State v. Trusiani

• Decision Date: 13 August 2004
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Michael TRUSIANI.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

854 A.2d 860

2004 ME 107

STATE of Maine v. Michael TRUSIANI.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Submitted On Briefs: March 24, 2004.

Decided: August 13, 2004.

Geoffrey A. Rushlau, District Attorney, Patricia A. Mador, Asst. Dist. Atty., Bath, for State.

Matthew B. Nichols, Esq., Nichols & Webb, P.A., Saco, for Defendant.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, ALEXANDER, and LEVY, JJ.

Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, and ALEXANDER, JJ.

Dissent: LEVY, JJ.

ALEXANDER, J.

[¶ 1] Michael Trusiani appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Sagadahoc County, Gorman, J.) convicting him of one count of aggravated operating under the influence (Class C), 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2411(1)(A), (5)(D) (1996) and one count of operating beyond license restriction (Class E), 29-A M.R.S.A. § 1251(1) (Supp.2003).¹ The conviction was entered as a result of a conditional guilty plea, M.R.Crim. P. 11(a)(2), allowing Trusiani to appeal the order of the Superior Court (Crowley, J.) denying his motion to suppress evidence. Trusiani contends that the suppression court erred in determining that the effects of an initial improper entry into a garage were vitiated by a subsequent consent to enter the home where Trusiani lived, thus allowing use of evidence obtained after the entry into the home. Because the suppression court correctly applied the law to the facts it found, we affirm the judgment.

I. CASE HISTORY

[¶ 2] On September 27, 2002, the Topsham Police Department received a call from a motorist, who reported that a Ford pickup truck was operating erratically on Interstate 95 and had exited the Interstate proceeding towards Topsham. The description included a license plate number. A Topsham police officer was advised of this information and looked for the described vehicle in the vicinity of the Interstate exit in Topsham. The officer did not see the vehicle in the area. The officer was then advised that the vehicle was registered to Michael Trusiani at an address in Topsham.

[¶ 3] Proceeding towards that address, the officer saw the vehicle stopping at an intersection. The vehicle then made a dangerous turn in front of an approaching vehicle, causing the other vehicle's driver to jam on the brakes to avoid a collision. The officer could not follow the vehicle immediately because he was behind another vehicle turning at the intersection. Exercising appropriate restraint, he did not engage his emergency lights to initiate a pursuit of the vehicle.

[¶ 4] The officer proceeded to the indicated address in Topsham, where he saw the vehicle in the driveway. The vehicle had been out of his sight for no more than two or three minutes. The vehicle was parked in front of the garage that was attached to the house. The garage had a large door for a vehicle, and a smaller door for persons to pass through. There were windows in both the vehicle door and the passage door, through which the interior of the garage was visible. There was no doorbell or other device to signal a request for entry near the garage doors.

[¶ 5] The officer promptly entered the garage through the passage door. There was a dispute between the testimony of the officer and the testimony of Trusiani's mother as to whether the passage door was open or closed. There is no dispute that, after the officer entered the garage, he knocked on the door to the house. Trusiani's mother opened the door and invited the officer into the house. In response to the officer's inquiry as to who had been driving the vehicle, Trusiani's mother advised the officer that Trusiani had been driving the vehicle and that he was presently in the bathroom. Trusiani emerged from the bathroom after a short period and admitted that he had been driving the vehicle. After administration of field sobriety tests, he was arrested for operating under the influence. 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2411(1)(A). There is no dispute that the officer had probable cause to arrest Trusiani for operating under the influence.

[¶ 6] Following his indictment, Trusiani moved to suppress the evidence of the statements and the officer's observations of Trusiani. After a suppression hearing, the court found the facts basically as indicated above. With regard to the conflicting testimony as to whether the passage door to the garage was open or shut, the court determined that the State did not establish that the passage door was open. The court also found that there were no exigent circumstances justifying the officer's entry into the garage.

[¶ 7] Based on those determinations, the court concluded that the officer's warrantless entry into the garage was a constitutional violation and was not otherwise justified and that the evidence obtained as a result of that entry should be suppressed. The court then allowed further argument on the question of whether the suppression order should extend to all of the evidence regarding Trusiani's operating the vehicle while under the influence, or only evidence that may have been obtained as a result of the officer's entry into the garage, before he received consent to enter the house. Ultimately, the court determined that it would not suppress the evidence obtained after the officer's entry into the house, with Trusiani's mother's consent. The court found that: "The consent to enter the kitchen purged the prior illegal entry into the garage." Therefore, the court concluded that all of the evidence sought to be suppressed was legally obtained and denied the motion to suppress.

[¶ 8] After his conditional plea, Trusiani brought this appeal.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

[¶ 9] In determining whether the evidence gained in the house is admissible, we must first determine whether a constitutional violation occurred when the officer entered the garage. On these issues, the trial court's findings of fact are reviewed deferentially for clear error, while its application of the law to the facts and legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. State v. Reynoso-Hernandez, 2003 ME 19, ¶¶ 10-12, 816 A.2d 826, 830; State v. Forsyth, 2002 ME 75, ¶ 9, 795 A.2d 66, 69.

[¶ 10] In Oliver v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment protects the curtilage of a house from unreasonable searches and seizures. 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984). The definition of curtilage was explored in United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987), where the Court developed a test for determining what constitutes the curtilage of the home, requiring the consideration of four factors:

the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.

Id. at 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134.

[¶ 11] Using this test, the garage was within the curtilage of Trusiani's mother's home. The garage was attached to the home. It was used for storage, and it housed a working refrigerator and a freezer. Although the garage had windows, the vehicle and passage doors to the garage were closed.² Because the garage was within the curtilage of the home, it was protected from unreasonable entries and searches under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 5 of the Maine Constitution.

[¶ 12] This view is supported by several cases where we have found a garage to be a protected area. See State v. Brochu, 237 A.2d 418, 421-22 (Me.1967) (holding that a garage that was not attached to the home was "plainly part of the defendant's house in which he was secure against unreasonable searches and seizures"); Marshall v. Wheeler, 124 Me. 324, 328, 128 A. 692, 693-94 (1925) (noting that "at common law a shed, connected with the house and used for ... household purposes ... would be considered a part of the dwelling-house, which an officer may not enter by force or against the will of the owner"); see also Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 5-6, 52 S.Ct. 466, 76 L.Ed. 951 (1932) (finding that a small metal garage adjacent to a dwelling was protected by the Fourth Amendment).

[¶ 13] We examined the law regarding entry into a home in State v. Crider, 341 A.2d 1 (Me.1975). In Crider, a police officer went to a house to question an individual about an assault. Id. at 3. He knocked on an outer door, but no one answered. Id. He noticed through the glass in the door that the door opened into an entryway, and the entryway led into a hallway. Id. The officer opened the unlocked outer door and proceeded inside to a second closed door. Id. He knocked on the second door, and the defendant answered it. Id.

[¶ 14] We indicated that the first step in analyzing whether there was a constitutional violation was to examine the "exact functional nature of the so-called hallway in relation to the premises." Id. at 4. We held that the officer's "entry into an integral part of a private dwelling, which in the light of the circumstances of this record could not be viewed as reasonably accessible to the public generally, constituted a trespass." Id. at 5.

[¶ 15] Although the curtilage of the home is protected from unreasonable entries and searches and the dwelling itself may not be entered, absent a warrant or exigent circumstances, the State is allowed to intrude into the home's curtilage under certain circumstances, including accessing the entry to a dwelling while conducting legitimate law enforcement activities.

[¶ 16] In State v. Cloutier, 544 A.2d 1277 (Me.1988), a police officer received complaints that a dog was barking in a neighborhood. Id. at 1279. While patrolling, he noticed a basement light on in a house that was otherwise dark. Id. He walked up to the side door to see if anyone was home, and when no one answered, he glanced into the basement window, where he saw several marijuana plants. Id.

[¶ 17] We held that the officer was in ...