Martin County v. Section 28 Partnership, Ltd.

• Decision Date: 13 December 2000
• Docket Number: No. 4D98-2813.,4D98-2813.
• Citation: 772 So.2d 616
• Parties: MARTIN COUNTY, Appellant, v. SECTION 28 PARTNERSHIP, LTD., Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

772 So.2d 616

MARTIN COUNTY, Appellant, v. SECTION 28 PARTNERSHIP, LTD., Appellee.

No. 4D98-2813.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

December 13, 2000.

Gary K. Oldehoff, Stuart, and Nancy E. Stroud, Susan L. Trevarthen and Edward F. Ryan of Burke, Weaver & Prell, Boca Raton, for appellant.

Charles L. Siemon of Siemon, Larsen & Marsh, Boca Raton, for appellee.

Robert P. Banks, Assistant County Attorney, West Palm Beach, Terrell K. Arline, Tallahassee and Sherry A. Spiers, Tallahassee, for Amicus Curiae-Florida Department of Community Affairs, Florida Association of County Attorneys, Florida Association of Counties, and 1000 Friends of Florida, Inc.

TAYLOR, J.

Martin County appeals from a final judgment on remand in favor of Section 28 Partnership, Ltd. The circuit court held that the county's refusal to grant appellee's requested comprehensive plan amendments, which sought increased residential densities, commercial development, and creation of a new urban services district, denied the developer substantive due process. The court awarded the developer $4,750,000 in damages. We reverse and remand for judgment to be entered in favor of Martin County.

This case spans nearly a decade of litigation between Section 28 Partnership, Ltd. ("the Partnership") and Martin County ("the County"). A more detailed account of events surrounding the developer's amendment applications is set out in this court's previous opinion. See Martin County v. Section 28 Partnership, Ltd., 676 So.2d 532 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996),rev. denied, 686 So.2d 581 (Fla.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1196, 117 S.Ct. 1553, 137 L.Ed.2d 701 (1997). Stated briefly, the Partnership obtained options on approximately 414 acres of property known as "Section 28" and purchased the remaining 222 acres. The Partnership wanted to develop the 636-acre property, previously designated as rural, agricultural, and agricultural ranchette, as a planned unit development (PUD) consisting of residential units, a golf course, clubhouse, and 50,000 square feet of retail and office space. Martin County rejected the Partnership's applications for amendments to its comprehensive growth management plan and future land use map.

The amendments sought to create an entirely new urban service district in the County's Comprehensive Plan which, along with concurrent map and text amendments and rezoning, would allow it to develop the Section 28 property more intensely. The County denied the requests for text and map amendments, partly because of the property's proximity to the environmentally sensitive Jonathan Dickinson State Park and the Loxahatchee River. The County denied the proposed amendment to establish a new urban service district, designated as an "Adjacent County Urban Service Area" (ACUSA), mainly because the development could not be served by urban public facilities within Martin County and would require the use of public services and facilities from adjoining Palm Beach County.

In June 1992 the Partnership filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the circuit court. The petition was denied, and the Partnership sought review by this court. Section 28 Partnership, Ltd. v. Martin County, 642 So.2d 609 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), rev. denied, 654 So.2d 920 (Fla.1995) (Partnership I). Relying on Board of County Comm'rs of Brevard County v. Snyder, 627 So.2d 469 (Fla.1993), we held that the County's decision against amendment of its comprehensive plan was legislative rather than quasi-judicial, and, therefore, certiorari review by the circuit court was not available.

After reviewing de novo the County's denial of the Partnership's amendment applications, the circuit court determined that the County's action involved the application of adopted policy. It then concluded that the County's refusal to grant the applications for development approval and its continued application of the land use designations to Section 28 (agricultural, agricultural ranchette, and rural) were arbitrary and capricious. The court found that the County's action denied the Partnership substantive due process under the state and federal constitutions and awarded $100,000 in damages. The court also granted the Partnership injunctive relief and $100,000 in damages for the taking of its property without just compensation.¹

The County again appealed to this court. In Martin County v. Section 28 Partnership, Ltd., 676 So.2d 532 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996),rev. denied, 686 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1196, 117 S.Ct. 1553, 137 L.Ed.2d 701 (1997)("Partnership II"), we held that the trial court committed reversible error because it failed to apply the deferential "fairly debatable" standard when reviewing the County's action on the proposed amendments and resolving the substantive due process claims. We quashed the order for injunctive relief and vacated the damages awarded for violations of substantive due process. We also reversed the damage award of $100,000 for an unlawful taking, determining that the record did not justify upholding the takings claim. Noting that the trial court did not have the benefit of our opinion in Partnership I when it applied the incorrect strict scrutiny standard, we remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to apply the fairly debatable standard of review to the related substantive due process claims and issues concerning the County's denial of the developer's application. Id. at 536.

The Partnership petitioned for discretionary review by the Florida Supreme Court, arguing that the taking decision was incorrect. The supreme court denied the petition. 686 So.2d 581. The United States Supreme Court also denied the Partnership's petition for certiorari on the taking decision. 520 U.S. 1196, 117 S.Ct. 1553.

On remand, the parties agreed that a new evidentiary hearing was unnecessary, since the court had already heard about 13 days of testimony from 30 or more witnesses and received approximately 200 items of evidence during the 1994 trial. After hearing argument of the parties, the trial court again found that the County's refusal to enact the comprehensive plan amendments denied the Partnership substantive due process and entered a final judgment on remand awarding the same injunctive relief on the substantive due process and taking claims as in the 1994 judgment and the same monetary damages on the substantive due process claim. Later, claiming that the injunctive relief had been rendered worthless, the Partnership sought modification of the final judgment to convert the injunctive relief on substantive due process into additional monetary damages. The circuit court entered a final order modifying its final judgment on remand, awarding $4.75 million in damages. This appeal by the County followed.

The County argues that on remand the trial court failed to properly apply the fairly debatable standard in reviewing the evidence submitted in support of the County's denial of the requested comprehensive plan amendments. Consequently, the court erred in concluding that the County violated the Partnership's substantive due process rights. We agree.

Although an appellate court must defer to the trial court's resolution of disputed issues of fact, the question of whether a governing body's actions are arbitrary and capricious is one of law. Dugan v. City of Jacksonville, 343 So.2d 103, 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). We, therefore, review the trial court's application of the "fairly debatable" standard de novo.

The Florida Supreme Court clarified that amendments to comprehensive land use plans are legislative decisions subject to the fairly debatable standard of review. Martin County v. Yusem, 690 So.2d 1288 (Fla.1997). The fairly debatable standard of review is "highly deferential" and requires approval of a planning action if reasonable persons could differ as to its propriety. Id. at 1295 (citing B & H Travel Corp. v. State Dep't of Community Affairs, 602 So.2d 1362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)). As the court further explained, `[a]n ordinance may be said to be fairly debatable when for any reason it is open to dispute or controversy on grounds that make sense or point to a logical deduction that in no way involves constitutional validity.' Id. (quoting City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So.2d 148, 152 (Fla.1953)).

In this case, the trial court awarded damages on the Partnership's substantive due process claim. As we ruled in Partnership II, the court was required to apply the fairly debatable standard of review in resolving this claim. Recognizing the close relationship between the fairly debatable standard and the review of substantive due process claims, we stated:

Turning to the Partnership's substantive due process argument, we find that the issues concerning these claims and Martin County's refusal to amend its comprehensive plan and the consequent denial of the development application are inextricably intertwined.

676 So.2d at 537 (emphasis added).

In our recent opinion in Gardens Country Club, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 712 So.2d 398, 404 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), we discussed how substantive due process claims are evaluated:

Substantive due process challenges are analyzed under the rational basis test; that is, a legislative act of the government will not be considered arbitrary and capricious if it has "a rational relationship with a legitimate general welfare concern." Restigouche, Inc. v. Town Of Jupiter, 59 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir.1995)(quoting Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d

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