Martin v. Lindenwood Univ., 4:20-CV-1128 RLW

• Decision Date: 21 July 2021
• Docket Number: No. 4:20-CV-1128 RLW,4:20-CV-1128 RLW
• Parties: DYLAN MARTIN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. LINDENWOOD UNIVERSITY. Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

DYLAN MARTIN, on behalf of himselfand all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. LINDENWOOD UNIVERSITY. Defendant.

No. 4:20-CV-1128 RLW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

July 21, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Lindenwood University's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8). This matter is fully briefed and ready for disposition. For the reasons discussed herein, the Court denies Lindenwood University's ("Lindenwood") Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8) Plaintiff Dylan Martin's ("Martin") claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment for failure to state a claim. The Court grants Lindenwood's Motion to Dismiss with respect to Martin's claim for conversion.

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" will not suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Several principles guide the Court in determining whether a complaint meets the plausibility standard. The court must take the plaintiff's factual allegations as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "This tenet does not apply, however, to legal conclusions or 'formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action'; such allegations may properly be set aside." Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" In re Pre-Filled Propane Tank Antitrust Litig., 893 F.3d 1047, 1056 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Rather, the facts alleged "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

BACKGROUND

Martin purports to allege a class action lawsuit against Lindenwood "on behalf of all people who paid tuition and fees for the Spring 2020 academic semester at Lindenwood, and who, because of Defendant's response to the Novel Coronavirus Disease 2019 ('COVID-19') pandemic, lost the benefit of the education for which they paid, and/or the services or facilities for which their fees were paid, without having their tuition and fees refunded to them." (Class Action Complaint ("Compl." or "Complaint"), ECF No. 1, ¶1).

Martin alleges that, during periods of normal operations, Lindenwood charges less for online course than for in-person courses. (Compl., ¶3). Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Lindenwood provided only online coursework for the Spring 2020 semester after March 11, 2020. (Compl., ¶4). Martin alleges that

[a]s a result of the closure of Defendant's facilities, Defendant has not delivered the educational services, facilities, access and/or opportunities that Mr. Martin and the putative class contracted and paid for. The online learning options being offered to Lindenwood students are subpar in practically every aspect, from the lack of facilities, materials, and access to faculty. Students have been deprived of the opportunity for collaborative learning and in-person dialogue, feedback, andcritique, including but not limited to the discontinuance of internships and clinical placements.

(Compl., ¶6). Martin contends the online coursework is "in no way the equivalent of the in-person education that Plaintiff and the putative class members contracted and paid for." (Compl., ¶6). Based upon the decision to mandate remote learning for the balance of the Spring 2020 semester, Martin alleges "Defendant's educational services have diminished in value significantly compared to the in-person education services that Defendant was providing prior to canceling in-person classes." (Compl., ¶6). Martin brings a putative class action for "a refund of tuition and fees for in-person educational services, facilities, access and/or opportunities that Defendant has not provided." (Compl., ¶7). Martin contends that, despite Lindenwood not having a choice to discontinue in-person classes, Lindenwood "has improperly retained funds for services that have diminished in value or are not being provided at all." (Compl., ¶7). Martin's Complaint alleges causes of action for Breach of Contract (Count I), Unjust Enrichment (Count II), and Conversion (Count III).

DISCUSSION

I. Educational Malpractice Doctrine

"Generally, courts have refrained from recognizing educational malpractice claims, either in tort or contract, on the premise that '[u]niversities must be allowed the flexibility to manage themselves and correct their own mistakes.'" Lucero v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 400 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Miller v. Loyola Univ. of New Orleans, 829 So.2d 1057, 1061 (La. Ct. App. 2002)). Missouri courts have "refuse[d] to recognize a claim for educational malpractice" because it is not the role of courts "to micromanage a university's daily operations." Id. (citing Dallas Airmotive, Inc. v. FlightSafety Int'l, Inc., 277 S.W.3d 696, 700 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) ("[C]ourts have refused to become the overseers of both the day-to-dayoperation of [the] educational process as well as the formulation of its governing policies" (second alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted))). The Eighth Circuit likewise acknowledges that Missouri refuses to recognize claims for educational malpractice against educational institutions:

In educational malpractice cases, a plaintiff sues his or her academic institution for tortiously failing to provide adequate educational services. If a negligence claim raises questions concerning the reasonableness of the educator's conduct in providing educational services, then the claim is one of educational malpractice. Similarly, if the claim requires an analysis of the quality of education received and in making that analysis the fact-finder must consider principles of duty, standards of care, and the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct, then the claim is one of educational malpractice. If the duty alleged to have been breached is the duty to educate effectively, the claim is one of educational malpractice. A claim that educational services provided were inadequate, substandard, or ineffective constitutes a claim of educational malpractice. Where the court is asked to evaluate the course of instruction or the soundness of the method of teaching that has been adopted by an educational institution, the claim is one of educational malpractice.

Soueidan v. St. Louis Univ., 926 F.3d 1029, 1034-35 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Dallas Airmotive, 277 S.W.3d at 700). The educational malpractice doctrine, however, does not foreclose all causes of action between students and academic institutions. Zagoria v. New York Univ., No. 20CIV3610GBDSLC, 2021 WL 1026511, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2021). For example, "[w]hen the essence of the complaint moves beyond the effectiveness of education and into more specific promises for specified services, a student may be able to sue for breach of contract." Id.

In this instant lawsuit, Martin frames his claims as that Lindenwood promised one thing -- an in-person experience for the entire spring 2020 semester -- but delivered another. See ECF No. 11 at 5 ("This [the educational malpractice doctrine] is simply not the law with respect to a university's commercial activities; here, selling an in-person, on-campus education to consumers."). Martin alleges that Lindenwood charged more for in-person classes than foronline tuition. (Compl., ¶¶17, 18 (citing https://www.lindenwood.edu/admissions/student-financial-services/tuition-and-fees-2019-2020 and https://online.lindenwood.edu/programs (for various online programs)). Martin claims that his causes of action relate to only these different forms and prices of education and do "not request any analysis where 'the trier of fact would have to inquire into the nuances of educational processes and theories in order to determine whether the alleged representations were false.'" (ECF No. 11 at 10 (citing Soueidan v. Saint Louis Univ., No. 4:17-CV-2777RLW, 2018 WL 1997287, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 27, 2018), aff'd sub nom. Soueidan v. St. Louis Univ., 926 F.3d 1029 (8th Cir. 2019)). Martin maintains that Lindenwood charges one amount for online education and another amount for "[f]ull-time undergraduate in-person tuition." (ECF No. 11 at 11 (quoting Compl., ¶17, n.3).¹

In response, Lindenwood argues that Martin's causes of action must be dismissed because its website does not differentiate between the cost of in-person and online learning. (ECF No. 13 at 4-5) ("Here, the link that Plaintiff invokes says nothing about "in-person" tuition or education, and instead discusses 'full-time undergraduate semester tuition.'")(emphasis in original).² Lindenwood states that its website provides pricing for "full-time undergraduate semester tuition" and "part-time undergraduate tuition."

The Court finds that Lindenwood's website appears to offer online programs that are at a different price point than the full-time and part-time semester tuition programs. Seehttps://online.lindenwood.edu/programs/.³ Based upon the website and Martin's allegations, Lindenwood appears to place a cost difference between in-person and online learning. Thus, the Court finds that Martin has alleged a cost difference between in-person and online learning, which would not necessarily invoke the educational malpractice doctrine. Cf. Soueidan, 926 F.3d at 1034-35 ("A claim that educational services provided were inadequate, substandard, or...