Martin v. Clemson University
| Decision Date | 28 August 2009 |
| Docket Number | C/A No. 8:08-354-GRA. |
| Citation | 654 F.Supp.2d 410 |
| Parties | Dr. Norma Corrales MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. CLEMSON UNIVERSITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Lynanne Butcher Wescott, Wescott Law Firm, Philadelphia, PA, Melvin R. Hutson, Melvin Hutson Law Office, Greenville, SC, for Plaintiff.
Vance J. Bettis, Gignilliat Savitz and Bettis LLP, Columbia, SC, for Defendant.
ORDER (Written Opinion)
This matter is before the Court for a review of Magistrate Judge William M. Catoe's Report and Recommendation made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g), D.S.C., and filed July 23, 2009. Plaintiff originally filed this action on February 7, 2007, and filed an Amended Complaint with leave from this Court on April 15, 2009, adding an otherwise time-barred claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Plaintiff alleges that her employer, Defendant Clemson University ("Clemson"), discriminated against her because or her gender, race, and national origin. Plaintiff specifically alleges the following in her Amended Complaint:
Count I—race and sex discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986;
Count II—violation of the Equal Pay Act;
Count III—violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 Count IV—violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;
Count V—defamation;
Count VI—breach of contract;
Count VII—tortious interference with contractual relations;
Count VIII—fraud;
Count IX—civil conspiracy; and
Count X—Title VII.
Defendant Clemson moved to dismiss certain claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on December 4, 2008. Although Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss does not address Count X, the new Title VII claim, Defendant acknowledges that the claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The magistrate recommends granting Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss and dismissing Counts I, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX. For the reasons stated herein, notwithstanding Plaintiff's objections, this Court adopts the magistrate's Report and Recommendation in its entirety and GRANTS Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss.
The magistrate makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and responsibility for making a final determination remains with this Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71, 96 S.Ct. 549, 46 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). This Court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which specific objection is made, and this Court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). This Court may also "receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate with instructions." Id.
In order for objections to be considered by a United States District Judge, the objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which the party objects and the basis for the objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-47 nn. 1-3 (4th Cir.1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 n. 4 (4th Cir.1984).
The Court first reiterates that it may only consider non-conclusory objections to the Report and Recommendation that direct this Court to a specific error. Many of Plaintiff's objections appear to simply rehash her previous arguments before the magistrate. To the extent Plaintiff raises cognizable and specific objections to the magistrate's Report and Recommendation, they relate to the magistrate's findings that Clemson is an arm of the state for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity, and that Plaintiff's claims under Title VI and Title IX are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff's objections are without merit and overruled.
Plaintiff objects to the magistrate's finding that Clemson is an arm of the state shielded by the Eleventh Amendment. Plaintiff makes numerous objections regarding this finding. As explained below, the magistrate applied sound legal principles and was correct in his analysis that Clemson is an arm of the state and entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for purposes of Counts I, V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX of Plaintiff's complaint.
Plaintiff argues that the magistrate's Report and Recommendation "fails to consider the fact that" Clemson is a municipal corporation with a separate and distinct identity from the state. (Obj. of Pl. at 1.) Plaintiff is incorrect. The magistrate discussed the issue of whether Clemson is a municipal corporation with a separate identity at length in his Report and Recommendation. (See Mag. Rep. & Recomm. at 427-28.) Further, the mere fact that South Carolina's statutory authority refers to Clemson as a municipal corporation is not enough to determine its status as an arm of the state. Clemson Univ. v. W.R. Grace & Co., C.A. No. 2:86-2055-2, 1991 WL 112319, at *4 (D.S.C.1991). See also Ram Ditta v. Md. Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 822 F.2d 456, 458 n. 5 (4th Cir.1987) ().
Plaintiff alleges that under Supreme Court precedence, Clemson is not entitled to sovereign immunity. Plaintiff's argument relies almost exclusively on a 1921 Supreme Court case which originated in a South Carolina state court. Hopkins v. Clemson Agr. Coll. of S.C., 221 U.S. 636, 637, 31 S.Ct. 654, 55 L.Ed. 890 (1911). In Hopkins, the plaintiff sought damages from Clemson, then known as Clemson Agricultural College of South Carolina, alleging that a dyke constructed by the college caused damage to neighboring property and constituted a taking of plaintiff's property. Id. The Hopkins Court overruled the South Carolina Supreme Court and held that Clemson was amenable to suit for taking private property without just compensation. Id. at 648-49, 31 S.Ct. 654.
Plaintiff reads the holding in Hopkins too broadly. The Supreme Court did not conclusively determine whether Clemson was an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. It held that a public corporation like Clemson cannot nullify the Constitution's Just Compensation Clause by employing the doctrine of sovereign immunity in state court. See id. at 648, 31 S.Ct. 654. See also Chicago Burlington & Quincey R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233, 17 S.Ct. 581, 41 L.Ed. 979 (1897) (). Accordingly, because Hopkins did not definitively determine Clemson's status as an arm of the state under the Eleventh Amendment, the magistrate correctly applied the four-factor analysis prescribed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ram Ditta.
Plaintiff claims the magistrate failed to properly assess and weigh the relevant factors in determining that Clemson is an arm of the state. In Ram Ditta, the Fourth Circuit outlined four factors courts should consider in determining whether an entity is an arm of the state. Ram Ditta, 822 F.2d at 457. First, and most importantly, is whether the state treasury will be responsible for paying any judgment that might be awarded. If the answer to this question is yes, the inquiry is at an end because "if the `State Treasury will be called upon to pay a judgment against a government entity . . . consideration of any other factor becomes unnecessary' and the entity will be immune." Kitchen v. Upshaw, 286 F.3d 179, 184 (4th Cir.2002) (quoting Cash v. Granville County Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 219, 223 (4th Cir.2001)). A negative answer to this question, though, does not necessarily mean that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply. Id. Instead, "if the state's treasury will not be used to satisfy a judgment, [the court] still must determine if the relationship of the entity with the state is close enough to implicate the `dignity of the State as a sovereign.'" Id. (quoting Cash, 242 F.3d at 224).
Determining the closeness of the relationship between the entity and the state involves consideration of the remaining three Ram Ditta factors: the degree of control exercised by the state over the entity; whether the entity deals with statewide or local concerns; and how state law treats the entity. Kitchen, 286 F.3d at 184. Plaintiff claims that the magistrate misapplied applicable case law and erred in balancing each factor in favor of Clemson.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff claims that the magistrate erred in relying on the Honorable C. Weston Houck's analysis in Clemson University v. W.R. Grace & Co., C.A. No. 2:86-2055-2, 1991 WL 112319 (D.S.C. June 18, 1991). In W.R. Grace & Co., Judge Houck, then United States District Judge,1 after applying the four-factor Ram Ditta analysis, concluded that Clemson University was an arm of the State of South Carolina. Plaintiff contends the magistrate's reliance on this case is misplaced because the opinion is unpublished, non-precedential, and the underlying facts were distinct from the case at bar. Although Plaintiff is correct that unpublished opinions do not constitute binding precedence, unpublished opinions can be persuasive when they address questions currently before the Court. Although Plaintiff contends that W.R. Grace & Co. is...
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