Marshall v. State ex rel. Dept. of Transp.
| Decision Date | 25 June 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-178,96-178 |
| Citation | 941 P.2d 42 |
| Parties | 119 Ed. Law Rep. 1213 In the Matter of the Driver'S License Suspension of: Daniel Len MARSHALL, Appellant (Petitioner), v. STATE of Wyoming ex rel., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee (Respondent). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Brian N. Beisher, argued of Hart & Reiter, Sheridan, for Appellant.
William U. Hill, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; and Lawrence A. Bobbitt, III, argued, Senior Assistant Attorney General. for Appellee.
Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.
Campus police arrested Daniel Len Marshall off campus for driving while intoxicated. Marshall refused chemical testing and, as a result, the Wyoming Department of Transportation (DOT) suspended his license pursuant to Wyoming's implied consent statute. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the suspension, finding that the campus police officer had statewide jurisdiction and therefore the authority to make the off-campus stop and arrest. Marshall seeks review of the hearing examiner's order.
We reverse.
Appellant Marshall poses the following issues:
A. Whether the Hearing Examiner ruled contrary to law in deciding that the campus peace officer in this case did not exceed his jurisdiction due to the fact that campus peace officers have "statewide jurisdiction."
B. Whether the fresh pursuit doctrine operates to make legal the campus peace officer's arrest of Appellant.
C. Whether consideration of the Appellant's refusal to submit to chemical testing as required by Wyoming Statute Section 31-6-102, is precluded due to the unlawful stop and arrest, and the exclusionary rule.
Appellee, Wyoming Department of Transportation, responds with the following issue:
Does the record contain substantial evidence to establish compliance with the implied consent statute? In particular, does the record establish that the officer made a lawful arrest, that the officer obtained probable cause to believe that Appellant had been driving under the influence on a Marshall reframed the issues in his reply brief as:
public street or highway, and that Appellant refused to submit to a chemical test?
A. Whether the fresh pursuit doctrine operates to make legal the campus peace officer's arrest of Appellant.
B. Whether, if the fresh pursuit doctrine does not make legal the campus peace officer's arrest of Appellant, the campus peace officer's arrest of Appellant was a legal citizen's arrest.
On February 4, 1996, Sheridan College Police Officer John R. Burch heard a broadcast on his police radio, reporting a stolen 1994 burgundy Oldsmobile Ciera with a Sheridan Motors plate on the front and a dealer plate on the back. Later that morning, Officer Burch spotted Marshall driving past the Sheridan College campus on U.S. Highway 87 in a maroon 1984 Oldsmobile. Officer Burch was unable to clearly see Marshall's license plates, but because of the similarity in the color and model of Marshall's automobile to the car reported stolen, Officer Burch pulled onto Highway 87 behind Marshall. After following Marshall for approximately one mile, Officer Burch pulled him over. At that time Marshall was not on the Sheridan College campus, nor had he previously ventured on to the campus.
Once Marshall was stopped, Officer Burch realized that Marshall's vehicle was not the stolen car. However, he became suspicious that Marshall was driving under the influence of alcohol because he detected a strong odor of alcohol and noted that Marshall's speech was slurred and he was unsteady on his feet. After conducting field sobriety tests, Officer Burch placed Marshall under arrest for driving while under the influence (DWUI). Based on Marshall's refusal to undergo chemical testing after his arrest, DOT suspended his license pursuant to W.S. 31-6-102 (1994).
Marshall requested a contested case hearing, which the OAH conducted on March 18, 1996. The hearing examiner determined that the stop and subsequent arrest of Marshall were supported by a reasonable articulable suspicion and that Officer Burch acted within his jurisdiction. As a result, the examiner found that the arrest was lawful and that DOT had authority to suspend Marshall's license. Marshall filed a Petition for Review of Administrative Action with the district court. The district court certified the appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b).
This appeal is based solely on the hearing examiner's conclusions of law; no factual matters are at issue. We afford no deference to an agency's conclusions of law, and shall "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be * * * [a]rbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law[.]" W.S. 16-3-114(c)(ii)(A); Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 896 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Wyo.1995).
Marshall's license was revoked pursuant to Wyoming's implied consent statute, which requires suspension of a driver's Wyoming license if that person is arrested for DWUI and refuses chemical testing. W.S. 31-6-102(a)(ii)(A). The statute provides that chemical testing must be incidental to a lawful arrest, given promptly after the arrest, and administered by a peace officer who had probable cause. W.S. 31-6-102(a)(i)(A)-(C). Marshall takes issue with the hearing examiner's conclusion that campus police officers have statewide jurisdiction. He contends that Officer Burch had no authority outside his territorial jurisdiction to arrest Marshall. Marshall argues that, as a result, the arrest was unlawful and the implied consent statute was improperly invoked as a basis to suspend his license.
The hearing examiner reasoned that campus police officers derive their authority from the legislature and, had the legislature intended to limit their jurisdiction, it would have done so expressly, as it did with state park officials in W.S. 7-2-101(iv)(G) (1995) and capitol security personnel in W.S. 9-1-612(c) (1995). Absent such a limitation, the Wyoming has no statute which specifically addresses the jurisdictional reach of a peace officer, and the hearing examiner is correct in stating that the statutes contain no express limits on the jurisdiction of campus police. This court, however, has recognized limitations on the jurisdictional authority of municipal police officers under the common law. State v. Stahl, 838 P.2d 1193 (Wyo.1992); see also Van Horn v. State, 802 P.2d 883 (Wyo.1990) (). In Stahl, a municipal police officer responded to a call eight miles outside the city limits. The officer found a parked car with a man slumped over the steering wheel and, after conducting field sobriety tests, arrested him for having physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The driver argued that he was the subject of an unlawful extrajurisdictional arrest. We articulated the common law rule of confined jurisdiction:
hearing examiner determined that campus police enjoy statewide jurisdiction. We disagree.
[A] peace officer's authority to make a warrantless arrest was confined at common law to the boundaries of the governmental subdivision in which he held office. The doctrine of "fresh pursuit" provided the only exception. * * *
* * * Thus, under common law, a municipal peace officer's authority to make a warrantless arrest for [a misdemeanor] offense would be limited to the municipal boundaries.
Stahl, 838 P.2d at 1195. We concluded that a municipal police officer acting without a warrant may not lawfully arrest an individual for DWUI outside the boundaries of the municipality which he serves unless such arrest is the result of fresh pursuit. Stahl, 838 P.2d at 1197.
We have little difficulty applying this common law rule of confined jurisdiction to campus police. Wyoming Statute 7-2-101(a)(iv) defines "peace officer." Subsection (B) includes "[a]ny duly authorized member of a municipal police force, a college...
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