Martin v. State
| Citation | 779 N.E.2d 1235 |
| Decision Date | 18 December 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 10A05-0201-CR-12.,10A05-0201-CR-12. |
| Parties | Roy A. MARTIN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Jeffrey D. Stonebraker, Jeffersonville, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Grant H. Carlton, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Roy Martin was convicted of murder, a felony, following a jury trial, and was sentenced to fifty-five years incarceration. He now appeals his conviction. We affirm.
Martin raises the following restated issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court properly admitted into evidence a statement Martin had given to police without benefit of counsel and after charges had been filed against him;
2. Whether the trial court properly admitted into evidence testimony regarding Martin's prior possession of a handgun; and
3. Whether the trial court properly allowed the State to impeach its own witnesses.
In the early morning hours of May 5, 2001, Vincent Sanders was shot multiple times and killed in the parking lot of the Greenwood apartments in Jeffersonville. Earlier that morning, Martin and Travis Green returned to the apartment complex and Martin became angry when he learned that Sanders had been driving his car while he was gone. He told Tina Hammond that he would "merc," or murder, Sanders for what he had done. Melvin Williams was in the parking lot that morning and knew that Martin was angry. Williams was only a few feet away when Martin confronted Sanders. Williams heard gunshots and turned to see Sanders on the ground and Martin holding a gun. After the shooting, Martin told Green that he "shouldn't have done that." Tr. at 109.
The investigation focused on Martin after detectives were given his name by witnesses and told that he was upset with Sanders. An information charging Martin with murder was filed on May 17, 2001. Martin surrendered himself at a police station in Louisville, Kentucky, on May 20, 2001, where he was later questioned by and gave a recorded statement to Jeffersonville police detectives.
Martin was tried to a jury and found guilty of murder. He was sentenced to fifty-five years incarceration. Martin now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
The admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the decision whether to admit evidence will not be reversed absent a showing of manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion resulting in the denial of a fair trial. Prewitt v. State, 761 N.E.2d 862, 869 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002). An abuse of discretion involves a decision that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. In determining the admissibility of evidence, we will only consider the evidence in favor of the trial court's ruling and any unrefuted evidence in the defendant's favor. Id.
Our analysis begins with the presumption that the defendant did not waive his rights. Little v. State, 694 N.E.2d 762, 765 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). To overcome this presumption, the State bears the burden of proving that the defendant was effectively advised of his Miranda rights in the first instance, and then that he voluntarily and intelligently waived those rights. Id. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial court must determine whether the defendant's statements were obtained through violence, threats, promises or other improper influences. Hurt v. State, 694 N.E.2d 1212, 1217-18 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1008, 119 S.Ct. 525, 142 L.Ed.2d 435 (1998). Although a signed waiver is evidence of a voluntary waiver, the State, when challenged, may be required to produce additional evidence to show the voluntariness of the waiver. Id. If the record contains substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's ruling, we will affirm it. Davies v. State, 730 N.E.2d 726, 736 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied, cert. denied, 532 U.S. 945, 121 S.Ct. 1410, 149 L.Ed.2d 352 (2001).
Martin filed a pre-trial motion to suppress his May 20, 2001, statement to police. The trial court did not rule on the motion prior to trial because there was apparently some chance that the State would not seek to introduce the statement. When it became clear during the course of the trial that the State did intend to introduce the statement, Martin again raised the suppression issue. The jury was dismissed and the trial court held a hearing on the motion, following which the motion was denied. The statement was admitted into evidence.
The facts surrounding Martin's statement are that at the time of Sanders' murder, Martin was represented by counsel on an unrelated matter. At some point, counsel, who was out of the country, was advised via e-mail that Martin was being sought in connection with Sanders' murder. Martin's counsel was in contact with both the Jeffersonville police and Martin. When the information was filed and the arrest warrant issued, counsel contacted Martin and told him not to talk to the police until they were able to consult with one another. Martin turned himself in to the Louisville police who in turn contacted the Jeffersonville police. Martin waived extradition and the Jeffersonville police came to Louisville to pick him up. Before leaving Louisville, the Jeffersonville officers questioned Martin. Detective Scott Oliver, who was present when Martin made the statement, testified that he had heard through another detective that counsel had been in contact with that detective about Martin's case. However, Detective Oliver was not aware of the content of the discussion between counsel and the other detective, and did not remember Martin saying anything about talking to his lawyer before giving his statement. Detective Oliver further testified that he read the advice of rights form to Martin: "I sat there and showed it to him and we went over it and ... we just explain that this was a waiver that he understood his rights and ... he signed at that time." Tr. at 499. From the point at which Martin signed the advice of rights and waiver form, the statement was both video and audio-recorded.
Martin claims that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress and admitting his statement into evidence for several reasons: first, that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel; second, that the record does not adequately show that he was advised of his rights; and third, that there was not a sufficient showing that his statement was voluntary. We will address each contention in turn.
Martin is correct that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches with the formal initiation of adversary judicial proceedings. Owens v. State, 732 N.E.2d 161, 164 n. 2 (Ind.2000). In this state, adversary judicial proceedings are begun with the filing of an information or indictment. Badelle v. State, 754 N.E.2d 510, 538 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied (quoting Callis v. State, 684 N.E.2d 233, 238 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied). Both parties agree that an information had been filed and adversary proceedings had begun when Martin gave his statement to the police. However, our supreme court has held that "[r]epresentation by an attorney does not mean that law enforcement officials cannot procure a statement from a defendant without notice to the attorney." Kern v. State, 426 N.E.2d 385, 387 (Ind. 1981). Rather, that is one of the factors that should be considered when determining whether the State has met its burden of proving that the statement was voluntary. Id. Thus, the police failure to advise Martin's counsel that they would be interrogating Martin does not per se render his statement involuntary, but will be considered as a factor in our discussion below of the voluntariness of his statement.1
Martin next claims that the State failed to prove that he was adequately advised of his rights prior to signing the waiver. When an accused is subjected to custodial interrogation, the State may not use statements stemming from that interrogation unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the accused's privilege against self-incrimination. Davies, 730 N.E.2d at 733 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)). The Miranda warnings apply only to custodial interrogation because they are meant to overcome the inherently coercive and police dominated atmosphere of custodial interrogation. Id. Miranda requires that the accused be informed of the right to the presence and advice of counsel during custodial interrogation by the police and of the right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him. See Wright v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1223, 1229 (Ind.Ct.App.2002)
.
There is no question that Martin was "in custody" when he gave his statement. Charges had already been filed and an arrest warrant had been issued. The advice of rights and waiver form which was introduced into evidence in this case states as follows:
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