of contracts generally. (Civ.Code, § 1635; In re Marriage of Garrity/Bishton (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 675, 683, 226 Cal.Rptr. 485; Verner v. Verner (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 718, 724, 143 Cal.Rptr. 826; 2 Hogoboom & King, Cal.Prac.Guide, Family Law (Rutter Group 1993) p 9.86, p. 9-25.) Thus, "[t]he interpretation of the effect of a judgment is a question of law within the ambit of the appellate court." (John Siebel Associates v. Keele (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 560, 565, 233 Cal.Rptr. 231.)

Civil Code section 4801, subdivision (b) (now Fam.Code, § 4337) provides:

"Except as otherwise agreed by the parties in writing, the obligation of any party under any order or judgment for the support and maintenance of the other party shall terminate upon the death of either party or the remarriage of the other party." (Italics added.)

"Support" is broadly defined as "a source or means of living; subsistence, sustenance, or living. In a broad sense the term includes all such means of living as would enable one to live in the degree of comfort suitable and becoming to his station of life. It is said to include anything requisite to housing, feeding, clothing, health, proper recreation, vacation, traveling expense, or other proper cognate purposes; also, proper care, nursing, and medical attendance in sickness, and suitable burial at death." (Black's Law Dict. (5th ed. 1979) p. 1291, col. 1, italics added.)

The term "maintenance" similarly involves expansive concepts of means to cover numerous types of living expenses, including health care: "The furnishing by one person to another, for his support, of the means of living, or food, clothing, shelter, etc., particularly where the legal relation of the parties is such that one is bound to support the other, as between father and child, or husband and wife.... Term 'maintenance' means primarily food, clothing and shelter, but it does include such items as reasonable and necessary transportation or automobile expenses, medical and drug expenses, utilities and household expenses." (Black's Law Dict. (5th ed. 1979) p. 859, col. 2, emphasis added.)

Thus, "support" and "maintenance" are merely general terms used to describe a wide variety of various types of assistance designed to cover everyday living expenses, including medical care.

In our view the issue whether payment of medical insurance premiums constitutes spousal support is not a close one. Its purpose is to guarantee proper health care to facilitate a healthy and productive life. Medical insurance coverage generally ensures a person will have access to the care necessary to maintain his or her physical well being. In illness, proper medical coverage provides the means to improve the quality of one's life or to enable one to live in relative comfort. Medical insurance also ensures a person will have access to adequate and immediate treatment in the event of accidents or other medical emergencies. Next to food, clothing and shelter, the necessity for proper medical care is at least as much a fundamental requisite of everyday living as is transportation or education.

We consequently conclude payment of medical insurance premiums to provide for proper health care for a supported spouse necessarily is in the nature of spousal support. (See also 1 Hogoboom & King, Cal.Practice Guide, Fam.Law (Rutter Group 1993) p 6:143.2, p. 6-238 [order to pay medical insurance properly part of spousal support order].)

In the context of this case, payment of the medical insurance premiums constituted an important part of the support Annette received in order to guarantee proper medical care. At the time the parties entered into the stipulated agreement Annette was already gravely ill and in serious need of continued medical coverage. Thus, appellant's payment of Annette's medical insurance premiums ensured she would not have to use funds designated for daily living expenses to pay for her medical coverage.

Earlier decisions have construed...