Martin v. Phillips

• Decision Date: 26 June 2018
• Docket Number: Case Number: 116672
• Citation: 422 P.3d 143
• Parties: April MARTIN, as custodial parent of S.M. and A.M., minor children, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. Daniel Paul PHILLIPS, Defendant/Petitioner.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

422 P.3d 143

April MARTIN, as custodial parent of S.M. and A.M., minor children, Plaintiff/Respondent,

v.Daniel Paul PHILLIPS, Defendant/Petitioner.

Case Number: 116672

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Decided: June 26, 2018

R. Ryan Deligans and Lane R. Neal, DURBIN, LARIMORE & BIALICK, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Petitioner.

P. Scott Spratt, THE SPRATT LAW FIRM, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent.

Wyrick, J.:

¶ 1 Daniel Phillips was convicted of multiple counts of indecent or lewd acts with children under the age of sixteen. The mother of the children has now sued Phillips, alleging various torts arising out of his crimes. The mother moved for partial summary adjudication in the case, arguing that Phillips's conviction for the crimes establishes his liability for the torts. In response, Phillips argued that because his conviction was the product of an Alford plea—where a defendant admits there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction, but nonetheless insists that he did not commit the crimes¹ —his conviction cannot preclude him from disputing liability in the civil case.

¶ 2 The district court agreed with the mother, granting partial summary adjudication in her favor on the issue of liability. Phillips asked the district court to certify that decision for immediate review pursuant to 12 O.S.2011 § 952(b)(3). The district court did so, and Phillips timely petitioned this Court for certiorari. We granted the petition and now affirm.

I.

¶ 3 As a general rule, when a case is litigated to judgment, the parties are precluded from later seeking to relitigate "the adjudicated claim, [and] also any theories or issues that were actually decided, or could have been decided, in that action."² Parties are also precluded in subsequent actions from relitigating any distinct issues of fact or law necessary to the judgment in the prior case.³ This "issue preclusion" or "collateral estoppel," as we call it, "prevents relitigation of facts and issues actually litigated and necessarily determined in an earlier proceeding between the same parties or their privies" where the parties had a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the issue.⁴ An issue is "actually litigated" if "it is properly raised in the pleadings or otherwise, submitted for determination, and in fact determined," and the issue is "necessarily determined" if "the judgment would not have been rendered but for the determination of that issue."⁵

¶ 4 This Court has already held that these preclusionary rules apply to criminal convictions resulting from a jury verdict, barring criminal defendants from relitigating their guilt in subsequent civil actions.⁶ The threshold question presented by this case is thus whether criminal convictions resulting from pleas, rather than jury verdicts, are generally subject to the same rules. We conclude that they are.

¶ 5 First, a criminal sentence cannot be imposed on a defendant unless there is a factual basis for the defendant's plea.⁷ Accordingly, any judgment of conviction following a plea is necessarily predicated on the presiding judge's determination that the evidence supports the conviction.⁸ Thus, the issue of factual guilt is one that is actually litigated (in that it is raised in the indictment or information and submitted to the judge for determination) and necessarily determined (in that a judgment of guilt cannot be entered unless the court finds that sufficient evidence of guilt exists).⁹

¶ 6 Second, section 513 of Oklahoma's Code of Criminal Procedure describes the types of pleas available under Oklahoma law, and in so doing specifically mandates that nolo contendere ("no-contest") pleas "may not be used against the defendant as an admission in any civil suit based upon or growing out of the act upon which the criminal prosecution is based."¹⁰ The Legislature's creation of this exception would be a solution in search of a problem if pleas weren't generally subject to normal rules of preclusion. Because we presume that the Legislature means to accomplish something when it writes a law,¹¹ section 513 represents the understanding that pleas other than no-contest pleas can "be used against the defendant as an admission in any civil suit" arising out of the same facts.

¶ 7 Third, extra-jurisdictional authorities agree that a guilty plea precludes subsequent relitigation of the issue of guilt.¹² "A counseled plea of guilty" is, after all, "an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case."¹³ Accordingly, "for purposes of applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel, there is no difference between a judgment of conviction based upon a guilty plea and a judgment rendered after a trial on the merits."¹⁴

II.

¶ 8 Because we hold the normal rules of preclusion apply to convictions resulting from pleas, the question that remains is whether an Alford plea like the one entered in this case falls within section 513's statutory exception to those rules. We hold that it does not.

¶ 9 First, the text of section 513 does not specifically address Alford pleas, at least not by that name. Section 513 only recognizes four pleas in response to a criminal charge: (1) not guilty, (2) guilty, (3) no contest, and (4) a plea of "former jeopardy."¹⁵ Moreover, as explained above, section 513's exception from the ordinary preclusive effect only applies to no-contest pleas.¹⁶ If the Legislature intended Alford pleas to be treated similarly, it could have said so; but it hasn't, despite Alford pleas having been recognized for nearly half a century.¹⁷ Thus, because the Legislature has declined to specifically account for Alford pleas, we will not do so for them. "Exceptions," after all, "should not be read into a statute which are not made by the legislative body."¹⁸

¶ 10 Second, an Alford plea cannot be characterized as a no-contest plea in order to fall within section 513's exception by its own terms. As the parties here recognize, because section 513 does not mention Alford pleas at all, an Alford plea must be either a no-contest plea or a guilty plea—otherwise Oklahoma courts wouldn't be statutorily authorized to accept them. We conclude, as have numerous courts before us, that an Alford plea is a guilty plea—just one "entered while maintaining innocence."¹⁹

¶ 11 In the Alford case itself, Alford pleaded guilty to second-degree murder on the understanding that, because of the State's strong case against him, his failure to do so could result in a first-degree murder conviction accompanied by the death penalty.²⁰ But when entering that guilty plea, Alford consistently maintained that he was factually innocent.²¹ The trial court nevertheless accepted the guilty plea and entered judgment against Alford. Alford then sought post-conviction relief, claiming his plea was the result of fear and coercion.²² In reaching that claim, however, the U.S. Supreme Court first examined whether Alford's guilty plea was rooted in fact.²³

¶ 12 While a guilty plea is ordinarily justified by (1) an admission that the defendant committed the crime and (2) consent to a waiver of trial,²⁴ the Court reasoned that an admission of factual guilt is not constitutionally required for a court to impose criminal liability because "[a]n individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime."²⁵ As long as the plea is rooted in fact—and Alford's was, in light of the State's evidence against him—and entered into voluntarily and with knowledge of the alternatives, the Court reasoned, a guilty plea is proper and need not be accompanied by an admission of factual guilt.²⁶

¶ 13 The Court thus concluded that Alford's plea was a constitutionally valid plea of guilty.²⁷ This is so because an Alford plea involves an admission of the government's ability to secure a conviction—i.e., an admission of legal guilt—even though the defendant professes his factual innocence. In the end, however, the effect is the same: the defendant has pleaded guilty. Thus, even though an Alford plea and a nolo contendere plea might appear similar in certain respects, courts nonetheless recognize that an Alford plea is a guilty plea accompanied by protestations of innocence.²⁸

¶ 14 Finally, there's the plea form Phillips entered in this case that confirms he was pleading guilty. Phillips insists in briefing that he entered into an Alford plea, and "in so pleading [he] never admitted to committing the crimes charged," and that his "plea was not based upon an admission of guilt, nor was the resulting judgment based upon a factual finding of such guilt."²⁹ The record, however, does not support this assertion. The plea is certainly delineated as an Alford plea in two places on the plea form, first on the first page where someone wrote in "(Alford)" above where the form says "Plea of Guilty and Summary of Facts,"³⁰ and then later in response to question 24—which asks, "What is/are your plea(s) to the charge(s) (and to each one of them)?"—where someone wrote "pleads guilty by Alford ."³¹ But when asked whether he committed the acts charged in the information, Phillips answered "yes," and did so under penalty of perjury.³² Phillips also repeatedly agreed that he was pleading "guilty" to the crimes charged.³³ The trial judge, meanwhile, plainly found that there was a factual basis for the plea and that Phillips was guilty as charged.³⁴ Indeed, apart from merely referencing " Alford " and relying upon any connotation that might come with it, Phillips never declared he was factually innocent. He instead did the opposite; he admitted that he committed the crimes. In other words, in all substantive respects, Phillips entered a guilty plea.

¶ 15 Because we conclude that an Alford plea is a form of guilty plea, we have no difficulty concluding that Phillips's plea carries...