Marriage of Chala, In re

• Decision Date: 14 May 1979
• Citation: 155 Cal.Rptr. 605,92 Cal.App.3d 996
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re the MARRIAGE OF Betty and Salvador Ansara CHALA. Betty CHALA, Respondent, v. Salvador Ansara CHALA, Appellant. Civ. 54225.

Page 605

155 Cal.Rptr. 605

92 Cal.App.3d 996

In re the MARRIAGE OF Betty and Salvador Ansara CHALA Betty CHALA, Respondent, v. Salvador Ansara CHALA, Appellant.

Civ. 54225.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

May 14, 1979.

Michael J. Movius, Glendale, for appellant.

Anita H. Dymant, Ventura, for respondent.

HASTINGS, Associate Justice.

Betty Chala (wife), respondent, and Salvador Ansara Chala (husband), appellant, were married for six years and three months. The minor child of wife, Heather, was adopted by husband during the course of the marriage. At the conclusion of the dissolution proceeding, wife was awarded as her half of the community property a 1966 Cadillac, valued at $200, miscellaneous household furniture and furnishings valued at $4,000, and cash of $10,186.50. Husband was awarded cash of $14,386.50. Husband was ordered to pay child support of $125 per month.

The community obligations of the parties totalled $19,971.10. ¹ In connection with these obligations, the court made the following order: "Respondent (husband) is ordered to assume, pay and hold Petitioner (wife) harmless from 100% Of the said community obligations. . . . Respondent (husband) is ordered to pay to Petitioner (wife) as and for spousal support, a lump sum payment in the amount of $9,985.55, which shall satisfy any and all obligations of Respondent to Petitioner for spousal support, and neither party shall thereafter be entitled to any further or other award for spousal support."

Other facts will be set forth when pertinent to the issues on appeal.

1. Husband's first issue on appeal is that the court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay child support in the amount of $125 per month. Evidence introduced at the trial showed that husband was 62 years of age and unemployed at that time. Husband had owned and operated the Calabasas Shell Station from 1972 through 1975, and was employed through December 1976 as a manager for Chala Enterprises, a corporation owned by his sons. He testified that he spends a portion of his time at his sons' service station in Hollywood, and that he occasionally helps out with the customers. He had applied for social security benefits approximately two weeks prior to the date of trial, and these benefits were expected to begin within one month. He resides with one of his sons who pays all of his expenses, and there is no charge to husband for rent. He testified that he suffers from high blood pressure.

He claims that these facts do not justify the $125 per month child support award. He concedes the liberal discretion given to the trial court in fixing child support (In re Marriage of Muldrow, 61 Cal.App.3d 327, 332, 132 Cal.Rptr. 48), but he feels the court abused its discretion in considering his ability to pay. We disagree. The facts disclose that husband can be gainfully employed by his sons at their service station and he will receive social security benefits. The award is not so excessive or exorbitant as to be an abuse of discretion as a matter of law. There was sufficient evidence before the trial court to support its conclusion that husband's needs were being met, that he was able to work and he could afford the child support award.

2. Husband's second issue on appeal is more challenging. After dividing $28,773 (mostly cash) of community assets equally the court found that there remained $19,971.10 in community liabilities. It then created a plan requiring husband to pay all of these liabilities, but labelled one-half of the payments to wife as spousal support. Wife seems to be satisfied with the order, but husband is not. He claims the order was merely a device to make him pay all of the community debts of the parties, which is contrary to California's Family Law Act, Civil Code section 4800 et seq., and current California case law.

It is true that California decisional law has interpreted the California Family Act to mean that community property assets and community obligations must be divided equally when the community assets Exceed the community obligations. (In re Marriage of Fonstein, 17 Cal.3d 738, 748, 131 Cal.Rptr. 873, 552 P.2d 1169; In re Marriage of Barnert, 85 Cal.App.3d 413, 420-421, 149 Cal.Rptr. 616; In re Marriage of Smith, 79 Cal.App.3d 725, 746, fn. 9, 145 Cal.Rptr. 205; and In re Marriage of Eastis, 47 Cal.App.3d 459, 463, 120 Cal.Rptr. 861.) If, as husband claims, the form of the award was solely a means for subverting this now established law, we would agree that the court abused its discretion.

However, it is also correct in appropriate cases to include in spousal support orders a provision that the payments, or portions thereof, may be paid to third parties for overdue or future debts. In the very recent case of In re Marriage of Epstein, 24 Cal.3d 76, 85, 154 Cal.Rptr. 413, 418, 592 P.2d 1165, 1170, the Supreme Court noted: "Payment of a debt, of course, may constitute payment of spousal or child support. (See Gay v. Gay, 146 Cal. 237, 243, 79 P. 885; Bushman v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.App.3d 177, 181-183, 108 Cal.Rptr. 765; In re Hendricks, 5 Cal.App.3d 793, 797-798, 85 Cal.Rptr. 220 . . . )."

In our present case the debts (see fn. 1, Supra ) were past due obligations incurred by the community business. It appears that the key issue is whether these debts can be shifted to the husband in the form of spousal support when there were sufficient community liquid assets to pay them at the time that the marriage was dissolved. It therefore becomes necessary to review prior case law to determine, if possible, what kind of debts can be ordered paid as spousal support. In Gay, supra, the earliest case cited by the Supreme Court in Epstein, the court ordered husband to pay $300 to wife as a form of reimbursement for costs incurred by her in the past but after separation for support. The court said (146 Cal. at p. 243, 79 P. at p. 888): "If it should appear to the court that it was necessary, in order to insure the support of the wife upon the amount to be paid to her periodically in the future, that existing wants or expenses incurred by her should be provided for, the court, within the qualification announced above, would have the right to do so." Later in the opinion, the court states that the lump sum payment of $300 was justified "in order that the respondent might be placed in a situation so that in the future she would be enabled to live upon the allowance provided to be paid her." (Id. at p. 243, 79 P. at p. 888.) In In re Hendricks, supra, 5 Cal.App.3d, at page 795, 85 Cal.Rptr. at p. 221, husband was ordered to pay wife as temporary alimony $300 per month, with the added proviso, " '(p) ursuant to the further stipulation of counsel, the court orders that defendant shall pay all community debts and obligations incurred prior to date of separation; . . . ' " A contempt action was brought against the husband for failure to pay the community debts, and the husband argued that if found in contempt of court, he could be imprisoned for a debt in violation of California Constitution Article I, section 15. The court concluded it was not such a debt, but was a valid spousal support order, stating at page 797, 85 Cal.Rptr. 222: "The court may include an amount for the payment of past community debts so that the spouse seeking support 'might be placed in a situation so that in the future she would be enabled to live upon the allowance provided to be paid her.' (Gay v. Gay (supra), 146 Cal. 237, 243, 79 P. 885, 888.)" In Bushman, supra, husband was ordered to pay mortgage payments on the residence as a portion of spousal support. Husband was cited for contempt for not making these payments and the court followed Hendricks, supra, in holding that these payments were a form of spousal support and that husband could be found in contempt for failure to pay.

In In re Marriage of Epstein, supra, 24 Cal.3d 76, 154 Cal.Rptr. 413, 592 P.2d 1165, the court considered the problem of reimbursing a spouse from the community who paid community debts after the separation. The opinion frowns upon payment of these debts by one spouse when community property is available for this purpose, unless the payments are directly related to spousal or child support. The court states: "(W)hen after separation, one of the spouses makes payments on preexisting community debts out of earnings or other separate funds, if the no-reimbursement rule is applied, The result is that community obligations which would otherwise be charged against community property and borne by the parties equally are charged exclusively to the paying spouse. Thus, application of the no-reimbursement rule will discourage payment of community debts after separation, exacerbate the financial and emotional disruption which all too frequently accompanies the breakup of a marriage and, perhaps, result in...