Marshall v. Wheeler

• Decision Date: 23 April 1925
• Citation: 128 A. 692
• Parties: MARSHALL v. WHEELER.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

128 A. 692

MARSHALL

v. WHEELER.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

April 23, 1925.

Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Oxford County, at Law.

Action by M. J. Marshall against Fred E. Wheeler. On plaintiff's exceptions, after directed verdict for defendant. Exceptions sustained, and judgment for plaintiff.

Argued before WILSON, C. J., and PHILBROOK, MORRILL, STURGIS, and BARNES, JJ.

Matthew McCarthy, of Rumford, for plaintiff.

Alton C. Wheeler, of South Paris, for defendant.

WILSON, C. J. The defendant, a deputy sheriff upon receiving a writ directed against the plaintiff in this action and to attach an auto truck which was stored in a barn belonging to the plaintiff's wife, went to the home of the plaintiff, who, with his wife, had for several months been in the woods engaged in a lumbering operation, and finding the door to the barn locked, went to the house of a neighbor, who, in the absence of the plaintiff, was taking care of his live stock and had the keys to a shed opening into the barn, and demanded admission for the purpose of attaching the truck under his precept.

Upon being refused admission, the defendant returned to the home of the plaintiff and removed a lock from the door of the shed connecting the house and barn, and, through the shed, entered the barn and took and removed the truck, whereupon the plaintiff brought this action of trover to recover the value of the truck.

The issue at nisi prius was whether, under the conditions shown to exist, the officer in removing the lock from the shed door was protected by his process. The presiding justice to raise the issue, it never having been judicially passed upon in this state, directed a verdict for the defendant. The case comes before this court on exceptions to this ruling.

The fact that the title to the premises was in the plaintiff's wife would make no difference. As the head of the household, occupying the dwelling house, it was in law the castle of the plaintiff, from which he might repel all intruders, If necessary to protect his home and family.

Nor did his absence with his wife for several months in the woods make it any less his dwelling house and castle. His household goods were still there and his live stock in the barn. Obviously, he intended to return as soon as his work in the woods was completed. Bish. Statutory Crimes, § 279; Nutbrown's Case, 2 East P. C. 496; Rex v. Westwood, Russ & Ry. 495.

The evidence discloses that the buildings consisted of a house, barn, and a connecting shed. From the shed one could enter either the barn or the house. The shed contained the usual toilet or closet found in country homes, and was also used as a convenient place for the storage of wood, the ordinary laundry articles, a refrigerator, and other articles frequently used in the kitchen which it adjoined.

It is not in dispute that the ancient right at common law of immunity from interference with the privacy of one's home has come down to us. A man's dwelling house is still his castle, which may not be invaded against his will except by the state in search of violators of the law or upon certain processes of which a writ of attachment is not one. Bish. Crim. Law, vol. 1, § 858; Bish. Crim. Pro. vol. 1, § 195; 1 Hale, P. C. 458; Kelley v. Schuyler. 20 R. I. 432, 39 A. 893, 44 L. R. A. 435, 78 Am. St. Rep. 887; State ex rel. McPherson v. Bechner, 132 Ind. 371, 31 N. E. 950, 32 Am. St. Rep. 257; Bailey v. Wright, 39 Mich. 96; Palmer et al. v. King, 41 App. D. C. 419, L. R. A. 1916D, 278, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1139; Ilsley v. Nichols, 12 Pick. (29 Mass.) 270, 22 Am. Dec. 425.

The first question to be determined then Is: What buildings are included within the "castle"? It is urged by the defendant that the ancient conception of the castle, which included all the buildings used as a part of or in connection with the house in which the occupant slept or dwelt, and permitted the occupants to exclude all intruders from its outer walls, has been modified in keeping with changed conditions and modes of living. The reason for the dwelling house being in fact a castle for the purposes of defense, it is true, no longer exists, but the principle of law insuring privacy in one's home, and giving to every man the right to repel intruders by force, if necessary, and which is usually expressed in the familiar maxim, "Every man's house is his castle," still remains in full force and vigor and is recognized in both our state and federal Constitutions. Const, of Maine, art. 1, § 5; Amendment 4 to the federal Constitution. The reason for maintaining the privacy of the home is just as strong to-day as it was in the time of Chas. II, when it was held that a sheriff might not even enter a barn by force by virtue of a writ of fieri facias, if it was a part of the mansion house. Pento v. Brown, 1 Keble's Rep. 698.

At common law, the term "castle" appears to have been practically coextensive with dwelling house. It included not only the house or building in which the owner or tenant slept or lived in the' ordinary sense of the term, but all that cluster of buildings connected or used with it. 4 Blackstone's Com. *224, *225; Bish. Statutory Crimes, §§ 278, 290.

As the last-named authority puts it:

"One need not so constitute his habitation that all the rooms will be under one roof. Therefore the term 'dwelling house' embraces the entire congregation of buildings, main and auxiliary used for abode. 'It includes,' says...