Martin v. Lloyd Motor Co.
| Decision Date | 07 April 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. B-327,B-327 |
| Citation | 119 So.2d 413 |
| Parties | J. W. MARTIN and Josephine McCullough Martin, Appellants, v. LLOYD MOTOR COMPANY, a Florida Corporation, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Curtis A. Golden, Milton, for appellants.
Isler, Welch & Jones, Panama City, for appellee.
This appeal is from a final judgment dismissing with prejudice an amended complaint for its failure to state a cause of action as against defendant Lloyd Motor Company. The principal point on appeal questions the correctness of the trial court's ruling that the complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to show that Lloyd Motor Company was jointly liable for the damages claimed.
The complaint is one at law seeking damages for the death of plaintiffs' decedent. The allegations of fact set forth in the complaint may be summarized as follows. Before the critical date in question one Charles A. Jones, who is joined as a party defendant in the cause, was the owner of a Chevrolet automobile. Jones delivered possession of this vehicle to defendant Lloyd Motor Company with the mutual understanding and agreement that Lloyd would sell the vehicle for the account of Jones. It was further mutually understood and agreed between the parties that Lloyd had the authority to allow prospective purchasers to drive the automobile for the purpose of determining whether they desired to purchase it. In pursuance of its undertaking Lloyd accepted possession of the vehicle and in the course of discharging its agreed obligation delivered possession of it to one Bennie James Coker, who was given permission by Lloyd to drive the automobile for the purpose of determining whether he desired to purchase it. Coker drove the automobile away from Lloyd's place of business for the ostensible purpose above stated. While the vehicle was in Coker's possession, he operated it upon the public highways of the state in a negligent and reckless manner. As a proximate result of the negligent operation of the vehicle by Coker, plaintiffs' decedent suffered serious bodily injuries which caused his death.
In his order granting defendant's motion to dismiss the amended complaint the trial court concluded that in order for the complaint to state a cause of action against Lloyd, it would be necessary for plaintiff to allege that the automobile involved was placed with Lloyd for the mutual benefit of both Lloyd and the owner, or that the automobile was placed with Lloyd for profit, or that the negligence alleged on the part of Lloyd was through either bad faith or gross negligence. Because of the failure of the complaint to contain allegations of fact found necessary by the trial judge, the amended complaint was dismissed with leave to further amend if plaintiff so desired. It was upon plaintiffs' failure to further amend their complaint that final judgment of dismissal was entered.
The question of law with which this court is confronted is whether a bailee having possession of and dominion and control over a motor vehicle may be liable in damages for the negligent operation of such vehicle by one to whom the bailee gives permission to operate it on the public roads and highways of this state.
The basic law of Florida respecting the liability of a person having possession of and dominion and control over a motor vehicle for its negligent operation upon the roads and highways of the state was first enunciated by our Supreme Court in the Southern Cotton Oil Co. case. 1 It was there held that an automobile is a dangerous instrumentality, and that a special liability is imposed upont he owner for the operation of such an instrumentality upon the public highways of this state.
The latest affirmation of the fundamental philosophy underlying the dangerous instrumentality doctrine is the decision of the Supreme Court in the Susco Car Rental System case. 2 It was there held that the logical rule, as gleaned from the prevailing rationale of the cases dealing with the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, is that when control of a motor vehicle is voluntarily relinquished to another, only the breach of custody amounting to a specie of conversion or theft will relieve an owner of the responsibility for its use or misuse. It was held that this rule arises from the absolute duty which is owing to the public by those who employ in their business a dangerous instrumentality whose negligent operation might result in great danger to others. We see no justifiable reason why the liability imposed upon an owner of a motor vehicle under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine is not equally applicable to a bailee, whether the bailment be gratuitous, for hire, or for the mutual...
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Eberhardy v. General Motors Corporation
...Earl v. Ray, 277 So.2d 73, 76-77 (Fla.App.2d, 1973); Sauer v. Sauer, 128 So.2d 761, 763 (Fla.App.2d, 1961); Martin v. Lloyd Motor Co., 119 So.2d 413, 415 (Fla.App.1st, 1960); ReMark Chemical Co. v. Ross, 101 So.2d 163, 165 (Fla.App.4th, 1958). First, plaintiff argues bailment. Bailment of a......
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Brown v. Seebach
...and purposes, that person was the bailee's spouse. The doctrine of beneficial ownership is further discussed in Martin v. Lloyd Motor Company, 119 So.2d 413 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960). In Martin, the court held that "regardless of whether bailment is gratuitous, for hire, or for mutual benefit of ......
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Rouse v. Greyhound Rent-A-Car, Inc.
...Lakeland, as bailee of the automobile was also liable because of its consent to Cobb's operation of the vehicle. Martin v. Lloyd Motor Co., 119 So.2d 413 (Fla.App.1960); Frankel v. Fleming, 69 So.2d 887 (Fla.1954). Greyhound is similarly liable under the Florida dangerous instrumentality do......
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...The same result occurred in a second action, the court noting that liability was not dependent upon ownership. Martin v. Lloyd Motor Co., 119 So.2d 413 (1st D.C.A.Fla.1960). Thus, if the negligence of a permittee of a bailee is imputable to both the owner and the bailee it seems logical tha......