Martin v. Georgia Dept. of Public Safety

• Decision Date: 25 June 1987
• Docket Number: No. 44194,44194
• Citation: 357 S.E.2d 569,257 Ga. 300
• Parties: MARTIN v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 569

357 S.E.2d 569

257 Ga. 300

MARTIN v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, et al.

No. 44194.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

June 25, 1987.

Reconsideration Denied July 9, 1987 and July 29, 1987.

David W. Griffeth, Athens, Mark H. Johnson, Downing, McAleer & Gaskin, Savannah, J. Richardson Brannon, Gainesville, for appellant.

Robert E. Andrews, Cullen C. Larson, Gainesville, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Neal B. Childers, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Reid G. Kennedy, Kennedy and Kennedy, Marietta, for appellees.

James E. Goodman, F. Clay Bush, Stephen H. DeBaun, amici curiae.

HUNT, Justice.

In a case of first impression, we are called upon to re-examine the status of sovereign immunity in this state after the enactment of the 1983 Constitution, which provides for the waiver of sovereign immunity for the state or its agencies where liability insurance has been purchased. 1983 Ga. Const., Art. I, Sec. 2, Para. 9. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Department of Public Safety, Commissioner Hardison and State Patrolman D.E. Cochran. The plaintiff appeals.

State Patrolman D.E. Cochran initiated a high-speed chase to apprehend Charles Brewer, who was detected by Cochran to be speeding on Georgia Highway 400 in Lumpkin County. The subsequent chase covered 23 miles and two counties. It lasted 22 minutes and involved speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour, officers from three counties and the State Patrol. During the chase, Cochran was in radio contact with Alan Seabolt, a Lumpkin County Deputy Sheriff. The plan was that Seabolt would attempt to block an intersection ahead of Brewer and Cochran, thus ending the chase. At one point, Cochran requested Seabolt to hurry because Brewer was rapidly approaching the intersection in question. In that effort, Seabolt lost control of his car on a curve and crashed into a car driven by Martha Collins, knocking it down an embankment into a creek. She was killed, and her five-year-old grandson was rendered quadriplegic.

This tort suit was filed on behalf of the child against the Department of Public Safety, then Commissioner Hugh Hardison, State Patrolman D.E. Cochran, Lumpkin County Deputy Sheriff Alan Seabolt, his superior Sheriff Kenneth Seabolt, and Charles Brewer. Claims against Commissioner Hardison were bottomed on negligence and 42 USC § 1983, alleging failure to set out objective guidelines for high-speed chases and to train officers properly in that regard.

The Department, Hardison and Cochran argue that, notwithstanding the provisions of the 1983 Constitution, they are immune from the prosecution of this claim under the principle of sovereign immunity. We disagree.

Art. I, Sec. 2, Para. 9 of the 1983 Constitution provides that "Sovereign immunity extends to the state and all of its departments and agencies.... Also the defense of sovereign immunity is waived as to those actions for the recovery of damages for any claim against the state or any of its departments or agencies for which liability insurance protection for such claims has been provided but only to the extent of any liability insurance provided." Thus, this section of the 1983 Constitution expresses the will of the people of this state that citizens injured by the actions of the state be compensated if insurance is available. Of course, the state is not required to provide insurance protection either through purchasing coverage from a private carrier or through the establishment of a self-insurance fund. But if it does either, the waiver operates and the proceeds of a self-insurance fund would stand on the same footing as those available from a policy issued by a private carrier. As pointed out by Justice Charles L. Weltner in his special concurrence in Toombs County, Georgia v. O'Neal, 254 Ga. 390, 393, 330 S.E.2d 95 (1985), "[w]hen a public body has purchased liability insurance, there is no necessity for the protection which sovereign immunity provides to the public. Conversely, the insurer, as a private, for-profit entity, should not be accorded the protection of sovereign immunity, which exists for the benefit of the public. Thus, ... when the public utility of sovereign immunity has evaporated, that doctrine should not serve to shield what is purely a private interest." [Emphasis in original.] Our duty is to honor that articulation of public policy.

1. We first decline the plaintiff's and amici's invitation to abolish the doctrine of sovereign immunity by judicial fiat. While under the 1983 Constitution this court may address the constitutionality of a constitutional provision as well as the constitutionality of other laws, 1983 Const. Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. II, we find that present public policy has been clearly expressed by the passage of the very constitutional provision the contenders argue gives us the power to abolish it. Compare Clark v. State of Georgia, 240 Ga. 188, 240 S.E.2d 5 (1977); Sheley v. Board of Public Education for the City of Savannah, 233 Ga. 487, 212 S.E.2d 627 (1975). There can be no mistaking the intention to preserve the protection of the public purse through the doctrine of sovereign immunity except to the extent that insurance has been purchased.

2. We next consider the question whether after the passage of Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX of the 1983 Constitution, the purchase of insurance for department employees under OCGA ch. 45-9 and OCGA § 45-9-40 results in a waiver of the sovereign immunity of the department itself and of the official immunity of the employees.

Before the 1983 constitutional amendment, Ch. 45-9, passed in 1977, provided for the purchase of liability insurance or establishment of a self-insurance fund: "... insuring or indemnifying such officers, officials or employees to the extent that they are not immune from liability against personal liability, for damages arising out of the performance of their duties or in any way connected therewith." Section 45-9-5 states: "Nothing in this article shall constitute a waiver of the immunity of the state from any action." Cases decided after the passage of these provisions clearly continued to uphold the sovereign immunity of the state and the official immunity of state employees. E.g., Hennessey v. Webb, 245 Ga. 329, 264 S.E.2d 878 (1980).

In Robinson v. City of Decatur, 253 Ga. 779, 325 S.E.2d 752 (1985), however, decided after the passage of the 1983 Amendment, but in which the cause of action had arisen before its enactment, a change in public policy was foreshadowed. There, now Presiding Justice Clarke, concurring specially in the face of three dissenters who would have applied the waiver retroactively, wrote: "Constitutional principles and public policy would dictate that this waiver be applied to all sovereign immunity cases arising after the effective date of this amendment. However, the application of these principles and policies must wait until the proper case." Id. at 780, 325 S.E.2d 752. This is the proper case. As Justice Weltner said in his dissent in the same case, "when there is no jeopardy to the public treasury, the traditional choice--either unrequited damage to an individual or reparations from the public treasury--no longer need be made."

In the case before us, the plaintiff asserts liability of the Department of Public Safety under principles of respondeat superior for the negligence of Cochran in initiating and continuing the pursuit of Brewer in reckless disregard of the safety of the public. Plaintiff additionally alleges negligence by the department in inadequately training and providing guidelines to its officers in order to minimize injuries in high-speed chases. That negligence is attributed to former Commissioner Hardison. The department admits that these employees are covered by a comprehensive general liability policy.

The comprehensive general liability trust fund includes the following pertinent provisions:

"This policy covers the following: PERSONAL INJURY, BODILY INJURY, SICKNESS, DISEASE OR DEATH AND PROPERTY DAMAGE caused by or resulting from error, omission or negligence in the performance of duties within the scope of an insured's employment with a participating entity that has purchased coverage prior to the date of the occurrence.

"In consideration of the payment of the appropriate premium, and subject to all of the limitations set forth in this policy or any addendum hereto, the Fund hereby agrees that it will provide the following coverage:

"A) Comprehensive general liability insurance. The Fund will pay on behalf of any insured, all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages, court costs and attorney fees, because of bodily injury, property damage or personal injury resulting from any job related occurrences caused by any insured....

"B) Occupational errors or omissions liability insurance. The Fund will pay on behalf of any insured, all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages, court costs and attorney fees, arising out of the performance of or failure to perform official duties in the insured's capacity as an officer or employee and caused by the insured. The Fund will also pay on behalf of the insured all such sums within the policy limits arising out of the rendering of or failure to render services by any person for whose acts or failure to act such insured is legally responsible by reason of the insured's position." [Emphasis in original.] Thus, this insurance fund covers the negligent acts "arising out of the performance of or failure to perform official duties in the insured's capacity as an officer or employee and caused...