Marriage of Patroske, In re
| Citation | 888 S.W.2d 374 |
| Decision Date | 22 November 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 18956,18956 |
| Parties | In re the MARRIAGE OF Anneta I. PATROSKE and James E. Patroske. Anneta I. PATROSKE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. James E. PATROSKE, Respondent-Respondent. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Missouri (US) |
Betty A. Pace, Springfield, for petitioner-appellant.
J.D. Baker, Baker & Dull, Osceola, for respondent-respondent.
Anneta Patroske (Wife) appeals from a decree dissolving her three-year marriage to James Patroske (Husband). 1 Wife raises four points on this appeal which relate to the division of property, custody of their two-year-old daughter, and failure of the trial court to continue the proceedings to permit an investigation into allegations of Husband's sexual abuse of the minor child.
When the parties were married, they moved onto Husband's property in Osceola, Missouri, where he was conducting an automobile repair business through his wholly-owned corporation, Double Nickel Service, Inc. (the corporation). The real estate, consisting of a metal shop building with an attached apartment on two lots, was then and continued to be titled solely in Husband's name. During the marriage, the corporation paid for construction of an addition to the apartment (the house), built to expand the living quarters. Wife contends on this appeal that because both she and Husband worked on the project, part of the increased value of the real estate caused by construction of the house should constitute marital property.
During the marriage, the parties maintained a personal checking account in their joint names. Money deposited in that account included proceeds Husband received from the settlement of a workers' compensation claim as well as a personal injury claim which arose prior to the marriage. Money from that account was used to make a $3000 loan to the corporation which Wife contends should, contrary to the judgment, also be included as marital property.
A confrontation occurred when the parties separated in April 1992 which resulted in Husband kicking out a window in Wife's car and Wife threatening Husband with a gun. An adult abuse action was filed in St. Clair County which resulted in Husband being awarded custody of their child with Wife receiving visitation privileges. Husband also filed a dissolution of marriage action in which he alleged that he then had custody of the child. Thereafter, there was an apparent attempt at reconciliation, resulting in the Trial commenced on Monday, March 22, 1993, and at the end of March 23 it was recessed until Friday, March 26. When the trial resumed, Wife presented evidence that the child, while staying with Wife's grandmother the evening of the first day of trial, had made statements indicating that she had been sexually abused by Husband the preceding weekend. Following trial that day, the case was recessed until June 7 and concluded on June 8, 1993. In the interim, an investigation was conducted by the Division of Family Services, including an interview of the child. Following considerable evidence concerning the alleged sexual abuse and the activities and conduct of each of the parties, the trial court awarded the care, custody and control of the child to Husband with specific visitation in favor of Wife. The trial court also distributed the marital and non-marital property as follows:
signing, in September 1992, of a stipulation to dismiss the dissolution action. At or about the same time, Wife obtained physical custody of the child for a visitation. She filed the dismissal of the then pending dissolution a few days later, and on the same day filed the petition in the instant dissolution action, alleging that she then had custody of the child.
Non-marital property: $46,113 $ 5,606
Marital property: $ 2,440 $ 1,284
Debts ordered paid: $ 650 $13,618
A judgment in a dissolution case must be affirmed if there is substantial evidence to support it, it is not against the weight of the evidence, and it neither erroneously declares or applies the law. Rule 73.01(c); 2 Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976); Schelsky v. Schelsky, 796 S.W.2d 888, 891 (Mo.App.E.D.1990). All of the evidence and permissible inferences therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision, and all contrary evidence and inferences are to be disregarded. Sinclair v. Sinclair, 837 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Mo.App.W.D.1992).
In Point I, Wife complains about the trial court's classification of some of the property as non-marital. First, she alleges that the trial court erred in not including, as marital property, part of the increased value of the real estate caused by construction of the house. She acknowledges that the real estate on which the residence is located was purchased prior to the marriage and was consistently maintained in Husband's name alone. She contends, however, that marital labor was expended in the construction of the house and that the increased value of the property caused by those services should have been classified as marital property. 3
The trial court has considerable discretion in determining whether, as a result of marital services or labor, non-marital property has increased in value and whether the increase should be determined to be marital property. Knapp v. Knapp, 874 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Mo.App.W.D.1994). As a result, an appellate court will not disturb the trial court's decision on such matters without a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. Id. We are to presume the trial court's order is correct, and the party challenging it has the burden of overcoming that presumption. Id.
It was acknowledged by the Missouri Supreme Court in Hoffmann v. Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d 817, 825 (Mo. banc 1984), that an increase in value of separate property can constitute marital property if marital labor contributed to the increase. After the Hoffmann case, § 452.330, 4 which concerns the division of marital property, was amended and now reads, in pertinent part:
2. For purposes of sections 452.300 to 452.415 only, "marital property" means all ....
property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage except:
(5) The increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage or pursuant to subdivisions (1) to (4) of this subsection, unless marital assets including labor, have contributed to such increases and then only to the extent of such contributions.
It has been held that for a proportionate share of the increase in value of a spouse's separate property to be considered marital property as a result of marital labor, effort or services, there must be "comprehensive substantiation" and proof of (1) a contribution of substantial services; (2) a direct correlation between those services and the increase in value; (3) the amount of the increase in value; (4) performance of the services during the marriage; and (5) the value of the services, the lack of compensation, or inadequate compensation. Meservey v. Meservey, 841 S.W.2d 240, 245-246 (Mo.App.W.D.1992). See also Knapp v. Knapp, 874 S.W.2d at 524.
Some cases seem to indicate that the issue is whether the labor of the spouse who is seeking to establish the marital interest in otherwise separate, non-marital property caused an increase in value as opposed to the labor of the owner-spouse. See Schneider v. Schneider, 824 S.W.2d 942, 946 (Mo.App.E.D.1992). Section 452.330.2(5) and other cases do not make such a distinction, however. See Meservey v. Meservey, 841 S.W.2d at 246.
In the instant case, there is no dispute that Husband essentially "closed down" the automobile repair business in the summer of 1991 for six weeks to two months while working on the house. There was also evidence that Wife provided some labor in connection with the construction of the house, although there is conflicting evidence concerning the amount. There was, however, no evidence concerning the value of the labor of either Husband or Wife or the proportion of the house's value attributable to those services. The law refuses to recognize services as substantial marital effort sufficient to create a marital interest in property in the absence of proof of the value of the services and the connection between their performance and any increased value of the property. Meservey v. Meservey, 841 S.W.2d at 246.
In addition, in Missouri the general rule is that performance of usual spousal duties is not the type of substantial contribution contemplated as the basis for establishing that an increase in the value of otherwise separate property constitutes marital property. See Deffenbaugh v. Deffenbaugh, 877 S.W.2d 186, 188 (Mo.App.E.D.1994); and Meservey v. Meservey, 841 S.W.2d at 245-246. Because of the nebulous nature of the evidence concerning the extent and nature of Wife's work on the project, the trial court could have found that the services performed by Wife were not so substantial as to take them outside the category of "usual spousal duties." In the instant case, as the issue is presented, we are unable to conclude from the record before us that the trial court erred in finding that all of the real estate and improvements were Husband's non-marital property. This allegation of error is, therefore, denied.
Wife also contends in her first point that the trial court erred in not classifying a $3000 loan to the corporation as marital property. The money used to make the loan came from the joint personal checking account. On August 15, 1991, Husband deposited in the account approximately $26,000 from the settlement of his personal injury claim which arose prior to the marriage, and on the same day a check in the amount of $3000 was written to the corporation for, as described by Husband, a loan. Wife contends that the $3000 loan is marital property. We agree.
Property acquired after the marriage which is placed in joint names is presumed to be marital property even if one spouse...
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