Marshall v. Chelli
| Decision Date | 21 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | C072618,C073612 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | CHERYL D. MARSHALL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. JOSEPH E. CHELLI, as Director, etc., et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
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Plaintiff Cheryl D. Marshall appeals pro se from superior court orders denying two petitions for writs of administrative mandamus. Marshall sought to compel defendant Joseph E. Chelli, as director of San Joaquin County's (County) Human Services Agency(HSA), to set aside orders denying (1) her application for general assistance for relief and food stamps (case No. C072618), on the ground Marshall's ownership of a condominium worth more than $20,000 rendered her ineligible for general assistance, and (2) her subsequent application for interim general assistance, on the ground Marshall had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies (case No. C073612).
Marshall challenges these orders on the merits, and also claims she was denied procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution because (1) during the administrative hearing that gave rise to case No. C072618, she was not allowed to cross-examine witnesses, and (2) neither administrative hearing was recorded. For reasons we explain, we affirm.
Marshall applied to County HSA for general assistance in March 2012, and was interviewed by caseworker D. Vinson. During the interview, Marshall told Vinson (among other things) that she purchased a condominium in January for $38,000. Vinson determined, on behalf of the HSA, that Marshall's application for general assistance should be denied on the ground that she had "excess resources" and she gave Marshall a notice to that effect, citing the General Assistance Manual section entitled "Property Standards." (Human Services Agency, San Joaquin County, General Assistance Manual (Jan. 2005) §90-500 et seq.; hereafter General Assistance Manual.)1
Marshall requested a hearing to challenge the HSA's denial of eligibility. She argued the denial "fail[ed] to specify the 'resources' that allegedly 'exceed the purported allowable limits' "; her application should have been granted because she provided sufficient proof of her disability and "evidence of having no visible source of income whatsoever"; and she is entitled by statute to the maximum permitted benefit because her "liquid assets do not exceed $3,000."
Administrative hearing officer Susan Hansen conducted the hearing, which was not reported or otherwise recorded. Marshall and her representative learned at the hearing that Marshall's residence was the resource which had effectively disqualified her from receiving general assistance. Marshall's condominium, for which she paid $38,000 in cash, had an assessed value at the date of purchase of $57,000. When Marshall disagreed with the value placed on the condominium, the hearing record was left open to allow her to produce evidence of the condominium's "net market value" on the date of her general assistance application and additional argument supporting her position that the resource limit on real property should not render her ineligible for aid. After receiving Marshall's submission in support of her assertion that the market value of her condominium is only $12,557, the hearing officer issued a written decision, rejecting Marshall's analysis and concluded that the HSA was correct to deny Marshall's general assistance application on the ground her resources were over the limits allowed for recipients of general assistance benefits. A second level review upheld the hearing officer's findings.
Marshall then brought the first petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) to overturn the administrative decision on the grounds it was erroneous on the merits and "contaminated by glaring and many due process procedural violations," including that: (1) she was not permitted to cross-examine the witnesses involved in the decision to deny her general assistance benefits; (2) she was not given the " 'staff position statement' " prior to the hearing; (3) the hearing was not recorded; (4) she and her representative were warned against getting out of hand at the beginning of proceedings, when they had done nothing untoward; and (5) the administrative decision improperly calculated the value of the condominium and ignored proof submitted by Marshall. Chelli, as director of the HSA, opposed the petition and argued Marshall was properly denied general assistance benefits based on the assessed value of her condominium and any procedural errors were harmless.
The trial court upheld the administrative decision as supported by substantial evidence, and found the applicable regulations precluded Marshall's receipt of general assistance benefits because her equity in the condominium exceeds $20,000. Moreover, because resolution of the issue turned on a question of law concerning interpretation of the applicable regulation, the court concluded Marshall was not denied due process, even if she were denied the right to cross-examine witnesses, the administrative proceedings were not recorded, and she was warned that security would be called if the hearing got out of hand.
Thereafter, in September 2012, Marshall submitted a second application for general assistance benefits, noting on the form that she sought "interim" assistance because her utilities were past due and her application for Social Security benefits was pending. Her application indicated her ownership of the condominium. The caseworker spoke with Marshall, but she was not called back for a formal interview, and her application was denied on the ground of excess resources.
Marshall's request for fair hearing was granted. At the hearing, Marshall's representative argued that the real property resources limit does not apply to interim general assistance, because interim assistance is funded by federal funds and, under Social Security rules, the value of an individual's home is not counted in assessing eligibility. Hearing officer Aaron Moreno determined, to the contrary, that general assistance is a County program funded by County general funds, to which federal Social Security rules do not apply and the HSA was correct to deny Marshall's general assistance application because her resources are over the limits allowed for recipients of general assistance benefits.
Marshall then brought her second petition for administrative mandamus, seeking to overturn that decision on the grounds the general assistance rule imposing a $20,000 net real property restriction on eligibility for aid is incompatible with federal law. She also argued she was prejudiced by procedural error, including the lack of a recording device at the hearing.
Chelli, as director of the HSA, opposed the petition on the grounds: (1) Marshall failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, because she did not seek a second level review of the administrative decision; (2) the denial of Marshall's prior petition of writ of mandate is res judicata on whether Marshall is eligible for general assistance; (3) due process does not require a recorded hearing; and (4) the HSA acted legally and appropriately.
The trial court denied Marshall's petition because Marshall failed to exhaust her administrative remedies by failing to request a second level review. It also concluded the petition lacked merit because federal Social Security regulations do not preempt Countygeneral assistance regulations, and the hearing officer properly concluded Marshall's resources exceed the allowable amount for aid eligibility.2
Marshall's appeals in case Nos. C072618 and C073612 were consolidated upon her request.
On appeal from the denial of a writ for administrative mandamus, we apply the substantial evidence rule and defer to the trier of fact where the inferences are conflicting. (Mathew Zaheri Corp. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1312.) When reviewing an administrative agency's interpretation of a governing statute, we must "independently judge the text of the statute, taking into account and respecting the agency's interpretation of its meaning." (Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 7.) Finally, we presume the judgment is correct, and adopt all inferences in favor of the judgment, unless the record expressly contradicts them. (Mathew Zaheri Corp. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd., supra, at p. 1313; see Brewer v. Simpson (1960) 53 Cal.2d 567, 583; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
It is the burden of the party challenging a judgment or order to provide an adequate record to assess claims of error. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140-1141 (Ketchum).) An appellant must present an analysis of the facts and legal authority on each point made, and must support the analysis with appropriate citations to the material facts in the record. If an appellant fails to do so, the argument is forfeited. (County of Solano v. Vallejo Redevelopment Agency (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1274(County of Solano); Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856 (Duarte).)
Lack of legal counsel does not entitle a litigant to special treatment. A party representing herself is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration as other litigants and attorneys. (Nwosu v....
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