Martin v. Dealers Transport Co.

• Citation: 48 Tenn.App. 1,342 S.W.2d 245
• Decision Date: 26 July 1960
• Docket Number: No. 89,I,89
• Parties: J. B. MARTIN, D. E. Streeter, E. E. Reeves, J. P. McDonald and C. H. Dorroh, Appellees, v. DEALERS TRANSPORT COMPANY and General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Local Unionnternational Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America, Appellant. 48 Tenn.App. 1, 342 S.W.2d 245
• Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee

Page 245

342 S.W.2d 245

J. B. MARTIN, D. E. Streeter, E. E. Reeves, J. P. McDonald and C. H. Dorroh, Appellees, v. DEALERS TRANSPORT COMPANY and General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Local Union No. 89, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs Warehousemen, and Helpers of America, Appellant.

48 Tenn.App. 1, 342 S.W.2d 245

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Western Section.

July 26, 1960.

Certiorari Denied by Supreme Court Jan. 13, 1961.

[48 TENNAPP 3] Ralph H. Logan and Hardy & Logan, Louisville, Ky., for Local Union No. 89.

Robert A. Tillman, Memphis, for appellee.

Newell N. Fowler, Memphis, for Dealers Transp. Co.

BEJACH, Judge.

The original bill in this cause was filed September 23, 1958 by J. B. Martin, R. E. Streeter, E. E. Reeves, J. P. McDonald and C. H. Dorroh against Dealers Transport Company, a corporation, 1368 Riverside Blvd. and Local Union 89, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 813 S. First Street, Louisville 3, Kentucky; but by consent order, entered October 14, 1958, the original bill was amended so as to correctly state the name of defendant as hereinabove given in the caption of this opinion. The bill was filed by complainants as representatives of a class of employees numbering more than 100, all having a common interest in the subject matter of the action, and being too numerous to join therein. The bill was filed for and on behalf of third-party beneficiaries under a contract executed between the Dealers Transport Company and Local Union No. 984, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, which was the collective bargaining agent for employees of the Dealers Transport Company, which contract is industry-wide, having been negotiated by a committee representing employees of all companies affiliated with a national association of automobile transporters. The bill sought an injunction to [48 TENNAPP 4] prohibit the Dealers Transport Company from honoring, and Local Union No. 89 from enforcing a rider to said nationwide contract, which had been negotiated between Local Union No. 89 at Louisville, Kentucky and the Dealers Transport Company, granting to members of Local Union 89, only, the exclusive rights to all work originating out of the Louisville branch of Dealers Transport Company. Said Union will be referred to as Local Union 89 or as defendant Union. The effect of said rider is to enforce a union shop with reference to all work originating at Louisville, Kentucky. It is conceded that the agreement contained in said rider could be legal and might be enforced in Kentucky, since the Taft-Hartley Law recognizes union shops in States which permit same, but it is contended the agreement contained in said rider is illegal and unenforceable in Tennessee, because it violates the public policy of this State as reflected in our Open Shop or Right to Work statute, as set out in Chapter 36, Public Acts of 1947, Sections 50-208 to 50-213, T.C.A. Complainants' bill also alleges that the rider in question is illegal as an amendment to the nation-wide contract, because it was not negotiated, advertised, and approved as is therein required.

Complainants undertook to obtain service on defendant Union by means of process served on the Secretary of State of Tennessee, under the provisions of Section 20-223, T.C.A. Local Union No. 89 entered a special appearance and filed a plea in abatement contesting the jurisdiction of the court, which contest it undertakes to carry on in its appeal to this Court; but, on May 21, 1959, after the Chancellor had granted a temporary injunction as prayed for in the bill, an order was entered permitting it to withdraw its plea in abatement and file an answer. [48 TENNAPP 5] On May 29, 1959, Local Union No. 89 entered its general appearance in this cause by filing an answer, in which, among other defenses, it is contended that the granting of an injunction as prayed for in complainants' bill, violates the obligation of contracts clause of the United States Constitution, art. 1, Sec. 10, cl. 1, and that the courts of this State are without jurisdiction because, by the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Law, exclusive jurisdiction is vested in the National Labor Relations Board. The defendant, Dealers Transport Company, had on October 3, 1958, filed its answer in the cause; but it did not appeal from the decree of the Chancellor and is not concerned with the litigation in this Court.

The cause was, by stipulation, tried on oral evidence before the Chancellor, who found as a fact that the rider attacked by complainants' bill in this cause violates the public policy of the State of Tennessee as expressed in its Open Shop or Right to Work Act, Sections 50-208 to 50-213 T.C.A. He made permanent the injunction previously granted. Defendant Union excepted to the final decree and perfected its appeal to this Court where it has filed seven assignments of error, which are as follows:

'The Court below erred:

'1. In assuming jurisdiction of the subject matter of the bill under T.C.A. 20-223.

'2. In its ruling that the Defendant, Local #89 was doing business in the State of Tennessee.

'3. In ruling that the jurisdiction of its Court was not preempted by Federal Law adjudicating that the grievance procedure as set out in the contract between the parties was not a final adjudication of a matter before it.

[48 TENNAPP 6] '4. In holding that the terms of the contract as altered by a rider was in violation of the laws and public policy of the State of Tennessee.

'5. In failing to give full faith and credit to a contract which is legal under the Federal Law and under the law of the State of Kentucky where the contract was made, overruling the plea in abatement and issuing a temporary injunction.

'6. By its judgment interfering with the free flow of commerce between the various states.

'7. In issuing a permanent injunction in this cause.'

It is contended by able counsel for appellees that the assignments of error quoted above are so indefinite and general in character as, to fail to comply with the rules of this Court and appellate court decisions, and, consequently that same should be ignored and treated as a nullity. For this contention appellees' counsel cites Gibson's Suits in Chancery, 5th Ed. Sec. 1389, and Yarbrough v. L. & N. R. R., 11 Tenn.App. 456. We prefer, however, to consider these assignments on their merits, although several of them present purely moot questions, which, on the record before us, it is wholly unnecessary for us to decide. The contention that defendant Union's plea in abatement should have been sustained and that said Union is not doing business in Tennessee within the meaning of Section 20-223 T.C.A., certainly became immaterial when said Union withdrew its plea in abatement and entered a general appearance in this cause by filing its answer. The questions of whether jurisdiction was exclusively in the N.L.R.B. or whether the Chancellor erred in ruling that the terms of the rider here involved [48 TENNAPP 7] violates the law and public policy of the State of Tennessee, are, however, in our opinion, adequately presented by these assignments of error, and we will dispose of same in this opinion.

We are unable to agree to appellant's contention that exclusive jurisdiction of the matters involved in this law suit has been preempted in favor of the National Labor Relations Board by the Taft-Hartley Law. Under Section 158 of that Act, 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 158, a union shop agreement is specifically authorized in States where same are legal; but, in Section 164 of said Act, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 164, States are specifically authorized to prohibit union shops in labor-management contracts. It is conceded, in the case at bar, that the contract embodied in the rider here involved is legal in Kentucky, and could be enforced there; but it is contended that same violates the public policy of the State of Tennessee as embodied in the Open Shop or Right to Work Law, so that same is unenforceable in Tennessee. In the case of Colgate-Palmolive Peet Co. v. N. L. R. B., 338 U.S. 355, 70 S.Ct. 166, 167, 94 L.Ed. 161, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the N.L.R.B. has no authority to convert into an unfair labor practice what was expressly authorized by Congress. In that case, the Court said:

'The question we have here is whether a closed shop contract, entered into and performed in good faith, and valid in the State where made, protects an...