Martin v. Houston

• Decision Date: 06 April 2016
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 2:14-CV-905-WKW
• Citation: 176 F.Supp.3d 1286
• Parties: Ricky Martin, Plaintiff, v. Randall V. Houston, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

176 F.Supp.3d 1286

Ricky Martin, Plaintiff,

v.Randall V. Houston, Defendant.

CASE NO. 2:14-CV-905-WKW

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

Signed April 6, 2016

Avery C. Livingston, Randall C. Marshall, ACLU of Alabama Foundation, Inc., Montgomery, AL, Daniel Mach, Heather L. Weaver, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Laura Elizabeth Howell, William G. Parker, Jr., Office of the Alabama Attorney General, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

W. Keith Watkins, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the court is Defendant Randall V. Houston's Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint (Doc. # 25), which has been fully briefed. Upon consideration of the pleadings, the arguments of counsel, and the relevant law, the motion will be denied.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Subject-matter jurisdiction is exercised pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331

, 1343, 2201, and 2202. The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

When evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

, the court must take the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Resnick v. AvMed, Inc. , 693 F.3d 1317, 1321–22 (11th Cir.2012). To survive Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). “[F]acial plausibility” exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

challenges the court's subject-matter jurisdiction. McElmurray v. Consol. Gov't of Augusta–Richmond Cnty. , 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir.2007). On a Rule 12(b)(1) facial attack, the court evaluates whether the plaintiff “has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction” in the complaint and employs a standard similar to that governing Rule 12(b)(6) review. Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc. , 733 F.3d 1323, 1335 (11th Cir.2013). The court thus examines the pleadings and decides whether the plaintiff has alleged jurisdictional facts that are facially plausible. See id.

III. BACKGROUND

Alabama enforces a sweeping statutory scheme regulating the activities of sex offenders. See McGuire v. Strange , 83 F.Supp.3d 1231, 1236 (M.D.Ala.2015)

(describing Alabama's sex offender scheme as the most “comprehensive” and “debilitating” in the country). In addition to requiring that sex offenders register with local law enforcement agencies, the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act (“ASORCNA”) limits where its registrants may live and work. Ala. Code § 15–20A–1 et seq. Plaintiff Ricky Martin (“Martin”), who serves as pastor of the Triumph Church in Clanton, Alabama, welcomed ASORCNA registrants into his congregation. Alabama lawmakers passed a measure limiting Martin's ability to minister to his congregation, and this action ensued. The relevant facts and procedural history will first be discussed.

A. Facts

Martin is called to serve others. As a man of the cloth, he believes, in keeping with his Christian faith, that he is duty bound to help those in need. He followed that Christian calling by ministering to men incarcerated in Alabama correctional facilities. His prison ministry brought him in contact with a number of sex offenders, many of whom had difficulty finding suitable housing upon their release from imprisonment. Martin opened his Clanton property to them, establishing a small settlement for ASORCNA registrants. He hoped to help them transition into society without running afoul of ASORCNA's stringent residential restrictions.¹

Martin owns a small parcel of property adjacent to Triumph Church in Clanton, Alabama.² He set up five mobile homes on this parcel, all within 300 feet of each other. Martin established a screening process for determining which registrants would be allowed to live in this settlement. He required men living there to abide by a residency agreement, which prohibited tobacco use, fighting, possession of weapons and pornography, and use of foul language. Martin also required that the men attend his church services, dress properly, keep the settlement tidy, and refrain from trespassing onto neighboring property. Martin and his congregants held yard sales to support the ministry, and the community responded positively by purchasing the items they offered. Martin only accepted registrants who were open to living according to Christian principles.

In addition to providing housing, Martin encouraged settlement residents to make healthy transitions back into free society. He stressed to these men the importance of living a Christian life, which he believed would prevent them from repeating their criminal offenses. He provided only temporary housing for settlement residents, requiring them eventually to find permanent homes. The population living in his settlement was thus subject to constant change. The new residents, who were recently released from prison, frequently replaced those residents securing permanent living arrangements. Throughout the time Martin made the settlement available, approximately sixty men lived there. The settlement usually housed between twelve and fourteen men at a time.

State lawmakers adopted a measure that disrupted the operation of Martin's settlement. The statutory measure, which originated as House Bill 556, and is now codified at Alabama Code § 45–11–82

(the “Act”), provides that individuals whose names are listed on the Alabama sex offender registry may not establish residency in the same home. Ala. Code § 45–11–82(b)(1). The Act further provides that an ASORCNA registrant may not establish a residence on the same lot or property as another ASORCNA registrant unless the homes are at least 300 feet apart. Ala. Code § 45–11–82(b)(2). These provisions do not apply where ASORCNA registrants who wish to live together or establish residence near each other are married or related. Ala. Code § 45–11–82(b). The Act also provides that a “violation of subsection (b) shall constitute a public nuisance.” Ala. Code § 45–11–82(c). It authorizes the district attorney to institute a civil action against the owner or lessor of property to abate such a nuisance. Id. The court hearing such an action is authorized, in its discretion, to assess a fine between $500 and $5,000 for each civil action. Ala. Code § 45–11–82(d). Of particular relevance is the fact that the Act applies only to Chilton County, Ala. Code § 45–11–82(a), which happens to be the locus of Martin's settlement.

Martin alleges that Alabama House Representative Kurt Wallace (“Wallace”), in concert with Houston, who is the District Attorney for Chilton County,³ supported the Act's passage with the intent of forcing Martin to dismantle his ASORCNA residential settlement. The legislature first considered a bill that would have applied the same sex offender residency restrictions across the state. Martin alleges that the majority of the testimony the legislature heard regarding the initial statewide bill focused solely on his property. The legislature rejected the statewide version of the bill and instead opted for the Act's single-county approach.

Martin's church and settlement are located in Clanton, within the confines of Chilton County. Martin contends that this statute affected no property other than his settlement. He further alleges that Wallace and Houston confirmed, in interviews with local news media outlets, that their intention in passing the Act was to prevent Martin from maintaining his settlement ministry. Martin wrote Wallace while the Act was still under consideration, pleading with him to allow the continuation of his ministry. According to Martin, Wallace's response made it clear that the Act was designed to prevent ASORCNA registrants from living on Martin's property.

After the Act's passage, Martin received a visit from a Chilton County Sheriff's investigator. The investigator informed Martin that the Act would become effective on July 1, 2014. He also encouraged Martin to speak with representatives from the Chilton County District Attorney's office regarding the Act's effect on his property use. Martin heeded this advice and met with Assistant Chilton County District Attorney C.J. Robinson (“Robinson”). At their meeting, Robinson informed Martin that, because his settlement was not in compliance with the Act, Martin should evict all sex offenders living on his property. Robinson further warned Martin that failure to do so would result in Martin being haled into court and fined per the Act's civil action provisions.

On June 30, 2014, the Chilton County District Attorney's office followed up by issuing an oral threat and written notice to Martin. These warnings made it clear that the District Attorney intended to take action against Martin if he did not evict the settlement residents from his property within fourteen days. Martin, fearing fines upwards of $60,000,⁴ promptly evicted all of the men living on his property. Had he not received the District Attorney's warnings, Martin would have continued housing ASORCNA registrants as part of his Christian ministry.

Martin alleges that the Act runs afoul of federal statutory and constitutional law. Specifically, in the First Cause of Action, he alleges that the Act places a substantial burden on his free exercise of religion in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). In the Second Cause of Action, he alleges that the Act infringes upon...