Martin-Trigona v. Smith, MARTIN-TRIGON

• Decision Date: 30 June 1983
• Docket Number: Nos. 82-1392,MARTIN-TRIGONA,MARTIN-TRIGON,A,s. 82-1392
• Citation: 712 F.2d 1421,229 U.S.App. D.C. 389
• Parties: Anthony R.ppellant, v. William F. SMITH, Attorney General. Anthony R.ppellant, v. Philip SHIFF, et al. Anthony R.ppellant, v. ACTON CORPORATION, et al. Appeal of Anthony R.Anthony GWARA v. William F. SMITH, U.S. Attorney General, et al. Peter N. GEORGIADES v. HelenAppeal of Anthony R.Peter N. GEORGIADES v. Helenppellant. Anthony R.ppellant, v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, Appellee, Capital Cities Communications, Inc., Intervenor. to 82-1394, 82-2511, 82-2382, 83-1066 and 82-2516.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 1421

712 F.2d 1421

229 U.S.App.D.C. 389

Anthony R. MARTIN-TRIGONA, Appellant, v. William F. SMITH, Attorney General.

Anthony R. MARTIN-TRIGONA, Appellant, v. Philip SHIFF, et al.

Anthony R. MARTIN-TRIGONA, Appellant, v. ACTON CORPORATION, et al.

Appeal of Anthony R. MARTIN-TRIGONA.

Anthony GWARA v. William F. SMITH, U.S. Attorney General, et al.

Peter N. GEORGIADES v. Helen MARTIN-TRIGONA.

Appeal of Anthony R. MARTIN-TRIGONA.

Peter N. GEORGIADES v. Helen MARTIN-TRIGONA, Appellant.

Anthony R. MARTIN-TRIGONA, Appellant, v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, Appellee, Capital Cities Communications, Inc., Intervenor.

Nos. 82-1392 to 82-1394, 82-2511, 82-2382, 83-1066 and 82-2516.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

June 30, 1983.

[229 U.S.App.D.C. 390] Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (D.C.Civil Action Nos. 81-01004, 81-03065, 82-00425, 82-01283 & 82-01763).

Appeal from an Order of the Federal Communications Commission.

Appellant, Anthony R. Martin-Trigona, pro se, was on the motion to vacate dismissal in No. 82-1392, the motion to proceed in forma pauperis in No. 82-2516, the oppositions to the motions to dismiss in Nos. 82-2382 and 83-1066, and entered appearances for appellant in all cases.

Stanley S. Harris, U.S. Atty., Royce C. Lamberth, R. Craig Lawrence and Nathan Dodell, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C.,

[229 U.S.App.D.C. 391] were on the motions for summary affirmance, for appellees, in Nos. 82-1393, 82-1394 and 82-2511, and the motion to dismiss or for summary affirmance, for appellee, in No. 82-1392.

David Florin and Steven M. Levine, Washington, D.C., were on the motions to dismiss, for appellee, in Nos. 82-2382 and 82-1066.

Bruce E. Fein, Daniel M. Armstrong and John P. Greenspan, Counsel, F.C.C., Washington, D.C., entered an appearance for appellee in No. 82-2516.

David R. Anderson and Joel Rosenbloom, Washington, D.C., entered appearances for intervenor, Capital Cities Communications, Inc., in No. 82-2516.

MOTION TO VACATE DISMISSAL

(No. 82-1392)

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

(Nos. 82-1392, 82-2382 & 83-1066)

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE

(Nos. 82-1392, 82-1393, 82-1394 & 82-2511)

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

(No. 82-2516)

Before MIKVA ^* and EDWARDS, Circuit Judges, and MacKINNON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM:

Anthony R. Martin-Trigona has filed many appeals in this court over the last few years. ¹ Today, a Motions Panel of the court decides preliminary motions in seven of these appeals. With two exceptions, these appeals do not involve consolidated cases. Each case, however, grows in some way from Martin-Trigona's conviction in Illinois for mail fraud and subsequent bankruptcy proceedings involving two radio stations in which he had an interest. We conclude, therefore, that it is appropriate to treat all of the motions in one opinion. ²

I. MARTIN-TRIGONA V. SHIFF & MARTIN-TRIGONA V. ACTON

In No. 82-1393, Martin-Trigona v. Shiff, and No. 82-1394, Martin-Trigona v. Acton Corp., Martin-Trigona contests the loss of his two radio stations in bankruptcy proceedings. ³ The district court dismissed each case before process was served on any of the defendants. The only contention Martin-Trigona presses on appeal is that Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305 (D.C.Cir.1981) (per curiam), prohibits dismissal of pro se prisoner complaints before service of process on any defendants. When Martin-Trigona moved to vacate and remand the cases for this reason, we denied his request. We later denied motions for rehearing and for rehearing en banc on the same issue. Crisafi merely prohibits a court from relying solely on an assertion of litigiousness in dismissing an in forma pauperis, pro se prisoner's suit as "frivolous or malicious" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1976). 655 F.2d at 1309. Here, however, the trial judge patiently analyzed Martin-Trigona's two long, rambling complaints and wrote reasoned decisions explaining their dismissal. Martin-Trigona thus has no claim under Crisafi, and the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") urges this court summarily to affirm the trial court's decisions.

This court will dispose of a case summarily only when the merits of a claim "are so clear as to justify expedited action." Ambach v. Bell, 686 F.2d 974, 979 (D.C.Cir.1982) (per curiam). Before taking summary action, therefore, we must carefully evaluate the propriety of the challenged dismissals. We also are required to examine closely a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, to determine whether any possibility exists that the plaintiff could prove a set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (per curiam).

A.

Because different charges in each complaint were dismissed for different reasons, we analyze each part of the dismissals separately. First, in both Shiff and Acton, the district court found that, to the extent that Martin-Trigona sought review of any FCC action that caused him to lose his radio station license, dismissal was proper because appellate courts have exclusive jurisdiction to review final orders of the FCC. See 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) (1976). Martin-Trigona did not contest this clearly correct ruling. City of Rochester v. Bond, 603 F.2d 927, 934-35 (D.C.Cir.1979).

Second, in Shiff, Martin-Trigona's complaint included two claims that already had been adjudicated in other federal courts. One involved a finding of civil contempt in the bankruptcy trial and the other protested a lack of access to the prison law library, an issue decided in Martin-Trigona v. Smith, No. 81-1497 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 1982). The district court correctly concluded that Martin-Trigona already had been afforded an opportunity fully and fairly to litigate these claims, and that he was barred from raising or relitigating the issues. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973-74, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979).

Third, in Acton, Martin-Trigona alleged that the actions of his attorney in the Connecticut bankruptcy proceedings violated his due process rights. The district court correctly concluded that there was no basis upon which it could assert personal jurisdiction over attorney Weiner. Martin-Trigona did not allege, and the court could not find, any contact between the lawyer and this forum. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).

B.

Finally, Martin-Trigona's central complaint in both cases charged that certain individuals involved in the bankruptcy proceedings conspired to take the stations from him in violation of various federal and state laws. The district court dismissed the conspiracy claims after finding that they alleged wrongdoing within the bankruptcy proceedings themselves. In so doing, the court relied on Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1246, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976) ("Colorado River"), and held that Martin-Trigona should air his complaints in the courts dealing with his bankruptcies. In our view, the district court misapplied Colorado River; accordingly, we vacate and remand.

Martin-Trigona's complaints in Shiff and Acton covered a wide range of state and federal law. In Shiff, for example, ⁴ Martin-Trigona charged that the trustee in bankruptcy, the two law firms involved, and the bankruptcy judge conspired to take the FCC license away from a radio station he owned, through involuntary bankruptcy proceedings. This conspiracy, he alleged, violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976) ("RICO"), and the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976); obstructed justice in contravention of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (Supp. V 1981) and 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (1976); violated his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (Supp. V 1981); deprived him of due process; interfered with existing and future commercial relationships; tortiously injured him; and offended traditional notions of fair play so egregiously that mandamus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976) was appropriate. Martin-Trigona's prayer for relief requested, inter alia, injunctions stopping the bankruptcy proceedings and barring the lawyers involved from appearing before the FCC or bankruptcy courts, money damages against the individual defendants, attorneys' fees, and expenses.

The district court addressed only the RICO claim, and it concluded:

Plaintiff's RICO claim concerns the same transaction on appeal in the Southern District of New York. The Court dismisses plaintiff's RICO claim, applying the guidelines set forth in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 [96 S.Ct. 1236, 1246, 47 L.Ed.2d 483] (1976): this forum is inconvenient for litigation concerning an out-of-state radio station; jurisdiction was first exercised in another forum; and dismissal would avoid piecemeal litigation.

Martin-Trigona v. Shiff, No. 82-0425, slip op. at 1 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1982).

We agree with the district court that, in essence, Martin-Trigona is complaining about his bankruptcy proceedings. Application of the Colorado River test, however, was inappropriate. In Colorado River, the government sued in federal court against some 1,000 water users, seeking a declaration of the government's rights to water in a specific part of Colorado. Shortly after the filing of this suit, one of the parties sought to determine the government's right to water in the same part of Colorado by joining the United States in a separate ongoing state proceeding. Both courts had valid jurisdiction, and the suits involved identical issues. On this basis, the Supreme Court concluded that despite the federal court's "virtually unflagging obligation ... to exercise the jurisdiction" given it, wise judicial administration counseled in favor of...