Marsh v. Baird

• Decision Date: 18 June 1948
• Docket Number: 16229.
• Parties: MARSH v. BAIRD.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

48 S.E.2d 529

203 Ga. 819

MARSH v. BAIRD.

No. 16229.

Supreme Court of Georgia

June 18, 1948

Pierce Bros., of Augusta, for plaintiff in error.

W D. Lanier, of Augusta, for defendant in error.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court.

JENKINS Chief Justice.

The exceptions are to the order overruling general demurrers to a petition for specific performance of a contract based upon the following writing: 'September 26, 1947. This is to certify that I have this day sold place known as the Anderson place on Rt. No. 1, 12 miles out of Augusta, Georgia to W. A Baird. * * * Cash selling price $6500; has paid $100 down on the place--the balance to be paid when deal is closed. Place to be turned over to Mr. Baird as soon as possible. [Signed] T. W. Marsh, W. A. Baird.' The questions thus presented on general demurrer relate to the sufficiency of the contract to authorize a decree of specific performance; as well as the sufficiency of the petition with respect to allegations as to tender of the purchase-price. Held:

1. The Code, § 96-101, provides as follows: 'Three elements are essential to a contract of sale: 1. An indentification of the thing sold. 2. An agreement as to the price to be paid. 3. Consent of the parties.'

2. 'The description of land in a contract of sale is sufficiently definite where the premises are so described as to indicate the grantor's intention to sell a particular lot of land. Where the contract indicates that a particular tract is intended to be conveyed, its practical identification can be proved by extrinsic evidence.' King v. Brice, 145 Ga. 65, 88 S.E. 960; McIntosh v. Roane, 148 Ga. 273, 96 S.E. 387; Petretes v. Atlanta Loan & Trust Co., 161 Ga. 468, 131 S.E. 510; Blumberg v. Nathan, 190 Ga. 64, 8 S.E.2d 374; Deich v Reeves, Ga., 48 S.E.2d 373.

(a) In the instant case, the description, 'Anderson place on Route No. 1, 12 miles out of Augusta, Georgia,' is sufficiently definite to indicate the grantor's intention to sell a particular tract of land, and unlike the description in the case of Molton v. Woodruff, 175 Ga. 168, 165 S.E. 59, 60, where it was said with respect to the description, 'It is impossible to locate in what part of the round world the lot which was the subject-matter of the bargain is located.' The instant description not only gives the location of the land--12 miles out of Augusta, Georgia, on Route 1, but further describes it as 'Anderson Place,' and it can not reasonably be said that the land as thus described can not be definitely located. Insofar as concerns the question as to the sufficiency of the description to authorize a decree of specific performance, it is immaterial that the land might, as contended by the plaintiff in error, be located in another State or County, and this is true for the reason that the action is one in personam and not in rem, and there is no plea to the jurisdiction.

3. Since under the above rulings there is no uncertainty as to the subject-matter of the contract, and since there is no question concerning the agreement as to the price to be paid or of the consent of the parties, it follows that the contract here considered was not lacking in any of the essential elements necessary to an agreement for the purchase and sale of the land described. The only remaining question with respect to the contract itself is whether or not the additional provision, that the 'place is to be turned over to [the purchaser] as soon as possible,' is so vague and indefinite as would render the contract impossible of enforcement by specific performance. In this connection, while 'Parol...