Martin v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 09 January 1914 |
| Citation | 103 N.E. 828,216 Mass. 361 |
| Parties | MARTIN v. BOSTON ELEVATED RY. CO. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
H. H. & H. J. Winslow, of Boston, for plaintiff.
F. W Fosdick, of Boston, for defendant.
DE COURCY, J.
The only question in controversy is whether the trial judge should have ruled as matter of law that the conductor was not negligent as to the time of starting the car, instead of leaving that issue to the jury as a question of fact.
These are the facts. At about noon on February 28, 1912, a car of the defendant, bound from Park Street subway to Arlington Heights, came to a stop at Church street to discharge and receive passengers. The plaintiff's married daughter and the latter's little boy boarded the rear vestibule and entered the car. The plaintiff followed as far as the vestibule, with a suit case, but was delayed from getting into the body of the car by an intervening woman passenger. Leaving her suit case in the vestibule, the plaintiff started to enter the car, the floor of which was one step higher than the floor of the rear platform, but before she had time to enter the door or to get hold of anything the car started suddenly, and she fell back into the rear part of the vestibule. On the rear platform at the time were two bundles described as 'Italian's Packs,' the plaintiff's suit case, and that of Mrs. Gray, which the conductor had placed there, but it does not appear that these in any way contributed to the accident.
It is settled law in this commonwealth that under ordinary circumstances it is not negligence for a conductor to give the starting signal after the passenger is fully and fairly on the car. Sauvan v. Citizens' Electric Street Railway, 197 Mass. 176, 83 N.E. 405. In reaching that conclusion the court recognized not only the imperative demand by the public for rapid transportation, but the fact known to experience, that ordinarily it is not necessary for the safety of a passenger in normal physical condition that the car should be delayed until he is seated. The testimony of the plaintiff here shows that at the time of the accident she was well and not suffering from any illness or disability. The only ground on which it is sought to distinguish the case at bar from the Sauvan Case is that this plaintiff was 65 years old. Whether the duty of exercising special care was imposed upon the conductor is dependent however not on...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Com. v. Libbey
... ... 361] ... C. Attwill, Dist. Atty., of Lynn, and A. C. Webber, Asst ... Dist. Atty., of Boston, for the Commonwealth ... D. D ... Corcoran, of Boston, for defendant Crane ... ...
-
Commonwealth v. Libbey
... ... 361]C. Attwill, Dist. Atty., of Lynn, and A. C. Webber, Asst. Dist. Atty., of Boston, for the Commonwealth.D. D. Corcoran, of Boston, for defendant Crane.Roger Clapp and J. J. Feely, ... ...
-
Libby v. New York, N.H.&H.R. Co.
...97 N. E. 920, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 381;Cerchione v. Hunnewell, 215 Mass. 588, 102 N. E. 908,50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 300;Martin v. Boston Elevated Railway, 216 Mass. 361, 103 N. E. 828 (with which compare Flanagan v. Boston Elevated Railway, 216 Mass. 337, 103 N. E. 905).Smith v. Hyde Park, 219 Mass......
-
O'Neill v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co.
...Elevated Railway, 224 Mass. 405, 112 N. E. 1025;Work v. Boston Elevated Railway, 207 Mass. 447, 93 N. E. 693;Martin v. Boston Elevated Railway, 216 Mass. 361, 103 N. E. 828;Jameson v. Boston Elevated Railway, 193 Mass. 560, 79 N. E. 750. Sudden stopping, without more, was not evidence of ne......