Martens v. Gaffney
| Decision Date | 17 June 1941 |
| Docket Number | 45631. |
| Citation | 298 N.W. 801,230 Iowa 712 |
| Parties | MARTENS v. GAFFNEY, Judge. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Certiorari to review the legality of the overruling by respondent judge of petitioner's motion to dismiss a county attorney's information against him. The motion alleged failure to accord petitioner a prompt trial.
Writ annulled.
Swift & Swift, of Marengo, for petitioner.
E. A Baldwin, County Atty. of Johnson county, of Iowa City, for respondent.
On September 14, 1940, a county attorney's information was filed in the Johnson county district court charging petitioner with the crime of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated committed on July 2, 1940. Petitioner was arrested but was released and remained at liberty on bail. The April, 1940 term had not been formally adjourned at the time the information was filed on September 14. The September term commenced on September 16 and adjourned on November 16. The November term commenced on November 18 and adjourned on January 25, 1941. The February, 1941 term commenced on February 3. Petitioner's motion to dismiss was filed on February 27, 1941, and was heard and overruled by respondent judge on March 4, during the February term.
The statutory provision upon which petitioner relies is section 14024, Code 1939, reading as follows:
Petitioner also relies upon Section 10, Article I of the Iowa Constitution providing that an " accused shall have a right to a speedy and public trial." We have held that the term " speedy trial," as used in the constitution, is given a more definite meaning by the statute above quoted. State v. Rowley, 198 Iowa 613, 198 N.W. 37, 199 N.W. 369.
Petitioner argues that the burden to show " good cause" rests upon the state. We agree. This is the law generally under similar statutory provisions. 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 470, page 721. This court has held repeatedly that the question of whether good cause, within the meaning of the above statute, has been shown rests very largely in the discretion of the trial court. We have recognized that the trial court has a wide discretion with which we will not interfere unless there has been an abuse thereof. Maher v. Brown, 225 Iowa 341, 280 N.W. 553; Ferguson v. Bechly, 224 Iowa 1049, 277 N.W. 755; Davison v. Garfield, 221 Iowa 424, 265 N.W. 645; Davison v. Garfield, 219 Iowa 1258, 257 N.W. 432, 260 N.W. 667; State v. Rowley, 198 Iowa 613, 198 N.W. 37, 199 N.W. 369. This is the law generally. 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 472-b, page 725. Indeed, in the Rowley case, supra, it was held that it was not " necessary that the record should disclose the specific reason or reasons why criminal causes were continued upon the termination of any term of court." See page 616 of 198 Iowa, page 39 of 198 N.W. This language is repeated in one of our most recent pronouncements, Ferguson v. Bechly, supra. See page 1054 of 224 Iowa 277 N.W. 755. Did respondent abuse his discretion by finding that there was good cause for not dismissing the information?
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss there was offered the affidavit of the petitioner in which he says he was prepared to go to trial at both the September and November terms; that he appeared by his attorney at the September term and requested an immediate trial; that accordingly the case was put in the assignment for trial on October 21 and again on October 28, but was not tried for reasons unknown. The affidavit also recited that petitioner's license to operate a motor vehicle had been suspended by the Commissioner of Public Safety on August 2, 1940. Both members of the firm of attorneys representing petitioner stated that at no time did either of them have any conversation with Judge Evans, one of the two judges in the district, concerning the assignment or disposition of the case.
Judge Gaffney presided at the September term and on the first day of the term made an assignment of six liquor injunction cases in which the state appeared as plaintiff. During the term five of these cases were tried and determined. On September 27 an assignment of 28 jury cases was made. Petitioner's case was the last case on this assignment,-the tenth case assigned for October 21. On October 16 a second assignment of ten jury cases was made, to be tried commencing October 28. Petitioner's case was the ninth case on the assignment. Petitioner's case was not disposed of during the September term because it was not reached on either jury assignment. Trial of the first two cases on the second jury assignment occupied the time of the court from October 28 to November 15. The September term ended the following day. Apparently these two cases consumed considerably more time than had been anticipated. Judge Gaffney stated upon the hearing " that at no time during said (September) term of court or since was there ever any request made upon the part of the defendant or his counsel, or anyone for him, claiming and urging a disposition of this cause."
The record discloses that on the second day of the November term, commencing on November 18, Judge Evans who presided assigned for trial 34 criminal cases, 26 of which were disposed of by trial, dismissal, or pleas of guilty. Petitioner's case was the 22d of the 34 cases in the order assigned. We must assume that the order in which the cases were assigned was proper. No claim to the contrary is made. It is a fair inference from the record that petitioner's case was not disposed of because its place in the assignment was never reached. While only 21 cases were assigned ahead of petitioner's case and 26 cases in all were disposed of, we have a right to assume that there was no contested trial of any criminal case except such as preceded petitioner's case in the assigned order.
After the disposition of the 26 criminal cases, the trial of civil jury cases was commenced, the last of which was completed on January 17, 1941, approximately one week prior to the end of the November term and also the commencement of the January, 1941, term in Iowa county over which Judge Evans was required to preside. On the court order assigning these civil jury cases and at the end thereof there appeared a blanket assignment of criminal cases, which doubtless referred to the eight criminal cases (including petitioner's) out of the 34 previously assigned which had not been reached for trial. During the last week of the November term the county attorney was not in good health and there was other necessary business for the court to dispose of.
Respondent upon the above record found that there was good cause why petitioner's case should not be dismissed, because, among other things, trial was an impossibility due to the trial of ...
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