Martinez-Olson v. Olson
| Decision Date | 01 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 3D20-1301,3D20-1301 |
| Citation | 328 So.3d 14 |
| Parties | Lynn MARTINEZ-OLSON, Appellant, v. The ESTATE OF Dan OLSON, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Sandy T. Fox, P.A., and Sandy T. Fox, for appellant.
Richard A. Schurr, P.A., and Richard A. Schurr and Bonnie M. Sack, for appellee.
Before LOGUE, GORDO, and LOBREE, JJ.
In this post-dissolution of marriage action, the Estate of Dan Olson sought to enforce a marital settlement agreement to recover proceeds from Dan's retirement savings 401(k) plan that were distributed to Dan's former wife, Lynn Martinez-Olson, as the named beneficiary under the plan. Because Lynn waived any entitlement to her former husband's 401(k) plan proceeds under the marital settlement agreement, the Estate is entitled to bring this post-distribution action against Lynn to enforce the contractual waiver and to recover those proceeds.
Dan Olson and Lynn Martinez married in 1998. Dan worked as a producer for WSVN 7 News owned by Sunbeam Television Corporation. Dan participated in Sunbeam's retirement savings 401(k) plan which is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. Dan executed a beneficiary designation form, naming his wife, Lynn, as the first beneficiary and his "living children"1 as the second beneficiaries under the 401(k) plan.
In 2017, Dan and Lynn divorced. A final judgment of dissolution of marriage was entered ratifying a marital settlement agreement ("Agreement") drafted by Lynn's counsel and signed by the former couple. The Agreement provides, in relevant part:
Dan died two years after the couple finalized their divorce. Prior to his death, Dan did not change the beneficiary on his 401(k) plan. Dan's daughter from a prior marriage, Chelsea Olson, was appointed as personal representative of his estate. Chelsea and Lynn made competing claims to the proceeds from Dan's 401(k) plan. Sunbeam ultimately distributed the proceeds to Lynn as the named beneficiary in the plan documents pursuant to ERISA.2
Chelsea Olson, as personal representative of her late father's estate, filed a verified motion to enforce the Agreement in the family law division of the Miami-Dade County Circuit Court. In the motion, Chelsea asserted that while Sunbeam was required to distribute the 401(k) plan proceeds to Lynn pursuant to ERISA and the plan documents, Lynn had clearly and unambiguously waived any and all right, title, and interest she had in the proceeds. Chelsea further argued that ERISA does not preclude the Estate from bringing a post-distribution action to enforce the contractual waiver and to recover the plan proceeds. Thus, Chelsea sought a court order requiring Lynn to turn over the proceeds to Dan's Estate, or to his four living adult children. The trial court referred the matter to a general magistrate.
In response to the motion, Lynn asserted that as the first named beneficiary she was entitled to Dan's 401(k) plan proceeds and that she had never waived entitlement to the proceeds under the Agreement. Specifically, Lynn argued that because the Agreement did not specify who is to receive the so-called "death benefits" under the 401(k) plan, the Agreement was insufficient to override the beneficiary designation form, which remained unchanged by Dan after the couple divorced.
Following a hearing, the general magistrate entered its report and recommendation finding that paragraph 9.1 of the Agreement is not a waiver of beneficiary rights because there is no specific reference to "death benefits" or "death beneficiary designations" to override the 401(k) plan document naming Lynn as the first beneficiary. The general magistrate relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Barker, 64 So. 3d 1246 (Fla. 2011), in which Justice Pariente, writing for the majority, stated, in dictum, the following general proposition:
Absent the marital settlement agreement providing who is or is not to receive the death benefits or specifying the beneficiary, courts should look no further than the named beneficiary on the policy, plan, or account. General language such as language stating who is to receive ownership is not specific enough to override the plain language of the beneficiary designation. Magic words are not required; however, if the parties wish to specify in a marital settlement agreement that a spouse will not receive the death benefits or wish to specify a particular beneficiary, this should be done clearly and unambiguously.
The general magistrate also relied upon Smith v. Smith, 919 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005), where the Fifth District similarly stated:
Id. at 528. The general magistrate also found that Florida's revocation-on-divorce statute enacted after Crawford, section 732.703(2), Florida Statutes (2017),3 is inapplicable to the extent that federal law, in this case ERISA, provides otherwise. Based on these conclusions of law, the general magistrate recommended that the trial court deny the Estate's motion to enforce the Agreement against Lynn.
The Estate filed exceptions to the magistrate's finding that since the Agreement does not expressly state that Lynn waived entitlement to the "death benefits" from Dan's 401(k) plan, Lynn is entitled to those benefits as the named beneficiary. The Estate asserted that if the Agreement was silent as to who was entitled to receive the "death benefits" of the 401(k) plan, then Florida's revocation-on-divorce statute would provide the legal mechanism to automatically revoke Lynn's beneficiary designation and provide a transfer of these benefits as if Lynn had predeceased Dan.
The trial court further concluded, relying upon recent cases from several state and federal jurisdictions, that Dan's estate is not precluded from seeking enforcement of the Agreement "simply because Dan forgot to fill out a form." Accordingly, the trial court ordered Lynn to turn over all proceeds received from Dan's 401(k) plan to the Estate's counsel within ten days of its order. Lynn appealed this order.
"We review a trial court's decision to accept or reject a general magistrate's report and recommendations for an abuse of discretion." Lascaibar v. Lascaibar, 156 So. 3d 547, 549 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015). The trial court "is free to reach a conclusion of law, contrary to that of a master, which he [or she] considers in the exercise of his [or her] judicial discretion produces a more equitable solution to the issues posed for decision." Mounce v. Mounce, 459 So. 2d 437, 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (citation omitted).
Crawford, 64 So. 3d at 1255–56 ().
Lynn asserts that the Agreement failed to specify who was to receive the "death benefits" under Dan's 401(k) plan and as such any waiver under the Agreement constitutes a general release, which is insufficient to override the beneficiary designation form. The Estate responds that both Dan and Lynn unambiguously waived any claim or interest, including the right to receive proceeds, from the other's 401(k) plan. We must look to the plain language of the Agreement to determine whether Lynn waived entitlement to Dan's 401(k) plan proceeds.
The Agreement provides the following specific waiver:
9.1 Each party shall receive any and all benefits existing by reason of his or her past, present, or future employment ... including...
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