Martin v. Townsend
| Decision Date | 17 October 1893 |
| Citation | 32 Fla. 318,13 So. 887 |
| Parties | MARTIN v. TOWNSEND. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Appeal from circuit court, Hillsborough county.
Action in ejectment by James P. Martin, administrator of the estate of Britania Wanton, deceased, against L. D. Townsend. From judgment for defendant entered on a nonsuit, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
Syllabus by the Court
1. By chapter 678 of the Acts of the Legislative Council approved February 17, 1833, and by chapter 11, Laws approved July 26 1845, boards of county commissioners, while acting in their official capacity as a board, were fully authorized and empowered to sell and convey the lands of their county, not required for public uses, in such manner as they deemed best.
2. In conveying the public lands of their county, the execution of a deed thereto by county commissioners was an official act that such boards were expressly authorized by law to perform and, in the performance of it, the judge of probate, while under the law, he was, ex officio, a member and president of such board, properly acted under his own official title of 'judge of probate;' the law, from the official act and the participation with him therein of other members of the board of county commissioners, acting as such under their official titles, supplying the fact that such judge was acting therein in his capacity as an ex officio member of such board.
3. Under the statutes in force in 1852, the judge of probate, who was then, ex officio, a member and president of the board of county commissioners, with any two of the other members of such board, or, in the absence of the judge of probate, any three members of such board, constituted a quorum, with full power to transact any official business, or to perform any official duties. Held, that the execution of a deed of conveyance to a parcel of county land that such board had authority to sell and convey was such an official act as could be validly and effectually performed by such quorum of said board, and that it was not necessary to the validity of such a deed that it should be executed by all, or any greater number than a legal quorum of such board.
4. Boards of county commissioners are quasi corporations, and their official duties and powers partake more of the characteristics of corporate acts and powers than those of mere trustees.
5. In executing a deed to county lands, boards of county commissioners do not act for themselves, as individuals, but act officially, for and on behalf of their county; and in such case it is not necessary that, to the name of each of them signing such deed, an individual seal should be set. All that was necessary, in so far as the requisite of a seal was concerned, in order to make it a valid and effectual deed from the county, was to attach thereto some seal adopted by such board as the seal of their county. Held, further, that the affixing of the official seal of the probate court of the county to such a deed, with the following attestation clause: 'In witness whereof, the said Simon Turman, judge of probate, William Hancock, Joseph Howell, Andrew H. Henderson, and Ezekiel Glazier, county commissioners, in their capacity as a board, have hereunto set their hands and seal of our probate court the day and year,' etc.,--was such an adoption by the board of the seal named and used as made the deed upon which it was used the validly sealed instrument of the county.
Barron Phillips and Thos. E. Wilson, for appellant.
G. A. Hanson, for appellee.
The appellant sued the appellee in the circuit court of Hillsborough county in ejectment, for the recovery of that lot of land in the town of Tampa described as 'Lot 3 of Block 63,' according to the general map of said town made by John Jackson, surveyor, in the year 1853. At the trial, in consequence of the rulings of the court, excluding the deed upon which the title of the plaintiff's intestate rested, the plaintiff took a nonsuit, and appeals from the judgment entered thereon.
The sole question presented for our consideration is the ruling of the court below, excluding the following deed from admission in evidence on behalf of the plaintiff:
County Commissioners.
'Benjamin Hogler.
'E. Glazier,
'Martin Cunningham.'
'Martin Cunningham,
'Clerk Ct. Ct., H. C., Fla.
'[Seal.]
'[Indorsed] Recorded in Book B, p. 66-67, September 10th, 1852. M. Cunningham, Clerk Ct. Ct., H. County, Fla.'
The objections urged against the admission of this deed at the trial below, that were sustained by the court, are as follows:
'(1) Because it purports to be a deed from the county commissioners of Hillsborough county, when, in truth and in fact, it is only signed by Simon Turman, judge of probate, W. A. Hancock, A. H. Henderson, and E. Glazier, county commissioners of Hillsborough county; the board at that time consisting of five members, and only three of them signing as county commissioners.
'(2) Because the seal of the board of county commissioners is not affixed to said deed.
'(3) Because there is no seal affixed to said deed at or near the signatures of the parties who signed the same.
'(4) For that said deed relates that the seal of the probate court has been affixed thereto, there being nothing in said deed to show that said seal had been adopted as the seal of the board of county commissioners, and no law of the state of Florida designating that as the seal of said board.
'(5) For that said board of county commissioners were trustees of said property for the county of Hillsborough, and that it required the signatures of the entire board to make a valid deed.'
In excluding the deed, the court below sustained all of these objections.
By the Acts of the Legislative Council of the Territory of Florida, (chapter 678,) approved February 17, 1833, a county court was established in each county, which was made a court of record, and was presided over by one judge, appointed by the governor and legislative council, whose general jurisdiction extended over civil causes involving amounts between $50 and $1,000, and over criminal causes below the grade of capital offenses; and he was clothed with general probate powers in the matter of the granting of letters testamentary and of administration, appointment of guardians for infants and lunatics, and in ordering the sale of, and distribution of, the estates of decedents.
By the fifth section of this act the county courts were required to hold two terms in each year, and it was thereby made the duty of each...
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