Marriage of Berger, In re, 87-1748

• Decision Date: 24 August 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-1748,87-1748
• Citation: 431 N.W.2d 387
• Parties: In re MARRIAGE OF Alexis Carole BERGER and Richard Allen Berger. Upon the Petition of Alexis Carole BERGER, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Richard Allen BERGER, Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Court of Appeals

Page 387

431 N.W.2d 387

In re MARRIAGE OF Alexis Carole BERGER and Richard Allen Berger.

Upon the Petition of Alexis Carole BERGER, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Richard Allen BERGER, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 87-1748.

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

Aug. 24, 1988.

As Modified Sept. 2 and Dec. 8, 1988.

Daniel L. Bray, Iowa City, for respondent-appellant.

Sharon A. Mellon, Iowa City, for petitioner-appellee.

Considered by SCHLEGEL, P.J., and HAYDEN and SACKETT, JJ.

SCHLEGEL, Judge.

Respondent, Richard Allen Berger, appeals several provisions of the decree entered in the dissolution of this ten-year marriage. He complains that: (1) the court should not have ordered alimony for petitioner, Alexis Carole Berger; (2) the court should not have awarded Alexis attorney fees; (3) the court should not have fixed post-high school child support for their seven-year-old daughter; and (4) the court should not have awarded Alexis a $100,000 judgment. We affirm as modified.

Because the issues are singularly interrelated, we review the award of judgment and alimony together.

The parties were married on June 4, 1977. They have one child, Andrea, born April 7, 1981. At the time of trial in May 1987, Richard had completed his third year of a five-year medical research residency. Richard expects to complete his residency in July 1989, at which time he will begin two years of post-graduate research-oriented fellowship. Richard's goal is to engage in medical and anatomical research. Alexis completed her B.A. degree in studio art in 1981. At the time of trial, she was a part-time student at the University of Iowa and had completed eleven hours toward a teaching certificate. She planned to receive her teaching certificate in May 1988. For the most part, Alexis was employed regularly during the parties' marriage.

The district court determined that Alexis' contribution to Richard's degrees and his ultimate certificate to practice medicine had a value of $100,000. Based upon that finding, the district court awarded Alexis a judgment in the amount of $100,000, to commence drawing interest at the rate of ten percent per annum on July 1, 1989, contemporaneous with an obligation to make an initial payment of $10,000. On July 1 of each year thereafter, the court ordered Richard to pay $10,000 plus interest until the entire judgment is satisfied in full. In addition, the court ordered Richard to pay $300 per month in alimony commencing December 1, 1987, and continuing through July 1, 1989. The expressed purpose in awarding such alimony was to permit Alexis to complete her education and to assist her in transition to a regular teaching job. Thereafter, the court ordered the payment of alimony of $1 per year, terminable on the death of either party or upon Alexis's remarriage.

The trial court, in addressing the subject of compensation for Alexis's contributions to Richard's career, stated:

The degree and education obtained by Richard are not property. In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Iowa 1978); In re Marriage of Graham, , 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978).

The Iowa Supreme Court recognizes, however, that an increase in future earning capacity is an asset for division. In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 891 (emphasis added).

Accordingly, the trial court determined that the increase in future earning capacity, in and of itself, possessed a value and constituted a divisible asset.

To the extent that the trial court based its decree upon its perception that the Iowa courts consider an advanced degree an asset for division, it misunderstands the holding of Horstmann. As is made quite clear by Horstmann and subsequent cases:

[A] party's advanced degree is not a property to be divided in value, yet education is a factor to be considered on the party's earning capacity--and this is true not only on the issue of "an equitable division of assets" but also as to whether "alimony should be awarded and, if so, to the amount to be awarded."

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Under Horstmann the question before us is not whether Gary's training should be considered; manifestly it is a factor in the case and it is a significant factor because it substantially enhances Gary's earning capacity.

In re Marriage of Janssen, 348 N.W.2d 251, 254 (Iowa 1984). See also In re Marriage of Estlund, 344 N.W.2d 276, 280 (Iowa App.1983).

In Janssen, the court noted that it is proper to recognize a spouse's contribution to the other spouse's enhanced earning capacity in the determination as to whether alimony should be awarded and if so, how much and for how long. 348 N.W.2d at 254. It is also proper to require that the recipient of that contribution may not, through neglect or design, deprive the donor of reasonable contributions. On the other hand, although there may be evidence that a person with superior education, talent and training can earn an extremely large income, courts may not, in decrees of dissolution, assume or require that either party will produce such incomes. In re Marriage of Griffin, 356 N.W.2d 606, 609 (Iowa App.1984).

In the case at bar, Richard's stated desire is to pursue a career in medical research, in which a large part of the compensation is in the nature of satisfaction of having helped the advancement of medical science and the improvement of the health and condition of society. Under the circumstances known in this record, we cannot assume that Richard will pursue a highly compensatory practice of medicine, because the less...