Martinez v. Canopy
| Decision Date | 03 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No.: 20-153 (RC) |
| Parties | LUIS MARTINEZ, Plaintiff, v. CONSTELLIS/TRIPLE CANOPY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
In this hostile work environment suit, Plaintiff Luis Martinez alleges that his employer, Defendant Constellis/Triple Canopy ("Constellis"), violated the D.C. Human Rights Act ("DCHRA"), D.C. Code § 2-1402.11. Specifically, Mr. Martinez alleges that Constellis employees and supervisors subjected him to repeated questioning about his beard and to a urinalysis test under false pretenses. Defendant now moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss Plaintiff's hostile work environment claims. For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant Defendant's motion to dismiss.
Mr. Martinez is an armed security guard employed by Constellis at the Ronald Reagan International Trade Center in Washington, D.C. Compl. ¶¶ 3-4, ECF No. 1-1. He has worked atthis position since January 1, 2018. Compl. ¶ 3. Mr. Martinez has an overgrown surgical scar known as a keloid that he covers with a beard and suffers from chronic folliculitis of the face and a neck, a condition that is aggravated by shaving. Compl. ¶¶ 6-7.2 Because of these conditions, a pre-employment physician gave Mr. Martinez an "Indefinite Term Waiver" in 2014, which exempted him from shaving requirements. Compl. ¶ 8. However, even under the medical waiver, Mr. Martinez was required to ensure that his "beard hairs are trimmed and do not protrude more than one-fourth of an inch from the face." Compl. ¶ 9.
Since the start of Mr. Martinez's employment in 2018, he alleges that he has been subject to repeated questioning about his beard by Mr. Williams, Constellis's Contractor Manager for Mr. Martinez's contract. Compl. ¶ 11. On one day in January 2019, Mr. Beasley, a Quality Control Inspector for Constellis, asked Mr. Martinez questions about his uniform and beard, telling Mr. Martinez that his beard was "stylized" in violation of company policy. Compl. ¶ 10;Pl.'s Surreply at 2. The following day, another Quality Control inspector for Constellis, standing with Mr. Williams and Mr. Beasley, again questioned Mr. Martinez about his beard. Compl. ¶ 11.
On October 9, 2019, Mr. Williams and representatives of the General Services Administration (Constellis's contracting agency for Mr. Martinez's contract), Major Joyce Brunson and Major Gerald Rouse, called Mr. Martinez into the plaza behind the Ronald Reagan building—allegedly "to take a survey." Pl.'s Surreply at 2. As part of this exercise, Mr. Williams and the agency representatives asked for Mr. Martinez's security belt. Pl.'s Resp. at 2. Major Brunson then took Mr. Martinez in his personal vehicle to a lab facility for a urinalysis. Compl. ¶¶ 12-14. On the same day, as part of what it claimed was an ongoing criminal investigation by the U.S. Federal Protective Service, Constellis also drug tested another armed security guard with a beard, Mr. White. Compl. ¶ 13. Mr. Martinez alleges that the manner in which he was tested was a violation of his Collective Bargaining Agreement. Pl.'s Surreply at 3. Mr. Martinez was also embarrassed because he was targeted for urinalysis and forced to give up his utility belt in a public area. Compl. ¶¶ 12-14. As a result of the October 9, 2019 incident, some of his coworkers assumed he was being fired, and Mr. Martinez has endured jokes by fellow employees. Pl.'s Surreply at 3. For example, colleagues, seemingly in jest, suggested "that a bag was put over [Mr. Martinez's] head and [he was] forced into the trunk of a car and taken somewhere." Id. Mr. Martinez has also alleged that he suffered loss of appetite and heightened depression and anxiety as a result of these events. Id. at 7.
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that he "was subjected to a hostile work environment" as a result of these incidents "on the basis of his appearance (Beard) and disability (keloid and chronic folliculitis)." Compl. ¶ 14. Although Plaintiff did not cite any particular statute in hiscomplaint, the Court will construe Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim as arising under the DCHRA because, unlike Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, the DCHRA prohibits discrimination on the basis of appearance. Furthermore, in its motion to dismiss, Defendant assumes that Plaintiff's claim fell under the DCHRA, Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 3-4, ECF No. 6, and Plaintiff later clarified that his claim was made pursuant to the DCHRA, Pl.'s Surreply at 4. Regardless of the specific statutory provisions involved, the legal analysis would be similar. See Clemmons v. Academy for Educational Development, 70 F. Supp. 3d 282, 294 (D.D.C. 2014) () (quoting Ali v. District of Columbia, 697 F. Supp. 2d 88, 92 n.6 (D.D.C. 2010)); Ramey v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 468 F. Supp. 2d 51, 60 (D.D.C. 2006) ().
To pursue a claim in federal court, a plaintiff must provide a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) does not test a plaintiff's ultimate likelihood of success on the merits; rather, it tests whether a plaintiff has properly stated a claim. See Greggs v. Autism Speaks, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 2014). A court considering such a motion presumes that the complaint's factual allegations are true and construes them liberally in the plaintiff's favor. See Campbell v. District of Columbia, 972 F. Supp. 2d 38, 44 (D.D.C. 2013). A court, however, need not accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions as true, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), nor must a court presume the veracity of legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations, see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
Additionally, when a pro se plaintiff is involved, "the Court must take particular care to construe the plaintiff's filings liberally, for such [filings] are held 'to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Cheeks v. Fort Myer Constr. Co., 722 F. Supp. 2d 93, 107 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)).3 Yet "even a pro se complainant must plead 'factual matter' that permits the court to infer 'more than the mere possibility of misconduct.'" Atherton v. D.C. Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Dismissal always remains appropriate "where the plaintiff's complaint provides no factual or legal basis for the requested relief." Strunk v. Obama, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2011) (internal citations omitted).
To summarize, Mr. Martinez alleges that since January 1, 2018 he has experienced a hostile work environment in the following ways: Constellis Contract Manager, Mr. Williams, repeatedly questioned Mr. Martinez about the length and trim of his beard; Constellis Quality Control Inspector, Mr. Beasley, questioned Mr. Martinez about his beard and uniform, accusing Mr. Martinez of having a "stylized" beard; the next day, another Constellis Quality Control Inspector questioned Mr. Martinez about his beard; and Mr. Martinez's supervisor Major Brunson, Mr. Martinez's superior Major Rouse, and Mr. Williams subjected Mr. Martinez to arandom urinalysis test under false pretenses and escorted him to the lab in Major Rouse's personal vehicle. See Pl.'s Resp. at 2; Pl.'s Surreply at 1-2. The question is whether these episodes are sufficient to make out a legally sufficient hostile work environment claim.
"The law is clear that to establish a claim of discrimination based on a hostile work environment under the DCHRA, a plaintiff must show: '(1) that he is a member of a protected class, (2) that he has been subjected to unwelcome harassment, (3) that the harassment was based on membership in a protected class, and (4) that the harassment is severe and pervasive4 enough to affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment.'" Campbell-Crane & Assocs., Inc. v. Stamenkovic, 44 A.3d 924, 933 (D.C. 2012) (quoting Daka, Inc. v. Breiner, 711 A.2d 86, 92 (D.C. 1998)). At the motion to dismiss stage, "[a]lthough a plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of hostile work environment in the complaint, the 'alleged facts must support such a claim.'" McKeithan v. Boarman, 803 F. Supp. 2d 63, 69 (D.D.C. 2011), aff'd in part, No. 11-5247, 2012 WL 1450565 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 12, 2012), and aff'd sub nom. McKeithan v. Vance-Cooks, 498 F. App'x 47 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Middlebrooks v. Godwin Corp., 722 F. Supp. 2d 82, 90-91 & n.6 (D.D.C. 2010)).
For the purposes of its motion to dismiss, Defendant assumes that Plaintiff is a member of protected classes based on appearance (having a beard) and disability (folliculitis). Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 5. However, Defendant argues that Mr. Martinez has not sufficiently alleged facts supporting two elements of a hostile work environment claim: (1) that any of the alleged harassment was based on his membership in a protected class or (2) that the alleged harassment was severe or pervasive enough to affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment. Id. at 5-6. The Court will discuss each contention in turn.
To make out an actionable hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff must plead facts indicating that the alleged "harassment occurred because of . . . [his] protected status." Peters v. District of Columbia,...
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